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Abstract
Transnational contracts are almost inevitable in the world today. It follows that a
system of law must govern the resolution of disputes that arise from the contracts.
The freedom of parties to choose a law that regulates transnational contracts is
recognized by most countries as party autonomy. However, the extent of this
autonomy has been controversial. This thesis unravels the controversy surrounding
the doctrine of party autonomy and, more importantly, provides another perspective
to the argument – that the application and scope of party autonomy in countries is
determined by historical, colonial, economic, and religious factors. It uses this as a
background to examine the new Hague Conference’s Principles on Choice of Law
in International Contracts, with the argument that the Hague Conference may have
neglected these factors in some of the Principles’ provisions. It proposes that these
factors must be considered to persuade countries, especially developing ones, to
adopt it.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1.

General Introduction

Due to transactions or private relationships across borders or territories, national
courts are usually faced with disputes that involve making a decision based on the
law of another country. Therefore, apart from national laws that deal with crime,
tort and commerce, countries have developed a system of law that decides disputes
which involve a foreign law. This is called private international law or conflict of
laws.1 Private international law is a branch of law that deals with cases involving a
foreign element.2 Foreign element means that an event or transaction before the
court has close connections with a foreign system of law which necessitates the
court’s recourse to that system of law.3 A foreign system of law is “a distinctive
legal system prevailing in a territory other than that in which the court functions.4”
Private international law is not a distinct branch of law, like contract or tort,
but an all-pervading branch of law. It has been noted that
It [private international law] starts up unexpectedly in any
court and in the midst of any process. It may be sprung like
a case in a plain common law action, in an administrative
proceeding in equity, or like a mine in a divorce case, or a
bankruptcy case… The most trivial action of debt, the most
complex case of equitable claims, may be suddenly
interrupted by the appearance of a knot to be untied only
by Private International Law.5
Owing to its all-pervading nature, one of the aims of conflict of laws is to
achieve uniform judicial decisions in legal disputes, regardless of the jurisdiction
1

See Lawrence Collins et al, eds, Dicey & Morris on The Conflict of Laws, 13th ed (London, UK: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2000) at 4.
2
E Cheatham, “Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws” (1941) 89:4 U Pa L Rev 430 at 430-431. This is
different from public international law because, while public international law seeks to regulate the
relations between different sovereign states, private international law seeks to regulate individuals’ actions
across sovereign states. Also, while the rules of public international law are the same everywhere, the rules
of private international law are different from country to country. See also Collins, ibid.
3
JJ Fawcett & JM Carruthers, eds, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law, 14th ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 5.
4
Ibid at 9.
5
Frederic Harrison, On Jurisprudence and the Conflicts of Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919) at 101102.

1

where litigation takes place.6 This is to promote transnational trade between persons
from different jurisdictions or legal systems. Thus, if disputes are resolved by
common criteria in different legal systems of the world, parties are certain of the
consequences of their legal relations in international trade, and by these they are
encouraged to make international contracts.7
However, despite efforts by scholars, international instruments and
conferences, the goal of uniformity has been elusive over the years, especially on
the scope of party autonomy, which is the freedom of parties to choose their
contractual governing law.8 This thesis examines these efforts, especially the
introduction of the new soft law by the Hague Conference in 2015 – Principles on
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts.9 The thesis argues that
despite the introduction of this instrument, the scope of party autonomy may still
remain globally divergent because the Principles do not take into consideration
national interests, especially those of developing countries in Africa and Latin
America. It argues that the history/development of party autonomy, as well as
factors bordering on inequality of bargaining power and state regulation of
contracts in these regions (Africa and Latin America), may still account for the
divergence in the scope of party autonomy.10 It, therefore, suggests ways that the
Principles may be interpreted/ recalibrated/ revised to achieve uniformity and
certainty of the scope of party autonomy in most of the jurisdictions of the world.
This thesis deliberately uses the phrase “in most jurisdictions” because it
acknowledges that it may be an overstatement to talk of a “global” scope of party
autonomy.11 This is because the sovereignty of each country dictates its political,
economic and social approach to party autonomy in handling international contracts
disputes. However, we must not neglect to seek uniformity by accommodating the
6

Fowler V Harper, “Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Reading Professor Lorenzen’s
Essays” (1947) 56:7 Yale LJ 1155 at 1159.
7
Robert A Leflar, “Conflict of Laws: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations” (1966) 54:4 Cal L Rev
1584 at 1586.
8
See e.g Maria Mercedes Albornoz & Nuria Gonzalez-Martin, “Towards the Uniform Application of Party
Autonomy for Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts” (2016) 12:3 J Priv Intl L 437.
9
[Principles], online: <www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135>.
10
See generally for example, Maria Mercedez Albornoz, “Choice of Law in International Contracts in
Latin American Legal Systems” (2010) 6:1 J Priv Intl L 237.
11
B Zeller, “Uniformity of Laws: A Reality or just a Myth” (2008) 1:3 Intl J Priv L 231 at 235 (creating a
global law was compared to crossing the Sahara).
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core interests of countries in relevant provisions in applicable international
instruments.12 Indeed, Kamba agrees that “it is now readily conceded that
unification at the international level is only feasible and desirable in more limited
spheres of law such as: commercial law, maritime law, conflict of laws, and in new
areas such as space law, broadcasting law and atomic law.”13 To this extent,
reference to “uniformity” in this thesis relates to substantial uniformity and not
necessarily a globalized one.
1.2.

Scope of the Thesis/ Statement of Limitation

Generally, discussions on conflict of laws focus on three issues: choice of law,
choice of jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments.14 Considering the
broad scope of these issues, this thesis is limited to discussions on choice of law.
Furthermore, discussions of choice of law can be divided into: choice of law in
contractual relationships, and choice of law in non-contractual relationships.15 Also,
there are two types of contracts: contracts executed between parties within the same
jurisdiction – domestic contracts; and contracts executed where at least one party
resides or carries out business outside jurisdiction –international contracts.16
Relying on these classifications, this thesis is concerned with the choice of law in
contractual relationships, that is, international commercial contracts.
Discussion of choice of law is also limited in this thesis. Although there are
various choice of law rules, this thesis focuses on party autonomy or express
intention rule which allows parties to choose the governing law in international
contracts. Although this thesis examines some other choice of law rules, including
the law of the place of contracting (lex loci contractus), law of the place of

12

Ibid (“history and practical experience has shown that the only solution is to create a halfway house”).
Indeed, scholars have advocated for unification in choice of laws. See e.g. Symeon C Symeonides,
Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An International Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
13
Walter J Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23:3 ICLQ 485 at 502.
14
Jean Gabriel Castel, Canadian Conflicts of Laws, 4th ed (Toronto: Butterworth publishers, 1997) at 6.
15
An example of contractual relationship is choice of law cases arising from contracts, while an example of
non-contractual relationship is choice of law in cases arising from torts or succession.
16
See AJE Jaffey, “Essential Validity of Contracts in the English Conflict of Laws” (1974) 23:1 ICLQ 1 at
2; See also Georges Rene Delaume, “What is an International Contract? An American and a Gallic
Dilemma” (1979) 28:2 ICLQ 258. See also the Principles, supra note 9 at para 1.11.

3

performance (lex loci solutionis), law of the place that validates the contract (lex
validitatis), and the law of the place of domicile (lex domicilii), it only does so
“comparatively” with the party autonomy rule.17 While discussions on other choice
of law rules are by no means comprehensive, they are enough to show that their
application, sometimes, results in uncertainty and absurdity. Also, due to the time
and space constraint of this thesis, party autonomy only refers to cases where
parties have, either through a choice of law clause or an independent choice of law
agreement, expressly stated the governing law of their contract – express choice of
law; and not cases where courts infer or imply the choice of law from contracts
terms or the surrounding circumstances of the contract – implied choice of law.
Finally, although this thesis seeks to examine efforts via regional
instruments to unify the scope of party autonomy, the examination is by no means
exhaustive. It does not go into the details of the provisions of these instruments; it
only generally examines their weaknesses as a justification for the enactment of a
new soft law. It particularly argues that the limited contribution of these
instruments to universal recognition and application of the scope of party autonomy
necessitated the emergence of a new instrument to serve as a model law for
adoption, not only in national conflict of laws statutes, but in regional choice of law
instruments.
1.3.

Purpose and Rationale of the Study

It has been noted that transnational trade or commerce is inevitable in the world
today.18 Transnational commerce has, therefore, generated transnational disputes
which national courts must settle. Given the role of private international law in
helping national courts to resolve disputes that are connected to a foreign system of
law, there is a need to ensure that private international law encourages uniform
17

It is acknowledged that comparing party autonomy with other choice of law rules is similar to comparing
oranges and apples – both set of rules apply in different circumstances. While party autonomy rule applies
in contracts where parties have made a choice of law; other choice of law rules apply in contracts where
parties have not made such choice. It should be noted that, unlike scholars who treat party autonomy as an
expression of other choice of law rules, this thesis examines party autonomy exclusively from other choice
of law rules.
18
Saul Perloff, “The Ties that Bind: The Limits of Autonomy and Uniformity in International Commercial
Arbitration” (1992) 13:2 U Pa J Bus L 323 at 324.

4

transnational judicial decisions.19 As explained above, this ensures certainty of
contractual relations for international parties on choice of law.

Party autonomy,

arguably the most acceptable conflict of law rule, is a way of ensuring such
uniformity.20 This is because a “universal acceptance” of the scope of the principle
will promote transnational commerce because contractual parties will be sure of
their legal choices, especially on issues relating to the choice of the governing
law.21 This way, the reasonable expectations of parties are protected.22
Consequently, litigation costs arising from prolonged disputes over choice of law is
eliminated since parties know the scope of the governing law.23
This thesis, therefore, examines party autonomy and some provisions of the
soft law instrument that seeks to propose global uniform provisions for countries
and regional legislative bodies. It suggests better ways to achieve certainty and
uniformity through these provisions in order to boost transnational trade and
commerce.
1.4

Literature Review

Generally, there has been no agreement on choice of law issues, especially on the
application and scope of party autonomy. Kermit Roosevelt III remarked that
“choice of law is a mess. That much has become a truism. It is a dismal swamp, a
morass of confusion, a body of doctrine killed by a realism intended to save it, and

19

It has been noted that “the main justification for the Conflict of Laws is that it implements the reasonable
and legitimate expectations of the parties to a transaction or an occurrence.” See Collins, supra note 1 at 45.
20
Russell J Weintraub, “Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts” (1984)187 Rec des
Cours 239 at 271; Yntema says “the law selected by the parties, the solution which alone provides a
uniform result with respect to the scope of their power of election and correspondingly answers the needs
of inter- national commerce for assurance in legal right.” See Hessel E Yntema “Autonomy’ in Choice of
Law” (1952) 1:4 Am J Comp L 341 at 356; Francis A Gabor, “Emerging Unification of Conflict of Law
Rules applicable to the International Sales of Goods: UNCITRAL and the New Hague Conference on
Private International Law” (1986) 7:4 Nw J Intl L & Bus 697 at 701 (“party autonomy provides the best
safeguard for protecting the parties’ expectations and creating a universally recognized form of legal
certainty in transactions cutting across national boundaries”).
21
Yntema, supra note 20 at 356; Albornoz & Martin, supra note 8 at 438-439.
22
Leflar, supra note 7 at 1586.
23
Anna Erin O’Hara & E Larry Ribstein, “Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law” in Boudewijn Bouckaert
& Gerrit de Geest, eds, Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics vol 5 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000) at
643.

5

now universally said to be a disaster.”24 Rodriguez also notes that “as an
unfortunate legacy of developments that unfolded during the nineteenth century,
choice of law in international contracts has become chaotic, characterized by
conflicting solutions around the world.”25 Party autonomy, as a choice of law rule,
has not been excluded from this chaos; its application and scope have been wrapped
in one controversy or the other. For example, early writers like Beale argue that the
doctrine usurps state powers and should be neglected.26 Other writers like Mancini
argue that it is the best expression of the will of the parties.27 Cheshire takes a
middle position: he argues that, although parties can choose the governing law, the
validity of their contract is outside the scope of the party’s will.28
However, most modern writers now acknowledge the importance of party
autonomy. Nygh says, “[t]oday the freedom of the parties to an international
contract to choose the applicable law and its corollary, to choose the forum, judicial
or arbitral, for the settlement of their disputes arising out of such contract is almost
universally acknowledged.”29 Party autonomy has been described as “perhaps the
most widely accepted private international rule of our time,”30 “leading principles
of contemporary choice of law,”31 “a fundamental human right,”32 and “a
proverbial motherhood and apple pie.”33
24

Kermit Roosevelt III, “The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts” (1999) 97:8 Mich L Rev 2449
at 2449.
25
José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, “Beyond the Mexico Convention and the Hague Principles: What’s
Next for the Americas?” (2017) 22:2 Unif L Rev 435.
26
Joseph Henry Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, vol 2 (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1935)
at
1079-1080;
see
also
Antone
Pillet,
Principes
de
Droit
International
Privé(
Paris: Pedone Grenoble, Allier Frères, 1903) at 430; JP Niboyet, “La théorie de I'autonomie de la volonté”
(1927) 16 Rec des Cours 1.
27
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, “De l’utilité de render obligatioires pour tous les Etats, sous la forme d’un
ou de plusieurs traits internationaux, un certain nombre de régles generals du troit international privé pour
assurer la decision uniforme des conflits entre les differentes legislations civiles et criminelles” (1874) JDI
221 at 221-239, 285-304 cited in Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1999) at 8.
28
GC Cheshire, International Contracts: Being the Fifteenth Lecture on the David Murray Foundation in
the University of Glasgow (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Company, 1948) at 94.
29
Nygh, supra note 27 at 13.
30
Weintraub, supra note 20 at 271.
31
Thomas M De Boer, “Party Autonomy and Its Limitations in the Rome II Regulation” (2008) 9 YB Priv
Intl L 19 at 19.
32
Erik Jayme, “Identité culturelle et intégration: Le droit international privé postmoderne” (1995) 251 Rec
des Cours 147.
33
Symeon C Symeonides, “Party Autonomy in International Contracts and the Multiple Ways of Slicing
the Apple” (2014) 39:3 Brook J Intl L 1123 at 1124.
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Mathias Lehmann asks why party autonomy continues to gain recognition in
different jurisdictions.34 He observed that state-recognised legislation could not be
used to explain the growing influence of party autonomy. To him, party autonomy
must be viewed from the perspective of contracting parties, who are at the centre of
negotiation, and not the state. Giesela Rühl comparatively studied convergence of
the scope of party autonomy in the United States and Europe.35 He points out that,
if viewed from an economic perspective, there is convergence between the scope of
party autonomy in Europe and the United States of America. However,
Symeonides, who examined various limitations of party autonomy in different
jurisdictions, noted that varying factors affect the scope of party autonomy in most
jurisdictions and that wide divergence still exists.36 Felix Maultzsch also examined
the general scope of party autonomy in European international instruments. He
agrees with Symeonides that there is a varying scope.37 Helena Carlquist reviewed
some of the rules for determining the scope of party autonomy and argued that the
closest connection test is the best rule.38 However, she also agrees that there is no
universal rule for determining the scope of party autonomy.
Commentators have also examined various regional instruments that seek to
unify the scope of party autonomy. For example, Francisco Alférez examined
provisions of the Rome 1 Regulation39 and argued that its provisions are inadequate
because: it does not lay down a uniform and consistent regime of international
contracts; it does not solve the problems of interaction between the Rome I
Regulation and the unilateral conflict rules contained in some Directives on
consumer contracts; and it does not determine the law applicable to the property
34

Matthias Lehmann, “Liberating the Individual from Battles between States: Justifying Party Autonomy in
Conflict of Laws” (2008) 41:2 Vand J Transnat’l L 381.
35
Giesela Rühl, “Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence
and Economic Efficiency” (2007) 3:1 CLPE Research Paper 4/2007 1.
36
Symeonides, supra note 33; see also Symeonides, supra note 12.
37
Felix Maultzsch, “Party Autonomy in European Private International Law: Uniform Principle or ContextDependent Instrument?” (2016) 12:3 J Priv Intl L 466. (He argues that there is no convergence in the
doctrine yet because of the peculiarities of the different fields which private international law applies to).
38
Helen Carlquist, Party autonomy and the Choice of Substantive Law in International Commercial
Arbitration (LLM Thesis, School of Business, Economics and Law Göteborg University, 2006)
[unpublished].
39
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 17 June 2008 on the
Law
Applicable
to
Contractual
Obligations,
online:
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008R0593>.
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effects of the assignments of credits.40 Friedrich K. Juenger also compared the
provisions of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International

Contracts

1994

(Mexico

Convention)

with

other

regional

instruments.41 He highlighted the improvements in the Convention against the
backdrop of the existing instrument (Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, with Protocol, and Joint Declaration – Rome
Convention).42 Despite these improvements, Maria Mercedes Albornoz pointed out
that the Mexico Convention is “a categorical failure of an international treaty”
because of the low signatures that it commands.43 The Hague Conference’s
introduction of the Principles to provide uniform provisions on the scope of party
autonomy has been welcomed by scholars.44 However, this instrument, especially
the provision for the application of non-state law, has generated controversies
among scholars. For example, Ralf Michaels45 and Andrew Dickinson46 argue that
the provision of non-state law is problematic and unnecessary in the Principles, but

40

Francisco J & Garcimartín Alférez, “The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado About Nothing?” (2008) 2 Eur
Leg F 61 at 79; see also Davor Babic, “Rome 1 Regulation: Binding Authority for Arbitral Tribunals in the
European Union?” (2017) 13:1 J Priv Intl L 71 (He argues that Rome 1 Regulation is not suitable for
regulation of arbitral proceedings).
41
Friedrich K Juenger, “The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts:
Some Highlights and Comparisons” (1994) 42:2 Am J Comp L 381.
42
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, with Protocol, and Joint Declaration –
Rome Convention, 19 June 1980, 19 ILM 14.
43
Albornoz, supra note 10 at 26.
44
See e.g. Symeon C Symeonides, “The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts:
Some Preliminary Comments” (2013) 61:3 Am J Comp L 29 (he hopes for positive outcomes); see also
Andrew Dickinson, “A Principled Approach to Choice of Law in Contracts” (2013) Butterworths J Intl Ban
& Fin L 159; Thomas Kadner Graziano, “Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law Clause in Battle
of Forms Situations: The Hague Solution” (2013) 14 YB Priv Intl L 71; Brooke Adele Marshall,
“Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract” (2012) 13:1 Melb J Intl L 1; Moreno Rodriguez & M
Albornoz , “Reflections on the Mexico Convention in the Context of the Preparation of the Future Hague
Instrument on International Contract” (2011) 7:3 J Priv Intl L 491; Brooke Adele Marshall, “The Hague
Choice of Law Principles, CISG and PICC: A Hard Look at a Choice of Soft Law,” Max Planck Private
Law Research Paper no 16/27, (2018) Am J Comp L 1(forthcoming); Júrgen Basedow, “The Hague
Principles on Choice of Law: Their Addressees and Impact” (2017) 22:2 Unif L Rev 304; Peter Makowski,
“Article 3 of the Hague Principles: The Final Breakthrough for the Choice of Non-State Law?” (2017) 22:2
Unif L Rev 369.
45
Ralf Michaels, “Non-State Law in the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial
Contracts” in Kai Purnhagen & Peter Rott, eds, Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation:
Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz (Gewerbestrasse, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2014)
at 46.
46
Dickinson, supra note 44.
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Geneviéve Saumier argues that the provision permits parties to freely choose their
governing law without restricting them to a state law.47
This thesis contextualizes these scholars’ views to unravel the controversy
surrounding the doctrine of party autonomy and, more importantly, to provide
another perspective to the argument – that the application of party autonomy and its
scope is determined by historical, colonial, economic, and religious factors. It uses
this as a background to examine the new Hague Conference’s Principles and to
argue that the Hague Conference may have neglected these factors in some of the
Principles’ provisions. To this end, it examines the likely reactions of states,
particularly developing ones, to some of the Principles’ provisions, and proposes
better ways to persuade countries to adopt the Principles.
1.5. Research Questions
This thesis asks why there is an existing differing scope of party autonomy and why
the recent Hague Conference’s legislative effort (Principles) may not signify a new
dawn in the global application of the scope of party autonomy. Indeed, Yntema
accepts that the scope of party autonomy “deserve[s] further and intensive
comparative investigation.”48 This thesis answers this call, and recommends better
ways to unify the scope of party autonomy, especially within the new instrument on
the subject. To answer these research questions in light of its aim, this thesis
employs some relevant research methodologies.
1.6. Research Methodologies
1.6.1. Historical Method

47

Genevieve Saumier, “The Hague Principles and the Choice of Non-State ‘Rules of Law’ to Govern an
International Commercial Contract” (2014) 40:1 Brook J Intl L 1.
48
Yntema, supra note 20 at 345; see also Symeonides, supra note 33 at 1143 (he urges a comparative
investigation in a more detailed manner).
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It has been noted that “what [historians] do … is a commitment to conscious and
careful scrutiny of the past.”49 In order to understand the basis of the doctrine of
party autonomy as contained in national statutes, cases, and international
instruments, it is necessary to examine the history of party autonomy. This is in line
with Danzig’s opinion that doctrines must be understood in the light of their
historical developments.50 It is also pertinent to examine the history of party
autonomy in this thesis because “a page of history may illuminate more than a book
of logic.”51 Thus, the legal history of party autonomy is important because it tells us
not just the source of party autonomy, but its development in various countries over
the years. It also allows us to reflect on the treatment of party autonomy in the past
and to see whether we could treat it differently presently,52 especially as it relates to
the scope of party autonomy proposed in the Principles.53 This thesis relies more on
“external” legal history than on “internal” legal history. Gordon succinctly
described these concepts as follows:
The internal legal historian stays as much as possible
within the box of distinctive-appearing legal things; his
sources are legal, and so are the basic matters he wants to
describe or explain, such as changes in pleading rules, in
the jurisdiction of a court, the texts assigned to beginning
law students, or the doctrine of contributory negligence.
The external historian writes about the interaction between
the boxful of legal things and the wider society of which
they are a part, in particular to explore the social context of
law and its social effects, and he is usually looking for
conclusions about those effects.54
The external history of party autonomy shows the social and economic
effects on the growth of the doctrine. As Gordon remarked, this thesis draws
inferences from this history to argue that the social and economic influences on the
49

Catherine L Fisk & Robert W Gordon, “Law as…’: Theory and Method in Legal History” (2011) 1:3 U
C Irvine L Rev 519 at 526.
50
R Danzig, “Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialisation of the Law” (1975) 4:2 J Leg Stud 249
at 250.
51
Justice Brian Dickson in R v Wetmore, [1983] 2 SCR 284.
52
Friedrich K Juenger, “A Page of History” (1984) 35:2 Mercer L Rev 419.
53
Jim Phillips, “Why Legal History Matters” (2010) 41:3 VUWLR 293 at 295.
54
Robert W Gordon, “Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography” (1975) 10:1 Law & Soc’y Rev 9 at 11.
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doctrine in different countries accounts for the varied scope of party autonomy in
international contracts.
However, the historical method utilized in this thesis is different from an indepth historical account that only “historians” may lay claim to. My foray into the
historical method utilizes an approach which Brown called “progressive
evolutionary functionalism.”55 The basic idea of this approach is that law develops
with society. To this extent, this thesis seeks to show that before the 19th century,
party autonomy was not recognized or established in most countries but because of
the increase in transnational contracts, especially from the 19th century onwards,
there was need for countries (society) to accept or recognize party autonomy. This
is because the doctrine ensures certainty in transnational transactions, especially as
it relates to choice of law.56 In order words, the need for smooth economic
interactions accounted for the development of the doctrine.57 However, due to
social and economic factors, not all countries recognized party autonomy during
this period.58
Also, this thesis shows, through this approach, that despite wide acceptance
of the doctrine, countries developed various methods for limiting its scope because,
as the doctrine grew, they realized that parties may “manipulate” the doctrine to
evade the mandatory laws of a state or to gain economic advantage over one
another. This historical account shows that the growth of the doctrine was limited
differently by countries. Under this account, national statutes and case law from
some countries are examined to show the development of various limitations.59
Different countries’ criteria on the scope of the doctrine create uncertainty in choice
of law in international contracts. In response to this uncertainty, regional legislative
bodies proposed some provisions through Conventions that seek common criteria
55

R Blake Brown, “A taxonomy of Methodological Approaches in Recent Canadian Legal History” (2004)
34:1 Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 146 at 147. He relied on Fisher’s description
of the term. See William W Fisher III, “Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of
the Methodologies of Intellectual History” (1997) 49:5 Stan L Rev 1065.
56
Juenger, supra note 52 at 423.
57
I am aware that I rely on external legal history in this approach. Indeed, Brown says “Scholars keen to
avoid the dangers of internal legal history often turn towards functional explanations.” See Brown, supra
note 73 at 147.
58
Juenger, supra note 52 at 423.
59
For example, close connection tests and public policy tests. This historical account takes the form of an
“internal” legal history.
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for determining the scope of the doctrine. It is the aim of these Conventions in
ensuring uniformity of the scope of party autonomy against which this thesis
assesses the new instrument on the subject – the Principles.
From the standpoint of this historical account of the doctrine, this thesis
shows that the doctrine developed from a need for economic efficiency and, since
then, it has grown with society in different jurisdictions. Generally, the aim of using
the historical method is to speak to such matters as: (1) that the historical
development of the principle, which differs from country to country, accounts for
the divergence in its scope; (2) that the Hague Conference’s reaction through its
uniformity-inducing formulations or suggestions via the Principles may not be
enough

to

secure

the

much-desired

uniformity.

This

is

because

the

history/development of the party autonomy doctrine in most countries is neglected
in the attempt to secure a uniform scope for the doctrine.
1.6.2.

Doctrinal Research

Doctrinal research is described as the analysis of a legal principle or doctrine
through texts, cases, and legislation which usually result in suggesting better ways
of treating an established principle.60 Due to the type of analytical process that this
doctrinal method requires, it is described as a “black letter law” method.61 This
thesis analyzes the decisions of national courts, especially in relation to
international commercial contracts. The exercise relies on case law and the statutes
of some jurisdictions,62 to show that national courts have differently interpreted
national private international rules which limit the scope of party autonomy in
international commercial contracts. While some have liberally interpreted the
statutes, others employ a strict interpretation.63
60

Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing what we Do: Doctrinal Legal Research”
(2012) 17:1 Deakin L Rev 83 at 105.
61
Ibid.
62
Case law and statutes have been accepted as sources of conflict of laws. See Morris & Dicey, supra note
1 at 8, para 1-015. Indeed, “the core business of legal doctrine is interpretation” of these sources. See Mark
Van Hoecke “Legal Doctrine: What Method (s): For what kind of Discipline?” in eds Mark Van Hoecke &
Francois Ost, European Academy of Legal Theory Monograph Series (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011)
at 3.
63
John F Coyle, “The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses” (2017) 92 :2 Wash L Rev 631.
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On another level, this thesis, through the “black letter law” approach,
analyzes some provisions of some regional instruments and, more importantly, the
new soft law – Principles. The analysis seeks to show that, apart from the regional
instruments, the Principles may not yet yield a uniform scope for party autonomy
by any acceptable convergence of the rules set out by national statutes and case
law. In effect, this thesis argues that the Principles may still not provide the needed
convergence if some pivotal national interests and interpretational issues are
reconsidered. Thus, it recommends an amendment of the Principles to
accommodate the issues raised in this thesis.
1.6.3 Theory as Method
Theories explain the underpinnings or rationale of an event, a doctrine or legal rule.
They usually seek to answer/respond to “why” in this quest. It is noted that through
theoretical exercises, “reality is described, ordered and created.”64 In effect, theory,
adds meaning to life.65
Party autonomy is enmeshed in the world of theories.66 For example,
scholars who argued against the recognition of party autonomy is based on the
positive theory of law – a theory which proposes that law is “given’ by the State.67
Those scholars who argue for the recognition of party autonomy are based on the
liberal theory of law – one that “recognizes and respects the power of individuals to
effect changes in their legal relations.”68 Even after the “triumph” of party
autonomy, scholars continue to advance theories on why party autonomy should be
limited and the extent of such limitation. For example, the local law theory
propounded by Walter Wheeler Cook, a conflict of law scholar, states that a
64

Hoecke, supra note 62 at 16.
See generally Terry Eagleton & Michael Payne, The Significance of Theory (Hoboken, New Jersey:
Wiley Blackwell, 1992).
66
See generally Louise Weinberg, “Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws” (2005) 103:6 Mich L Rev 1631.
67
See generally, Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1967).
68
Thomas Gutmann, “Theories of Contract and the Concept of Autonomy” (Paper delivered at the Shibolet
Private Law Theory Workshop at Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law / The Zvi Meitar Center for
Advanced Legal Studies, March 6, 2013) [unpublished]; See also Robin West, “Law, Rights, and other
Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud’s Theory of the Rule of Law” (1986) 134:4 U Pa L Rev 817
at 817.
65
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country or state should only apply its local law and never a foreign law in the
determination of cases before it.69 As such, if the local law does not recognize party
autonomy, reference cannot be made to the foreign law to recognize party
autonomy. Ruhl also explains that an economic theory justifies the scope of party
autonomy in international commercial contracts.70 This theory says that due to the
inequality of bargaining power between contracting parties – an economic factor –
a state must regulate the scope of party autonomy in order to achieve fairness
among contracting parties.71 According to her, “limitations to party autonomy,
especially those in consumer, insurance and employment contracts, can be
explained by the presence of market failure, most importantly opportunistic
behaviour and information asymmetry.”72
This thesis does not engage in the debate as to the merit of these theories. It
only contextualizes them for advancing the argument that these theories account for
reasons why countries treat the scope of party autonomy differently. Thus, this
thesis seeks to critically “think about theories” on the scope of party autonomy.
This is what Richard Devlin calls an “explicit”, as opposed to an “implicit” level of
theory.73 The discussion on these theories answers a critical question in this thesis:
why do countries limit the scope of party autonomy in the way they do? This gives
a complete understanding of the statutes and cases that this thesis analyzes via a
doctrinal method.
1.6.4. Comparative Methodology
Comparative research involves the systematic comparison of two or more legal
systems (macro comparison) or parts, branches and aspects of two or more legal
69

Walter Wheeler Cook, “The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws” (1924) 33:5 Yale LJ 457;
Cheshire, North & Fawcett, supra note 3 at 26.
70
See generally, Rühl, supra note 35.
71
This is like the contract theory of distributive justice. See generally Anthony T Kronman, “Contract Law
and Distributive Justice” (1980) 89:3 Yale LJ 472.
72
Rühl, supra note 35 at 41.
73
Richard Devlin, “The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory” (1998) 4:1 Rev Const Stud 19 at 21. He
says that while both levels are ways of “doing theory”, the implicit level of theory engages in theoretical
debates while the explicit level engages in a critical discussion on the existing theories in a field. This level
of theory fits well into what Okafor termed as a broad approach in discussing issues in third world
countries. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL):
Theory, Methodology, or Both?” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371 at 377.
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systems (micro comparison).74 Therefore, it is the “systematic application of
comparison to law.”75 It has been noted that “the Conflict of laws has long relied on
the comparative method as a natural ally.”76 However, there is controversy on the
extent of the contribution of legal comparative scholarship to law reform or legal
theory. For example, a writer claimed that:
it is fair to say that comparative law has been a somewhat
disappointing field. For the most part, it has consisted of
showing that a certain procedural or substantive law of one
country is similar to or different from that of another.
Having made this showing, no one knows quite what to do
next.77
But Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz contend that comparative law “does
not merely provide a reservoir of different solutions; it offers the scholar of critical
capacity the opportunity of finding the "better solution" for his time and place.”78
Zweigert and Kötz’s position can be analogized thus: a society is like a train, with
the law as the engine. The comparatist is a mechanic whose job is finding the parts
that will make the engine run more smoothly.79
From this analogy, it can be deduced that the former argument ignored the
function of making the society run “smoothly” that the latter argument presents. In
other words, the former argument looks at comparative scholarship from a “dry”
perspective with no practical function in society, while the latter views it as a
74

Kamba, supra note 13 at 486, 505. My comparative analysis focuses on private international law as a
branch of law in national systems. Therefore, it is micro comparison.
75
Ibid.
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Maria Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Oxford: Hart Publishing Co, 2016) at 2; see generally B
Fauvarque-Cosson, “Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws: Allies or Enemies? New Perspectives on an
Old Couple” (2001) 49:3 Am J Comp L 407; AT Von Mehren, “The Contribution of Comparative Law to
the Theory and Practice of Private International Law” (1978) 26 Am J Comp L (Supplement) 31 at 31.
77
Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago
Press,1981) at vii; See also Alan Watson, “Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture” (1983) 131:5
U Pa L R 1121 quoted in Jonathan Hill, “Review: Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory: An
Introduction to Comparative Law by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz” (1989) 9:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 101 at
102.
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Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed, translated by Tony Weir
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Functional Method of Comparative Law” (2005) Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 26.
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Hill, supra note 77 at 106.
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practically oriented exercise which seeks to answer a particular legal issue. Thus,
while the former argument sees comparative scholarship as an end, the latter sees it
as a means to an end.
Indeed, the comparative method has been used over the years by scholars to
achieve various objectives/functions. It has been used to: (1) achieve comparability
between two or more systems, (2) emphasize or show similarities among legal
systems, (3) build a particular system of law by formalizing various systems of law,
(4) determine a better system of law by evaluating two or more systems, (5) prepare
legal unification by universalizing a particular rule, (6) provide tools for the critique
of a law, and (7) understand a legal rule or institution.80
This thesis exhibits three functions of comparative law as highlighted
above. First, to understand the development of party autonomy in different
jurisdictions, it uses a comparative historical method (function 7). This helps to
contextualize party autonomy as one of the most important conflict of laws rules
developed over the years in most countries. This comparative function works with
the historical method discussed above. Through these methods (historical and
comparative), the legal rule or doctrine of party autonomy is explicated for better
understanding.
Secondly, a comparative analysis of the development of party autonomy and
the various limitations developed by countries will be a tool to critique the
international instruments which seek to unify the scope of party autonomy,
especially the Principles (function 6). As opposed to showing similarities between
laws (function 2), this thesis seeks to show countries’ divergence in the treatment of
the scope of party autonomy, which they do for different reasons, including public
policy and protection of national interests.81 This helps to advance the criticism that
the Principles did not consider the peculiar development/history of party autonomy
in some countries. It explains why some countries, especially the developing ones,
may not find reason to incorporate the provisions of the Principles into their
national statutes. As a result, lack of uniformity in the scope of party autonomy may
persist.
80
81

Ralf, supra note 78 at 25. See also Zweigert, and Kötz, supra note 78 at 16.
Yntema, supra note 20 at 358.
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Finally, the comparative method utilized in this thesis takes an evaluative
form (function 5). In this manner, it evaluates the national statutes and cases on
whether disputes relating to the scope of party autonomy are treated uniformly. It
should be noted that this comparative analysis is not to show that a country has a
better system of law (function 4), but to show the differences between countries’
emphases regarding the elements of the principle, a state of affairs which makes it
difficult to achieve a uniform scope of party autonomy around the world.
Apart from jurisdictional evaluation, this thesis engages in legislative
evaluation. It examines various regional attempts to codify party autonomy in
response to the jurisdictional variation in its scope. The aim of this examination is
to show why, most likely, they have all failed to achieve a uniform application of
the scope of party autonomy. The result of both evaluations (jurisdictional and
legislative) is to establish a basis upon which to propose a better unification system
or procedure to define and frame the scope of party autonomy in the new
international soft private international law – Principles.82
1.6.5. Interdisciplinary Method
It has been noted that interdisciplinary research “combines components of two or
more disciplines in the search or creation of new knowledge, operations, or artistic
expressions.”83 This thesis does not boast of “creating new knowledge” through an
82
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interdisciplinary method. Rather, it draws on the existing knowledge from
interdisciplinary scholarship on party autonomy to drive home the point that the
scope of party autonomy has been limited because of the interconnectivity of law
with other disciplines. For example, knowledge of the relationship between law and
economics is one of the factors that determine the scope of party autonomy in most
countries.84 This is not limited to employment, adhesive, and consumer contracts,
but to international contracts generally. This is because some persons are
economically weak and need state protection to ensure equal bargaining power
when they enter into an international contract. In effect, it is generally believed that
some parties may be “forced” to agree to any term proposed by the other, including
a clause on choice of law. This thesis points out that the list of contracts which
requires regulation because of economic reasons differ from state to state – a factor
that the Hague Conference neglected in the drafting of the Principles.
Also, this thesis examines the relationship between law and history. The
result of this analysis advances the argument that the history of party autonomy in
the four different regions examined in this thesis accounts for the varied scope of
the doctrine. Without taking into consideration this relationship, it is impossible for
the new Hague Principles to propose provisions that seek to globally unify the
scope of the doctrine. In effect, this interdisciplinary approach accounts for reasons
why it may not yet be a new dawn in the achievement of a global uniform scope of
party autonomy. Again, it should be noted that this thesis does not lay claim to “do
history” as historians do;85 it only attempts to treat the available texts and
documents in a progressive evolutionary manner as discussed above.
1.7.

Structure of the Thesis

The substance of the material and argument of this thesis follows in Chapters 2 to 6.
Chapter 2 uncovers the meaning, history, and arguments for and against party
autonomy. It defines party autonomy in the light of its relevance to international
84

See generally, Ruhl, supra note 35.
I acknowledge Robin Fisher’s opinion that “the interface between the discipline of history and the legal
system is still a problematic one.” See Robin Fisher, “Judging History: Reflections on the Reasons for
Judgment in Delgamuukw v BC” (1992) 95 BC Stud 43 at 54.
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commerce. Apart from the general English jurisprudence on freedom of contract,
and its Hellenistic history, chapter 2 traces the history and development of party
autonomy from four different regions: continental Europe, Anglo-America, Latin
America, and Africa. The history or development of party autonomy in these
regions was characterized by arguments for and against the doctrine. This thesis
classifies arguments in favour of recognition of party autonomy as pro-autonomy
argument. It classifies arguments against it as anti-autonomy arguments. It points
out that, notwithstanding the argument against party autonomy, the rise of
international trade in the 20th century made it necessary for countries to recognize
party autonomy. However, despite its wide recognition, some countries, especially
in Latin America and Africa, still, do not recognize party autonomy or
fundamentally restrict it. It argues that this is not unconnected with the late
development of the doctrine in these regions, the effects of colonialism, their fragile
economies, and scholars’ arguments against party autonomy.
Chapter 3 examines other choice of law rules associated with party
autonomy (express intention rule). This is because the argument against party
autonomy necessarily features arguments in favour of other choice of law rules.
The analysis seeks to show that the application of other choice of law rules, which
include the law of the place of contracting (lex loci contractus), law of the place of
performance (lex loci solutionis), law of the place that validates the contract (lex
validitatis), and the law of the place domicile (lex domicilii), is characterized by
uncertainty and absurdity.86 Juxtaposing these characteristics with party autonomy
(express intention rule), it points out that the application of party autonomy ensures
certainty and uniformity in choice of law decisions in international commercial
contracts. In effect, party autonomy, because of its certainty and uniformity
functions in international commerce, is the “least problematic” choice of law rule.87
However, as advantageous as party autonomy is to international trade, it cannot be
unrestricted because parties with superior economic bargaining power may be
86

It should be noted that some scholars see these choice of law rules as express intentions of the parties
because the connecting factors for determining the rules are based on the actions or intentions of the
parties. For example, it is the parties’ intention to execute a contract in a place that activates lex loci
contractus rule.
87
Although courts still apply other choice of law, they only resort to them in cases where parties have not
made an express choice of law.
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placed in an advantageous position over those with less bargaining power. National
laws, therefore, restrict the scope of party autonomy to prevent or minimize the
inherent abusive trait that the doctrine possesses.
Chapter 4 comparatively examines how and why countries have limited the
scope of party autonomy. The comparative analysis shows that (1) party autonomy
is essentially a manifestation of national, rather than supranational recognition, (2)
absolute or unlimited party autonomy is almost impossible in any legal system, and
(3) there are varying degrees or scope of party autonomy in different countries. The
scope is determined by political, national and economic interests, legal history,
public policy, academic opinion and even, sometimes, religious beliefs, as in the
case of the United Arab Emirates; and (4) the relative exceptions and expansion of
the doctrine and constraints in most jurisdictions challenge the prospect of
achieving a uniform scope of party autonomy. Chapter 5 examines efforts to unify
the divergent scope of party autonomy presented in chapter 4. This chapter, which
is divided into four sections, focuses on the new soft law instrument – Principles.88
It first examines the efforts of international organizations and regional legislative
bodies to unify the scope of party autonomy through different codification
approaches or techniques. It then particularly examines the scope of the Principles
and the Hague Conference’s justifications for using a soft law approach. It
concludes that a soft private international law rule, especially on the scope of party
autonomy, the first of its kind in choice of law international legislation, is a step in
the right direction to unify the divergent scope/limitations of party autonomy.
Section 2 argues that, although the Principles constitutes a step in the right
direction, the Hague Conference did not consider factors for its acceptance in
developing countries. These factors mainly relate to the economic imbalance
between parties in the developed and developing countries. It points out that it is
imperative for the Hague Conference to consider these factors because the
acceptance of the Principles in different countries depends on its intrinsic values,
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Principles, supra note 9. Although this thesis refers to other instrument on the subject, its focus is on the
Principles.
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that is, “on the substantive content of its rules, rather than on external or political
factors.”89
Section 3 examines the relationship of the Principles, as soft law, with two
hard law instruments on choice of law – the Rome 1 Regulation and the Mexico
Convention. It particularly examines the provisions of a choice of non-state law in
these instruments. It argues that the choice of non-state law may not be persuasive
to countries in continental Europe because the Rome 1 Regulation, which prohibits
the choice of a non-state law, is a binding instrument. The Principles’ conditions
for the application of non-state laws in litigation proceedings even make it more
problematic, not only for countries in Europe but for developing countries that do
not recognize the choice of non-state law. Finally, Section 4 examines the nature of
the Principles and its relationship with another soft law instrument – the
UNIDROIT-Principles of International Contracts 201090 and non-state law – the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
1980.91 It first explains the scope of the Principles and then argues that it cannot
normatively empower the choice of another soft law or non-state law because they
are either in the same legal normative order, or they outrank the Principles. Even if
the Principles empowers the choice of other soft laws, it cannot do so in areas that
the soft laws have not made provisions for or situations where the soft laws are
inapplicable. It concludes that, if the Principles’ provisions are not “creatively”
interpreted, their application with other soft laws or non-state law may produce
problematic, uncertain and unintended results.
Chapter 6 recommends solutions for some of the challenges identified in
this thesis that may yet face the Principles – acceptability and interpretational
challenges. It proposes that, to achieve a uniform scope of party autonomy in most
jurisdictions, the Principles must generally protect parties in international contracts,
and not employment and consumers contracts alone.92 It must also inform
89

Albornoz & Martin, supra note 8 at 458.
Online:<www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010e.pdf> [PICC].
91
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 11 April 1980, 1489 UNTS
3, Can TS 1992 no 2(entered into force 1 January 1988) [CISG].
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This thesis does not cover issues relating the effect of contracts between contracting parties on nonparties. Also, the definition of international contracts, as this thesis show, varies from country to country.
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countries,

especially countries

where party autonomy is

prohibited or

fundamentally restricted, of the usefulness of applying the Principles. The
Principles must further expatiate on some of its provisions, especially about its
relationship with other soft laws or non-state laws. This thesis generally concludes
that, although the Principles is a step toward global unification of the scope of party
autonomy, greater tasks lie ahead.93

For the purpose of this thesis, an international contract is one conclude between private individuals or
companies (commercial as opposed to investment transactions) that has connection with more than one
jurisdiction. See generally, Georges Rene Delaume, supra note 16.
93
Scholars are already accepting this task. See generally, Rodríguez, supra note 25.
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CHAPTER 2: PARTY AUTONOMY: MEANING, HISTORY, AND
ARGUMENTS
2.1. Meaning of Party Autonomy
The manner in which parties exercise freedom of contract to choose a law or legal
system to govern their transaction is called party autonomy in conflict of laws.
In this regard, it is a choice between two or more alternative laws. Therefore, party
autonomy is “the entitlement of parties to select the law under which their
contractual terms will be interpreted [governed], and the jurisdiction in which those
terms will, in the event of a dispute, be enforced.”1 In other words, party autonomy
is a form of freedom of contract as espoused by English philosophical jurisprudence
in the 19th century.2 The English jurisprudence is founded on the principle that an
individual is “the best judge of his own welfare and of the means of securing it.” 3
Since a contract is a product of the parties’ free will which they exercise by
deciding the terms in their contracts, the phrases “party autonomy,” “private
autonomy” and “freedom of contract” have often been used interchangeably.4 Thus,
except that party autonomy is used in a conflict of laws context, the three terms
exhibit the characteristics of the autonomous will of individuals.5 Notwithstanding
the similarities, the three concepts differ contextually. They differ in the sense that
“party autonomy emphasizes the respect of personal rights, private autonomy is
opposed to the constraint and or restriction of public law, and the freedom of
contract is an extension of the idea of equality and utility with the situation that
commodity economy fully developed.”6
1

Fluer Johns, “Performing Party Autonomy” (2008) 71:3 Law & Contemp Probs 243 at 249. See also
Albert Ehrenzweig & E Jayme, Private International Law, A Comparative Treatise on American
International Conflicts Law, Including the Law of Admiralty, vol 3 (Leyden: AW Sijthoff, 1977) at 253.
2
Patrick S Atiyah, “The Classical Law of Contract” ‘in an Introduction to the Law of Contract’ in Richard
Devlin ed, Contracts, Supplement II Contract Law in Politico-Philosophical Perspective (Halifax:
Dalhousie University, 1988) 28 at 33.
3
F Kessler, G Gilmore & A Kronman, “Contract as a Principle of Order,” ibid at 38.
4
Zhaohua Meng, “Party Autonomy, Private Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract” (2014) 10:6 Can Soc Sci
212 at 215; see also Symeon Symeonides “Party Autonomy in International Contracts and the Multiple
Ways of Slicing the Apple” (2014) 39:3 Brook J Intl L 1123 at 1130 (“party autonomy is the external side
of a domestic law principle of freedom of contract”); see also see also Stefan Grundmann, “Information,
Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract Law” (2002) 39 CML Rev 269.
5
Meng, ibid at 215 (“[i]n the applicable area of international private law, the following conclusion can be
made: Private autonomy equals to party autonomy, and party autonomy includes freedom of contract”).
6
Ibid at 212.
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Furthermore, unlike the philosophical freedom of contract, parties can only
choose the governing law of a contract if a national system of law or private
international law rules of a state permit them to do so.7 Indeed, “the forum State
[national system of law], which ultimately controls the choice of law, has to
determine the conditions, the limits and the scope of the parties’ autonomy.”8 Thus,
party autonomy is a function of the conflict of laws rules of every state. It should be
noted that party autonomy is not only used in terms of the applicable law in
contracts; it has also been applied in other areas of law, including torts, family,
succession, and trusts.9
2.2. History of Party Autonomy
Party autonomy is “almost as ancient as conflicts law itself.”10 However, the history
of party autonomy varies from country to country. Therefore, a holistic history of
all countries may be impossible in this chapter. It should be noted that notion of
individual rights across states which influences the growth and development of
party autonomy in states is outside the scope of this thesis. However, the history of
party autonomy in each state cannot be divorced from the history of how they have
balanced the right of an individual to enter into contracts and states’ intervention in
such contracts.11 For example, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a New

7

Giuditta Cordero Moss, “International Arbitration and the Quest for the Applicable Law” (2008) 8:3
Global Jurist (Advances) Art 2, 1 at 6; Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1999) at 32.
8
Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993)
at 139.
9
Nygh, supra note 7 at 14; see Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property
Regimes, 14 March 1978, 16 ILM 14 (entered into force 1 September 1992); Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations [2007] OJ L199/40 (Rome II); Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to
Maintenance
Obligations
(entered
into
force
1
August
2013),
online:<
www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=133>.
10
Symeon C Symeonides, Wendy Perdue & Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Conflict of Laws: American,
Comparative, International: Cases and Materials, 3rd ed (Minnesota: West Publishing Co, 2012) at 338.
11
See generally, F Kessler, G Gilmore & A Kronman supra note 3. See also David P Weber, “Restricting
the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition” (2014) 16:1 Yale Human Rights and Development
Journal 51.
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York employment law which limited the daily number of hours a baker could work
as unduly “favouring one party to the contract.12
This chapter attempts to give a general account and developments of the doctrine
in four major legal systems: continental Europe, Anglo-America, Latin America,
and Africa. These historical accounts aim to show that there is an uneven
development of party autonomy in these legal systems.13 While the developments in
continental Europe and Anglo-America (The United States and the United
Kingdom) vary “in degree rather than in substance,”14 the same cannot be said of
Latin America and Africa because the doctrine developed late in these regions due
to many factors, including territorialism and apathy to the development of private
international law rules on choice of law. Also, the historical analysis shows that the
influence of scholars on the development of the doctrine in these legal systems
varies. While scholars in continental Europe in the 16th century laid the foundation
of the doctrine, scholars in Anglo-American countries espoused the doctrine as
developed by courts.15 Similarly, most scholars opposed the principle in Latin
American countries, while their contemporaries in the African region simply
showed apathy to conflict of laws issues generally.
2.2.1. General History
The problem of choice of law predates the existence of any nation-state.16 It is
claimed that choice of law issues arose as soon as two individuals from different
“matured” legal systems began to deal with one another.17 However, the history of
party autonomy as a conflict rule may be traced, albeit indirectly, to a decree issued
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
Thus, as Juenger puts it, the aim is to show that there is “an uneven evolution of party autonomy.” See
Friedrich Juenger, “The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts:
Some Highlights and Comparisons” (1994) 42:2 Am J Comp L 381 at 388.
14
Peter Hay, Patrick J Borchers & Symeon C Symeonedes, Conflict of Laws, 5th ed (Minnesota: West
Publishing Co, 2010) at 16.
15
Ernst G Lorenzen, “Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws – One Hundred Years After” (1934)
48:1 Harv L Rev 15 at 18. (characteristics of Anglo-American law has been its development by courts and
not by legal writers).
16
Friedrich K Juenger, “A Page of History” (1984) 35:2 Mercer L Rev 419 at 420.
17
Ibid; It has been noted that “[i]t was the interaction between the laws of the Italian city states emerging
after the collapse of the Roman empire that laid the core foundation for the discipline [conflict of laws]”
see Richard Oppong, “Private International Law in Africa: The Past, Present, and The Future” (2007) 55:4
Am J Comp L 677 at 685.
12
13
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in Hellenistic Egypt in 120-118 BC. The decree provided that contracts written in
the Egyptian language were subject to Egyptian courts which applied the Egyptian
law, while contracts written in Greek were subject to the Greek Court which
applied the Greek law. Invariably, a choice of language necessarily meant both a
choice of court and choice of law.18 The decree has been criticized as not having
any conflict of laws intent, but a political gesture that allows persons to patronize
the Egyptian Courts because of the latter’s loss of influence to the Greek Courts.19
However, regardless of its intent, this example remains one of the early cases of
history where an individual has a choice to decide the applicable law and court.
2.2.2. Continental Europe (Civil Law Countries)
In Europe, party autonomy can be traced to Roman times.20 This is because the
Roman Empire regarded a law as a peculiar property of persons entitled to it, who
can lay claim to it or ignore it. This means that while Roman citizens can claim an
entitlement to Roman law anywhere in the world, they could also discard such law
by choosing the law of the place where they reside.21 This influenced the
development of party autonomy in Europe because it is said that “it is a prevailing
doctrine on the Continent of Europe that in the case of all voluntary obligations,
parties, since they have the right to choose whether or not they will be bound, have
also the right to choose the law under which they shall be bound.”22 Thus, the word
“autonomy” has its root in two Greek words: “auto-” (self) and “nomos” (law)
which is used to describe the rights that certain noble families and incorporations
enjoy in Germany to regulate their affairs through private legislations.23
However, beyond these concepts, party autonomy in contracts was not
recognized. Even early writers like Bartolus, a statutist, did not recognize party
18

Friedrich K Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993)
at 7-8.
19
Hans Julius Wolff, Das Problem der Konkurrenz von Rechtsordnungen in der Antike (Heidelberg:
Winter Publishing Co, 1979) at 62-64, cited in Friedrich K. Juenger, supra note 16 at 421.
20
SM Richardson, International Contracts and The Choice of Law (DCL Thesis, University of Canterbury,
2005) [unpublished] at 18.
21
Joseph Henry Beale, “What Law Governs the Validity of Contract I” (1909) 23:1 Harv L Rev 1 at 7.
22
Ibid.
23
Maria Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Oxford: Hart Publishing Co, 2016) at 20.
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autonomy as the right of parties to choose the governing law.24 Instead, he
advocated that the national law of the place where the contract was made (lex loci)
or the law of the place of performance (lex solutionis) should be the applicable
law.25 The early predominant view is that a contract is like a child who is subject to
the law of the place of birth.26 In other words, a contract is subject to the law of the
place of contract because parties have tacitly acceded to the law of the place of
contracting.
It was in the 16th century that the French scholar, Dumoulin, posited that the
will of the parties, express or implied, should be the determining factor of the
governing law of a contract.27 He thought that the will of the parties is sovereign
and that if not expressly made; the governing law must be determined by the
surrounding circumstances of the contract, the place of the contract being only one
of these circumstances (tacit choice). Thus, he stretched the application of the
principle to situations where the choice of law is not expressly made. This “tacit
choice” as espoused by Dumoulin may be regarded as a foundation for the “proper
law” doctrine which in turn founded the notion of the “reasonable connection test”
formula of the Restatement (second) of the Conflict of Laws in the United States.28
His doctrine was given judicial confirmation by the court of cassation in 1836.29
Huber, a Dutch scholar, in 1689, also sees the will of the parties as supreme,
as opposed to an alternative, because he believes that the place of contract can be
dispelled by the wills of parties. He declares that “the place, however, where a
contract is entered into, is not to be considered absolutely; for if the parties had in
mind the law of another place at the time of contracting the latter will control.”30
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Bartolus de Saxoferatto, Conflict of Laws (Beale's translation) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1914) at 18-20.
25
See Ernst G Lorenzen, “Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws” (1921) 30:6 Yale LJ
565 at 573; Hay, Borchers & Symeonedes, supra note 14 at 13.
26
Armand Lainé, Introduction Au Droit International Privé: Contenant Une Etude Historique Et Critique
De La Théorie Des Statuts Et des rapports de cette théorie avec le Code civil, vol 2 (Librairie Cotillon, F
Pinchon, successeur, 1892) at 189.
27
See Lorenzen, supra note 25 at 574.
28
Juenger, supra note 16 at 431.
29
Lorenzen supra note 25 at 573.
30
Huber, De Conflictu Legum, para 5 quoted in Lorenzen, ibid at 574. His idea of recognizing a foreign law
based on comity influenced subsequent writers. See generally, Ernest G Lorenzen, “Huber’s De Conflictu
Legum” (1919) 13 Ill L Rev 375; See also Hay, Borchers & Symeonedes, supra note 14 at 19.
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His works, as shown later in this chapter, influenced the development of the
doctrine in the Anglo-American world.
Savigny, a German jurist, built on this theory in 1849.31 He posited that the
law of the place of performance, the law of the place of contracting and the
nationality of the parties should govern the contract unless there is a contrary
choice.32 He explained that every legal relation has a seat, that is, the territorial law
on which the legal relation is based, but that the parties’ intention may replace the
law of the seat through the voluntary submission of parties to the law of another
State.33 It was the Italian jurist, Pasquale Mancini, who in 1851, formulated the
doctrine as we know it today as the expression of the will of the parties.34 He,
however, in theory, conceded that autonomy must be exercised within the bounds
of law because he believed that “the principle of party autonomy should yield to
territorial sovereignty only with respect to matters concerning public policy,
sovereignty, and rights in real estate.”35 Laurent, a Belgian jurist, also explained the
meaning of “bounds of law” as follows:
It is certain that the contracting parties cannot determine
their status and capacity; these matters belong to public
order, and as such fall within the exclusive province of the
legislator. Still less can they regulate what belongs to the
sovereign power. To express myself in the language
ordinarily used, everything belonging to status and to the
real statute is beyond the autonomy of the individuals.36
The development of the doctrine of party autonomy in continental Europe
shows a recurrent theme for its history; that is, while the doctrine was erstwhile
shackled with the territorial limitations of place of contract and performance, it grew
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The lex loci contractus was formerly applied in Germany. Lorenzen, supra note 30 at 567.
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33
Ibid at 575-576.
34
Giesela Ruhl, “Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence
and Economic Efficiency” (2007) CLPE Research Paper 4/2007 1 at 5. Party Autonomy was recognized in
the Italian statute as early as 1865 and reiterated in codice civile, 1942.
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Juenger, supra note 16 at 455; see also Y Nishitani, Mancini und die Parteiautonomie im Internationalen
Privatretcht (Heidelberg: Winter, 2000) at 220-222, 246.
36
Laurent François, Le droit civil international (Bruxelles: Bruylant-Christophe, 1880) at 383-384.
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considerably through the works of scholars,37 and despite some early opposition,38 it
has been accepted as an established doctrine.39 Also, while the recognition of the
doctrine may be traced to the 16th centuries (or even earlier),40 the growth of
international trade in the 19th and 20th century further increased the acceptance of the
doctrine because party autonomy was seen as a means of achieving economic
efficiency.41 It could be said that the “final victory” of the doctrine in continental
Europe came in 1980 when it was incorporated in the Rome Convention.42 Article 3
of the Convention provides that contracts shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties.
2.2.3. Anglo-America (The United States and The United Kingdom)
Compared to the civil law jurisdictions, the doctrine’s acceptance in common law
countries was a slower business. Generally, the judicial authority upon which the
doctrine of party autonomy is based in Anglo-America is Robinson v Bland.43 The
much-quoted Lord Mansfield’s dictum in the case is to the effect that a particular
law which would otherwise be applicable may be excluded if parties at the time of
making the contract had the law of “another kingdom” in mind.44 However, this
decision did not state the means of knowing when parties have a view to a different
law. This leaves room for scholars and latter cases to develop the doctrine, drawing
influences from their civil law contemporaries. Indeed, it has been noted that
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The Court contributed little to the development of the doctrine in continental Europe. See Lorenzen,
supra note 15 at 17.
38
Saxoferatto, supra note 22.
39
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principle. See Hessel Yntema, “Autonomy’ in Choice of Law” (1952) 1:4 Am J Comp L 341 at 350 -351.
40
Henri Batiffol, Form and Capacity in International Contract in Lectures on Conflict of Laws and
International Contracts delivered at the Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law
University of Michigan Law School 5 August 1949 (Buffalo, New York: Hein & Co, 1982) at 103.
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Ruhl, supra note 34 at 6.
42
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation, with Protocol, and Joint Declarations 19
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[1755] 96 Eng. Rep. 129 KB. This decision was followed by Re Missouri SS Co, [I889] 42 Ch Div 321 at
340-341; Lorenzen, supra note 25 at 577; William J Woodward Jr, “Contractual Choice of Law:
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Huber’s teachings influenced Lord Mansfield’s decision and Joseph Story’s treatise
in the United States.45
2.2.4. The United States
Joseph Story is one of the early advocates of party autonomy in the United States
who relied on Lord Mansfield’s dictum. In 1834, he argued, in his Commentaries
on the Conflict of Laws,46 that if the place of contracting is also the place of
performance, then the contract is automatically governed by the law of the place of
contract (lex loci contractus).47 But where the place of contract is different from the
place of performance, then the presumed intention as to the law of the place of
performance (le loci solutionis) must be recognized and given effect to in the
interpretation and validity of the contract.48 While the United States courts,
especially the Supreme Court applied the doctrine,49 some American scholars, chief
among whom is J.H. Beale, an ardent supporter of vested/territorial right theory,50
opposed the doctrine.51 He argued that the doctrine as developed in civil law
countries should not be adopted in the United States because it enables parties to
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Woodward Jr, supra note 41 at 144. Huber’s ideas of comity were quoted to American courts since 1788.
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Erwin Spiro, Conflict of Laws (South Africa: Juta & Co, 1973) at 6.
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Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 1st ed (reprint) (New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange
Limited, 2010).
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legislate themselves out of the reach of the territorial law.52 Much of his arguments
will follow in the next section, but suffice to say that Beale was successful in
convincing the American judiciary and scholars to omit the principle from
America’s First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (the Restatement).53 He was
able to do this because of his position as the Reporter for the proposed Restatement
of Conflict of Laws discussed at the 1927 American Law Institute conference which
considered chapter 8 (contract) of the Restatement. He was directed to prepare a
revision of the chapter on contract. He did this without including party autonomy or
the intention theory.54 Thus, section 322 of the final version on contract in the
Restatement did not acknowledge that parties to an international contract could
depart from the law of the place of contract. At best, parties could only incorporate
the provisions of a foreign law as terms of their contract.55
This omission drew criticism from American scholars who argue that parties
should be allowed to contract out of the law of the place of contract, with the
exception that they may not do so where the law mandates its compulsory
application – mandatory laws.56 Since this omission in the Restatement, the
development of the doctrine was described as “erratic.”57 This is because there was
no uniform application of the doctrine by American courts. However, contrary to
Beale’s prediction that the doctrine is a dying one, case law continued to recognize
the doctrine after the Restatement, although they acknowledged that the doctrine
ought to be restricted for the protection of the forum state.58
The first major step of the “uniform” acceptance of the doctrine was the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1952, drafted with the support of
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the American Law Institute.59 This was followed by the Restatement (Second) of
the Conflict of Laws in 1968. These statutes, in section 105-1 and 187, respectively,
recognize the doctrine of party autonomy with qualifications.60 Courts have,
therefore, applied these statutes together with their qualifications. For example, in
1972, the Supreme Court of the United States held in The Bremen v Zapata OffShore Co61 that parties in a “freely negotiated private international law agreement,
unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power” can freely
choose the applicable law to their contract.62 Thus, while party autonomy is now
recognized in the United States, the qualifications may be different in the 50 states
of the United States because states adopt the statutes differently.
2.2.5. The United Kingdom
As stated earlier, the doctrine in the Anglo-American jurisdictions can be traced to
the English decision of Robinson v Bland.63 Briefly, the fact of the case is that an
action was instituted in the English Court to enforce a gambling debt incurred in
France. Despite similarities of French and English law on whether such debt is
recoverable, the King’s Bench considered a situation where the laws of both
countries were different. The three judges: Chief Justice Lord Mansfield, Denison
and Wilmot JJ applied different tests to deny enforcement of the gambling debt in
England. Denison J believed that since the case was instituted in England, English
law will govern the contract (law of the forum). Wilmot J stated that since the debt
was to be paid in England, English law is the most appropriate (law of the place of
performance). Lord Mansfield added that since the parties intended to apply
English law, the English law was applicable (the law intended by parties – party
autonomy). The latter judge also stated that since the place of payment of the debt
was in England, the security was in England, and the parties had intended to apply
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English law, English law must be applied (the law of the place of performance as
that presumably intended by the parties).64
Notwithstanding that the first two dicta have been overruled in latter cases,65
Lord Mansfield’s “intention dicta” has been accepted as the rule by which to
determine the validity of contracts in England.66 Some judicial authorities,
including P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. v Shand,67 Lloyd v Guibert,68 and Jacobs v
Crédit Lyonnais69 also established that parties’ intention could be made either
expressly or impliedly, and the court can decipher parties’ intention by examining
the surrounding circumstances. In effect, these cases held that the court is at liberty
to construe the intention of parties and give effect to it.70 These decisions
established the doctrine of “proper law” that was distinctly developed in the United
Kingdom.71 One of the judicial authorities which explains this doctrine is Vita Food
Products v Unus Shipping Co.,72 where Lord Wright, delivering the opinion of the
Judicial Committee, said that:
It is now well settled that by English law (and the law of
Nova Scotia is the same) the proper law of the contract “is
the law which the parties intended to apply.” That intention
is objectively ascertained, and, if not expressed, will be
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presumed from the terms of the contract and the relevant
surrounding circumstances.73
Two scholars, Westlake74 and Dicey,75 espoused the theoretical basis of this
doctrine.76 Westlake thinks that the proper law means that English courts would
take into consideration the close connection of the contract (subjective theory). He
puts his view as follows:
In the circumstances it may be said that the law by which to determine the
intrinsic validity and effects of a contract will be selected in England on
substantial considerations, the preference being given to the country with
which the transaction has the most real connection, and not to the law of
the place of the contract as such.77
Dicey’s concept of proper law emphasized the intention of the parties
(objective theory) rather than the close connection test. He thinks that proper law
means the “law, or laws, by which the parties intended, or may fairly be presumed
to have intended, the contract to be governed.”78 These theories, which interpreted
case law, developed the doctrine of party autonomy in English jurisprudence.
In sum, the development of party autonomy in the United Kingdom relied
on case law and contribution from scholars. It avoided the early rigid approach of
civil law countries which is based on the place of contract or place of performance;
instead it embraced the elastic criteria of the “close connection test” or “proper
law.”79 Like the continental European experience, party autonomy was further
recognized in the 19th century in the United Kingdom.80 Indeed, it has been noted
that “until the nineteenth century, the idea of proper law was hardly distinguished
from that of the proper jurisdiction. The questions of choice of law and choice of
jurisdiction were confused.”81 This is because, hitherto, English courts in the 17th
and 18th centuries held that a litigant who institutes an action in England
73
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automatically intended English Law – tacit confusion of choice of forum and choice
of law issues.
It should be noted that, just like in the United States, party autonomy has
been codified in the United Kingdom. The Contracts (Applicable) Act 199082 has
largely replaced the doctrine of proper law of contract.83 This statute implements
the Rome Convention which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1 Regulation).84
Notwithstanding the codification, references are still made to case law that establish
party autonomy.
2.2.6. Party Autonomy in Latin America and Africa
The development of party autonomy in Latin America and Africa was
slower than their counterparts in continental Europe and Anglo-America. The
history of party autonomy in Latin America and Africa is characterized by
territorialism and uneven treatment of the doctrine by different countries in the
same region. The history of the doctrine in Latin America is discussed first,
followed by that of Africa.
2.2.7. Latin America
It has been noted that “in the Americas, the question of what law applies to
contracts that cross national frontiers may charitably be described as unsettled.”85 It
has also been particularly noted that “in Latin America, the road towards
recognition of the principle of party autonomy has been arduous and long.” 86 The
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judicial and legislative response to the problem of choice of law in this region was
different from the approach in continental Europe and Anglo-America.87 This is
because, until recently, most courts and legislations favoured the law of the place of
contract or the place of performance over party autonomy.88 For example, the Civil
Code of Chile (1855) stated that “the effects of contracts made abroad and to be
performed in Chile are determined by Chilean laws.”89 The Supreme Court of Chile
held that if a contract is to be performed in Chile, Chilean law would be applied,
while a Chilean contract to be performed abroad will be susceptible to a different
law.90 Honduras, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador adopted choice of
law rules similar to Chile.91 This nationalistic tendency is premised on the theory
that the state is entitled to dictate the lex obligationis to its subjects.92 Indeed, it has
been noted that “the territorialism of the Latin American continent has caused the
assimilation of party autonomy to be slow.”93 The nationalist tendencies of
countries in this region did little to promote transnational trade within and outside
the Americas.94
The late development of this doctrine in Latin America may also be
attributed to the fact that most countries saw no need for transnational trade. As a
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result, there was a reluctance to develop choice of law rules which govern
transnational contracts.95 Coupled with the foregoing is also the need to protect the
economy of Latin American countries from foreign manipulation or intervention.96
Allowing party autonomy in international commercial contract was believed to
encourage the choice of a foreign law over and above the national law of the
Americas.
The “premature attempts at regional codification of choice-of-law rules
[also] bear some responsibility for the underdeveloped state of the law on contract
conflicts.”97 Even the Montevideo Civil International Law Treaty of 1889 rejected
party autonomy.98 Instead, the treaty instead emphasized the place of performance
as a connecting factor for choice of law in international contracts.99 The Additional
Protocol to the treaty declared that “jurisdiction and law applicable according to the
respective treaties cannot be modified by the intention of the parties, except to the
extent this law authorizes them so to do.”100 It is arguable that the “victory” of
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party autonomy came through the enactment of the Inter-American Convention on
the Law Applicable to International Contracts(Mexico Convention)101 which, is in
most respects, similar to the provisions in Rome 1 Convention 1980.102 Article 7 of
the Convention provides that “[t]he contract shall be governed by the law chosen by
the parties.”103 Although American countries participated in the preparation of the
draft text, only Mexico and Venezuela ratified it. Because of the low ratification
that the Convention commanded, it has been described as a “categorical failure.”104
Indeed, some countries in Latin America still do not recognize party autonomy
because they are neither signatories to the Convention nor persuaded by it.105
Finally, a reason for the late development of the doctrine in Latin America
may be because of the “hostility” of the region’s scholars towards the doctrine.
While some Latin American scholars favoured the doctrine, most scholars
disapproved of it on “positivist and conceptualistic grounds.”106 For example,
Ildefonso Garcia Lagos, an Uruguayan jurist, argued that party autonomy should be
the general rule to determine the choice of law, and that the law of the place of
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performance should only be a subsidiary/secondary rule.107 But another scholar
argued that “party autonomy amounts to an alien element in the conflict of laws
and, in spite of its venerable history, merits censure rather than approbation.”108
Notwithstanding these arguments, “hostility” towards party autonomy generally
waned after 1950109 but controversy over the doctrine still exists among Latin
American scholars.110 This is why some Latin American countries still do not
accept party autonomy. As Juenger puts it, there is “an uneven evolution of party
autonomy in our continent.”111
2.2.8. Africa
Generally,

private international

law

in

Africa has

been described as

“underdeveloped” or one with stunted development.112 This is because conflict of
laws is an area of law that, until recently, scholars have given little or no attention
to.113 To this end, conflict of laws issues, including party autonomy, were isolated
from development in Africa’s civil and common law countries.114 One jurist noted
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that “one issue that gives occasional problem [in Africa] is the choice of law or
choice of the jurisdiction of contracting parties.”115
However, British-colonized African countries have applied the doctrine of
proper law as developed in the United Kingdom on choice of law issues. This is
because the English common law is one of the sources of private international law
in these countries.116 Therefore, unlike their European counterparts, most issues in
conflict of laws, including party autonomy, had no theoretical underpinnings.117 For
example, before colonization, “African system of law” applied the lex fori to
problems involving a foreign element.118 This is because it is inconceivable to
apply any other system of law than the native laws of the land since transnational
trade was restricted or unknown during the 15th century.119 Thus, application of the
lex fori was a result of the dynamics of power and pragmatism, but not a product of
legal reasoning inspired by any theory of conflict of laws.120
Apart from the implicit choice of law in Egypt discussed above, there is
little evidence of the development of party autonomy in Africa.121 However, in the
late 20th and 21st centuries, there were judicial decisions that have recognized
parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law in international contracts.122 For
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example, in 1961, a South African Court held that “according to English law and
our law[,] the proper law of the contract is the law of the country which the parties
have agreed or intended or are presumed to have intended shall govern it.”123 Also,
a Kenyan Court, in Fonville v Kelly III,124 held that “the position in law is that
where parties have expressly stipulated that a contract is to be governed by a
particular law, that law is the proper law of contract.”125
However, in some instances, the application of the doctrine in some
countries appears to be unsettled. For example, a Nigerian case law decided in
1987, suggests that the doctrine may be subject to nationalistic and territorial
scrutiny. In Sonnar (Nigeria) Ltd. v Partenreedri M S Nordwind,126 a Justice of the
Supreme Court, Oputa JSC, while considering the conflict aspect of the case, held
that “as a matter of public policy, our courts should not be too eager to divest
themselves of jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution and by other laws
simply because parties in their private contracts choose a foreign forum and a
foreign law.”127 In this case, a Liberian shipwoner and a Nigerian shipper chose
German law to govern their bill of lading. The court, relying on Australian
decisions,128 held that the choice of law is “capricious and unreasonable” because it
has no connection with the parties’ contract. The court further held that “luckily
nowadays, a choice of the proper law by the parties is not considered by the Courts
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as conclusive.”129 Therefore, the Court, in its discretionary exercise, disregarded the
parties’ express choice of law.130 This decision reflects the nationalistic tendencies
in Latin America.
It may be safe to conclude that African courts are still hesitant to
acknowledge party autonomy in those cases that are not clear cut.131 This is because
private international law rules are underdeveloped in the various jurisdictions.
Since there is no treaty regulating choice of law issues in Africa, instances where
the doctrine may be disregarded depend on the discretion of the judge, applicable
local statutes, application of the common law doctrine (proper law), and the type of
contract in issue.132 Indeed, as shown in subsequent chapters, African countries
generally restrict or prohibit party autonomy through local statutes to protect their
national interests form foreign economic exploitation. This is not unconnected to
their fragile economies and their colonial experiences. Just like in the Americas, it
is believed that allowing parties to contract on choice of law in contracts of national
interest exposes African parties to monopolistic tendencies by parties in developed
countries.
2.3. Arguments for and against Party Autonomy
As the history shows, the quest for the recognition of party autonomy globally has
been controversial, and even presently there are still controversies over the
recognition of the doctrine.133 As discussed above, the disapproval of party
autonomy in international commercial contracts in some Latin American and
African countries has been largely influenced, among others, by this controversy.
There are two positions on the doctrine: some scholars believe parties should not be
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allowed to choose a law that governs their transaction, while other scholars are of
the view that a choice of law is like any other clause or term in the contract which
should be left for the parties to decide. This thesis briefly captures the reasons for
arguments on both sides here. The arguments are tagged “anti-autonomy” and “proautonomy,” respectively.
2.3.1. Anti-Autonomy Arguments
The main argument of the anti-autonomists is that recognizing party autonomy
“makes a legislative body of any two persons who choose to get together and
contract.”134 Lorenzen adds that “the validity or invalidity of a legal transaction
should result from fixed rules of law which are binding upon the parties. Allowing
the parties to choose their governing law in this regard involves a delegation of
sovereign power to private individuals.”135 The reason for this argument is that the
choice given to parties to determine the contract’s governing law is in itself an act
of making law. Pillet136 and Niboyet137 argue that parties’ choice of law in a
contract enables them to evade domestic legal obligations which are closely
connected to their contract. They think that the sovereign nature of a state prevents
parties from choosing an extra-territorial law. This view suggests that contracts are
born into a certain law and that if parties cannot modify this law in a domestic
sphere, they cannot do so by an agreement that another law should govern their
contract.138
Furthermore, anti-autonomists assert that it is impossible to predict how the
court will view the intention of the parties on their choice of law. For this reason,
parties cannot make an advanced valid contract through a choice of law until the
applicable law is decided by the court.139 Therefore, individuals do not have
freedom to choose the law that may govern their contracts. This argument suggests
that it is the law of the place where the contract is made or performed that dictates
134
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the applicable law.140 A very similar argument is that a choice of law is like any
element/clause in the contract which “localizes” the contract within a specific legal
system and that the court is not bound by the will of the parties since other
clauses/elements may point to another legal system.141 Although this argument
agrees that parties could agree on a law, it still denies a complete autonomy in
choice of law.142
Reflecting on these arguments, it is safe to conclude that anti-autonomy
arguments are based on the positive theory of law.143 This is because they suggest
that the law regulates human conduct, and not vice-versa. In other words, their
arguments reflect a positivist territorial approach to regulatory legitimacy. The pith
of their view is that the law of the place of performance or place of execution of the
contract determines the applicable law and not the will of the parties. In sum,
parties cannot determine the law that governs/validates their contracts because it is
the law that performs this function.
2.3.2.Pro-Autonomy Arguments
On the other side of the divide, some scholars have advocated recognition of the
doctrine. The theme of their argument is that parties to a contract should be allowed
to choose its governing law.144 They argue that notwithstanding the law of the place
of a contract, or performance, parties should be allowed to choose a different law to
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govern a contract.145 In contrast to the argument that a contract is born into a certain
law, pro-autonomists see a contract as a creation of the human mind which is not
fixed to any locality.146 These scholars see the will of the parties as the basis of
legal obligation in contracts. Although they acknowledge that law may set the limit,
they believe that legal obligations flow from the choice of the parties. Thus, the law
may only regulate parties’ freedom to choose a law where public policy demands
that party autonomy be rejected.147
A scholar has even argued that the principle of party autonomy is protected
by international human rights instruments,148 for example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.149 According to her, since the Universal Declaration
of Human rights protects the liberty of individuals, such liberty should not just be
exercised in the personal and political sphere, but also in the economic sphere by
allowing parties to “liberally” choose the legal system which governs their
contracts.
In response to the anti-autonomists’ argument that party autonomy is
synonymous with party legislation, pro-autonomists argue that parties are not
legislating by choosing a legal system to govern their contracts. Rather, they are
exercising a power conferred on them by the law of the place where the contract is
executed.150 The law of the place where the contract is litigated (forum state) may,
therefore, choose to ignore their choice or accept it.151 In a related argument, proautonomists argue that there is a difference between the operative fact and legal
145
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consequences of a contract. Since the law allows parties to choose the applicable
law, they are only exercising that power by altering the operative facts of their
contracts to which the law attaches legal consequence.152 For example, whether a
contract is in writing or not depends on the choice of the parties which has a legal
consequence for their contract. Similarly, parties’ choice of law clause may alter the
otherwise applicable legal consequences in the conflict of law rules. Thus, parties
do not alter the provisions of a statute, but only facts, that, in turn, alter the legal
consequences of their contracts.153
Pro-autonomists further argue that assuming that parties are, indeed,
legislating through party autonomy, such legislations are made only for the parties
and no other person.154 They argue that, in any event, party autonomy is not the
only circumstance where parties “legislate.”155 They conclude that “party
legislation” does not transcend into a “crime.”156 Also, they argue that in an
international contract where the contract is associated with more than one law, no
national law has the right to exclusively govern the contract. 157 Therefore, if we
remove one national law in preference to the other, we should able to remove all of
them in preference for a third law.158
In sum, pro-autonomy arguments resonate a common theme – that parties
should be autonomous in choosing the law that governs their contract. These
152
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arguments reflect a liberal theory of contract which “recognizes and respects the
power of individuals to effect changes in their legal relations inter-se.”159 Proautonomists claim that the will of the parties dictates the applicable law that must
govern the contract, as opposed to the positivist contention that the choice must be
made by the sovereign.
2.4. Conclusion
Generally, the history of party autonomy shows that the development of the
doctrine is uneven in the legal systems of the world. While Anglo-America and
Continental Europe share similarities in the early development of the doctrine,
Latin America and Africa share similarities in the late/underdevelopment of the
doctrine and even presently, it is still not recognized in some countries in these
regions. The slow development in these regions may be attributed to their colonial
experiences and fragile economies. Sometimes, they see party autonomy in
international commercial contracts as a threat to their national and economic
interests. Therefore, territorialism and nationalism have shackled, and still shackle,
the development of party autonomy in Latin America and Africa.
The arguments against the doctrine as a conflict rule further reflect the
reasons for the hostility toward the doctrine, especially in Latin America and
Africa. Although anti-autonomist arguments started from the Anglo-American and
Continental regions, they reflect the positivistic and territorial tendencies in Latin
America and Africa towards party autonomy. However, the responses to these
arguments show that anti-autonomists’ objections to party autonomy may not be
based on sound theoretical footings – anti-autonomist arguments do not reflect the
realities of transnational trade in the 21st century. Notwithstanding the debate, and

159

Thomas Gutmann, “Theories of Contract and the Concept of Autonomy” (Paper delivered at the
Shibolet Private Law Theory Workshop at Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law / The Zvi Meitar Center for
Advanced Legal Studies, 6 March 2013) [unpublished] at 3; See also Robin West, “Law, Rights, and other
Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud’s Theory of the Rule of Law” (1986) 134 U Pa L Rev 817 at
817.

47

some Latin American and African countries’ resistance, party autonomy has been
globally recognized as an important conflict rule from the 19th century.160
From the historical account and arguments against party autonomy, it is
gleaned that there are different rules on choice of law, of which party autonomy is
one. The next chapter describes and analyzes these rules and argues that, because of
the advantages that party autonomy brings to bear in private international law, it is
the best choice of law rule for resolving conflict issues in international commercial
contracts. The next chapter also points out that, notwithstanding these advantages,
there are various limitations to party autonomy. It briefly discusses these limitations
with a note that, just like the history of party autonomy, the tests for determining
the limitation or scope of the doctrine vary from country to country.
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CHAPTER 3: CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN CONTRACT
3.1. Introduction
The obligations and validity of a contract rely exclusively on the contract’s
connection with a law.1 In other words, for a contract to be enforceable, a legal
system must recognize the validity of the contract, as well as the obligations arising
from it.2 It is a truism that states usually (whther consciously or not) determine a
contract’s connection to a legal system based on their choice of law rules. A choice
of law rule, therefore, is a “rule for choosing the [applicable] law.”3 This is because
the rules only select the applicable legal system without determining the legal
obligations of the parties; the chosen law performs this function.4 Thus, choice of
law rules as discussed in this chapter relate to rules that determine the validity and,
in appropriate instances, construction of a contract.5
It has been argued that the determination of the applicable law in a contract
should not be made subject to any rule or principle but should be based on the
“juridical conscience” of the forum judge in each case.6 By this, the judge is free to
choose the applicable law based on his appreciation of the facts of the case.
Advocates of this position argue that this will free a judge from the shackles of
choice of law rules, and allows him to do justice in each case.7 A flaw in this
argument is that it unwittingly proposes a generalized rule itself. It proposes a shift
from “rigid” rules to “no rule,” thereby creating an individualized choice of law
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rule that focuses on the peculiarities of each contract type.8 This proposition leaves
the outcome of a decision at the mercy of the conscience of a judge. It also breeds
uncertainty in the outcome of a decision because parties do not know the opinion of
a judge about their dealings prior to a dispute. No matter how insufficient or narrow
the choice of law rules may be, it is better than no rule because a “no rule system”
breeds international judicial anarchy. For example, in a case that has a foreign
element, a judge is free to neglect the rules of both the lex fori and the law of the
foreign country, since he is at liberty to decide a case based on his intuition or
personal appreciation of the case.9 In sum, this rule is “anti-juridical” because it is
against every principle of structural judicial decision making.10 Indeed, the
importance of choice of law rules cannot be over-emphasized. Choice of law rules
create coordination or symmetry between states, a state of affairs which is
“essential” in international litigation.11 It also helps parties to evaluate the rules
applicable to their actions and make adjustments, if need be.12
The choice of law rules discussed in this chapter are the law of the place of
contract (lex loci contractus), the law of the place of performance (lex loci
solutionis), the law of the domicile of parties; the law that validates the contract, the
law that is closely connected with the contract (center of gravity rule), and the
express intention of the parties (party autonomy). This analysis shows, among other
things, that all but one of the rules (the party autonomy rule), suffers from a
common defect – they do not promote the objectives of the choice of law theory
which include certainty and uniformity of decisions.13 In other words, the
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application of these rules, except the party autonomy rule, sometimes, produces
uncertainty and arbitrary results; hence the preference for the party autonomy
rule.14
Generally, a comparison of the party autonomy rule with other choice of
law rules may be likened to comparing “apples and oranges.” This is because most
countries usually apply party autonomy and other choice of law rules in different
contexts. While the party autonomy rule is applicable where parties have made, or
intended to make a choice of law, other rules apply where parties have not made
such choice.15 However, it should also be noted that some countries still rely on
some of these rules regardless of the parties’ choice.16 This thesis does not seek to
make a parallel comparison of the rules, but to point out reasons why parties may
prefer to make an express choice of law in their contract, and why courts usually
give preference to this choice. It does this by examining the rules one after the
other.
3.1.1. The Law of the Place of Making (Lex loci contractus)
This choice of law rule connects the law of a territory to contracts made within that
territory.17 It is rooted in the territorial or vested right theory supported by Beale
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and his followers.18 Indeed, it is a time-honoured principle that parties in a given
territory ought not to violate the law of the territory, lest their contract be
invalidated by the law of that territory.19 This theory proposes that a contract is
born into a legal system and that rights are “vested” in a contract through its “place
of birth.”20 This vested territorial right is inherent in the contract, no matter where it
is interpreted or enforced.21 Courts and writers favour the application of this rule
when in doubt about the application of other choice of law rules.22 They justify it on
the basis that the territoriality principle is similar to the one applicable to crime and
tort cases – territorial principle and lex loci delicti.23 Proponents of this rule
conclude that it gives certainty in choice of law issues because the place where a
contract is “made” is usually established and certain.24
However, this rule has some inherent weaknesses. First, because of different
modes and rules of creating contracts, it sometimes produces uncertain and absurd
results.25 This is evident in international or interstate contracts where contracts are
concluded by correspondence.26 If a Canadian and a Norwegian enter into a
contract via electronic communication, telegram or mail without meeting in a
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particular territory, it is difficult to determine the law of the place of contract. Dicey
and Morris say that the rule is “useless” in this instance.27 An attempt to explain
away this weakness by referring to the last place of correspondence (place of
acceptance – mailbox rule),28 in the course of negotiation, as the place of contract,
is an arbitrary and artificial refinement and may not even be applicable in oral
electronic contracts.29 Indeed, the last place of acceptance is usually “accidental” or
“fortuitous” because it has no connection with the contract.30 If a Canadian and a
German, traveling from Egypt to Brazil, while on a train passing through Spain,
agreed and executed a contract, should Spanish law govern their contract just
because the contract was executed on Spanish soil?31 Advocates of this rule argue
that so far as they were not dragged into the train by fraud or by force, there is no
reason why Spanish law should not be the governing law.32 This argument is weak
because parties may not be aware that they are on Spanish soil, or of the effect of
Spanish law on their agreement and contract. This scenario shows that the place of
contract may be fortuitous and irrelevant to the contract because the rule attaches
importance to unintended actions. It is safe to conclude that the law governing a
contract requires more spatial connection than the one that the lex loci contractus
rule offers.33
27
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This rule is also problematic in unilateral contracts where parties agree that
the contract be performed in different states to establish it.34 Since the contract has
different places of establishment, it may be difficult to ascertain the governing law.
This is because there are differences in the contract laws of states regarding the
place of contract.35 While the forum court may regard an “event” as done in a
particular place, it may not be regarded as such by the law of the place where the
contract was purportedly made.36 For example, at common law, a contract is
deemed executed as soon as the addressee of an offer dispatches his acceptance; but
some civil law countries only recognize acceptance when it is declared, or when it
arrives at the offeror's address, or received by the addressor, or even when it comes
to the addressor’s knowledge.37 On this basis, the differences in the theory of
acceptance in different countries make the lex loci contractus impracticable in some
instances.38 Indeed, Rabel says that “[i]t [lex loci contractus] defies common sense
every time when it makes the fate of a contract dependent on the legalistic fitness
determining at what place the deal was completed in the juristic sense.”39
Despite its shortcomings, this rule is not completely useless in determining
an applicable law in most countries. In the absence of the parties’ express choice of
law, courts usually consider the place of the making of a contract as one of the
factors for determining a tacit or implied choice of law.
3.1.2. The Law of the Place of Performance (Lex Loci Solutionis)
This rule shares a theoretical underpinning with the lex loci contractus rule – the
vested right theory or territorial principle. The difference is that, while lex loci
the rule. The mail box rule posits that in a correspondence contract, the place of the last correspondence is
the place of contract.
34
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contractus rule makes the law of the place of execution the connecting factor, lex
loci solutionis rule makes the place of performance the connecting factor for
determining the applicable law. This rule attaches significance to the “mode and
incidents” or modalities of payment or other performance of a contract.40
Proponents, therefore argue that this rule is based on express intention rule (party
autonomy) because the performance of a contract is usually based on the intention
and agreement of the parties.41 Although the lex solutionis rule usually answers
questions regarding the performance, discharge, and breach of a contract,42
opponents of this rule argue that it cannot be used to determine the validity of a
contract.43 This is because the vested rights theory only refers the question of the
validity of a contract to the place of execution and not the place of performance.44
Just like the lex loci contractus rule, it is also difficult to determine the place
of performance in cases of multiple places of performance, unless the contract is
divisible and each is treated as a separate contract.45 For example, it is difficult to
know the exact place of performance in a case of a freight contract that obligates a
party to distribute goods to different destinations or countries. Advocates of this
rule try to explain away this weakness by postulating that in the event of a breach of
a contract that requires multi-state performance, the law of the place where the
breach occurred will be the applicable law.46 This postulation ignores the fact that
multiple actions, occurring in different places and times, may culminate into a
breach. In such an instance, it may be difficult to determine the place of the action
that materially caused the breach of performance. Advocates of this rule also
neglect the fact that a contract may not involve a breach to activate a conflict of law
issue. Matters involving validity and the formalities of a contract do not involve
breach, but they are matters that require the application of a choice of law rule.
In another attempt to solve this multi-state performance problem,
proponents of this rule rely on the most connected place of performance or the
40
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place of contract making.47 But courts’ reliance on the most connected place of
performance, without any criteria for determining the “most connected place,”
usually results in “nebulous evaluations” which breed uncertainty in the application
of the rule.48 In the event that the place of performance is ascertainable, it may bear
little or no relation to the contract, or may even be accidental, just like the lex loci
rule.49 The most connected place supposition offers no explanation to argue away
the uncertainty and absurdity that the lex loci solutionis generates.
The rule also becomes problematic where a contract is silent on the place of
performance; or where it is difficult to determine performance in the contract; or
where there is no place of performance at all.50 Also, it is difficult to know the law
of the place of performance where the performance of a contract is optional, that is,
where a party may perform in one or several places that he deems fit; or where the
performance of a contract is to be agreed upon at a later date which never
happened.51 In these instances, advocates argue that the contract is performable in
the place of its making, or at some other superficial place.52 The weakness of this
argument has been pointed out above – it is difficult to ascertain the place of
contract making. The rule also creates an unfair and absurd result in a bilateral
contract where both parties are required to perform obligations. The law of one
party may exempt him from performance, but he may still be able to demand
performance from the other party because the law of the place of performance of
the other party enforces performance.53
Conflicts of law cannot schematically rely only on the lex solutionis rule to
solve choice of law problems. This rule does not only, sometimes, produce unfair
results; it breeds uncertainty in the application of choice of law rules.54
3.1.3. Personal Law of the Parties (Lex Domicilii)
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This rule proposes that matters concerning an individual should be governed by the
system of law mostly connected to the individual.55 It connects the law of the
domicile of parties to their contracts.56 This rule stems from Mancini’s theory that
the law of domicile should be applied to a contract, subject to the ordre public of
the lex fori.57 The application of this rule appears straight-forward because parties
can only have one domicile at a time.58 However, it becomes problematic in a
contract where parties possess different domicile – an unavoidable situation in
international contracts.59 The difficulty arises from choosing the domicile that
prevails. For example, the rule proposes that the debtor’s domicile should
determine rights and obligations arising from the debt. As a result, he cannot
promise more than what his domicile allows.60 This makes the domicile of the
debtor more important than that of the creditor. This means that the debtor’s
domicile governs the performance of a debt in another country – an unintended
extra-territorial effect. The application of this rule could have produced an absurd
result in Milliken v Pratt.61 Here, Mrs. Pratt, who was domiciled and resident in
Massachusetts, agreed with a supplier, who was resident in Maine, that she would
stand surety for her husband, who was buying goods on credit from the supplier.
Mr. Pratt defaulted, and the supplier sued Mrs. Pratt in Massachusetts. Under the
Massachusetts law as it stood at that time, a married woman could not bind herself
as surety; but under Maine law, she could do this. The court rejected the arguments
on the law of domicile because this means that the surety would not be liable for
her actions. The Court relied on the “place of acceptance”, which is Maine, to hold
that Mrs. Pratt was liable. This decision avoids the absurdity that could arise from a
situation where a surety is absolved form responsibilities. Indeed, the development
of personal laws is more advanced in some countries than in others. It is, therefore,
not uncommon to see that sometimes, the law of the domicile of a country may lose
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touch with current developments in the world.62 If the objective of conflict of laws
is to do justice in private matters, the domicile law of some countries, as depicted in
Milliken v Pratt, may not reflect this justice.
Relying on the law of domicile as a connecting factor also means that
parties have the “onerous” task of investigating each other’s domicile, as well as
ascertaining the law of that domicile, however remote.63 This investigation involves
discovering the parties’ intention as to domicile.64 It is difficult to determine the
scope of the law of the debtor’s domicile because the contract of the debtor may not
have any factual connection to his domicile.65 Even if this is successfully done, a
party may abandon his domicile after the execution or performance of the
contract.66 This results in absurdities because parties, during negotiation, may have
executed the contract based on the law of the domicile of each other.67 Therefore, it
is not an overstatement to conclude that, because of these weaknesses, lex domicilii
law does not play a significant role as a connecting factor in choice of law issues.68
3.1.4. Center of Gravity or Close Contact Rule
This choice of law rule proposes that the terms of a contract, including a choice of
law clause, must be weighed together in determining the applicable law of a
contract.69 It is believed that the validity of a contract must be weighed
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independently of the intention of the parties.70 Thus, this rule seeks to weigh or
group the terms of a contract to determine the applicable law or validity of the
contract.71 It seeks to choose the law that has the closest connection or contact with
the contract. It is believed that this will produce an “equitable result” in determining
the “proper law.”72 As stated in Auten v Auten,73 this rule “gives control to the place
having the most interest in the case, enables the court to give effect to the probable
intention of the parties, and provides courts with an opportunity to give
consideration to the states offering the best practical result.”74
There are two levels of contact under this rule – policy consideration level
and the contract counting level. The first considers the policy of states connected to
a contract –jurisdiction-selecting theory and government interest analysis.75 United
States scholars usually advocate policy considerations for determining the contact
of the contract and, by extension, the applicable law of a contract.76 These theories
remove the application of conflict of laws rules from the realm of individual will
and fix it between state policies. This jurisdiction-selecting theory particularly
encourages the development of “narrow rules” that enable courts to determine the
contact of the contract through an “objective [state] approach.”77 These theories
poses challenges to the autonomy of parties.
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A choice of law based on the theoretical underpinnings of “state interest” is
problematic because parties are at the center of contracts and not states.78 In fact,
the origin of contract disputes starts with parties. It is the individuals, and not
states, who bear the consequences of their actions.79 Parties should be able to
fashion their relationships the way they like, because they must have considered
how their choice of law will affect their controversy.80 The jurisdiction-selecting
theory and government interest analysis advocate for the recognition of state
policies, but states themselves recognize the autonomy of parties to choose the
applicable law.81 It is not surprising that the “government interest” theory has been
the subject of theoretical criticism since its introduction by Currie.82 Currie’s
analysis has been tagged irrelevant in the determination of choice of law rules.83
The second level of contact – contact counting – considers other choice of
law rules, including the place of contract, performance, domicile of parties or place
intended by the parties.84 While this level of contact counting seeks to avoid
criticisms against anti-autonomy by acknowledging that a choice of law clause is
one of the “contacts” in a contract, its application is characterized by uncertainty.85
This is because it is conjectural to determine the applicable law of a contract by
deciding the contracts’ contact with a legal system.86 It is difficult to determine the
most vital and substantial contact in cases of competing or evenly balanced clauses
in a contract.87 Thus, a judge may attach significance to the most trivial connection,
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which may be the forum law, because the trivial connection may be the best law for
some judges.88
Also, it is common for parties to select different laws to govern different
areas in their international contracts. In this instance, it is difficult to group different
choice of law clauses to determine an applicable law of the contract because chosen
laws apply to different individual contract terms. Realizing that the application of
this rule may sometimes be futile, advocates argue that where it is impossible to
group contacts in a contract, party autonomy should be applied.89 This argument
paradoxically accords a subsidiary role to party autonomy, instead of making it the
main rule.
Finally, contract counting encourages parties to engage in “contact
building.”90 This means that parties, because of an impending litigation, may
intentionally tie the events of a contract to a particular legal system, such that the
intended legal system becomes the center of gravity or the closest connection to the
contract.91 The wisdom in the dissenting opinion of Judge Desmond in Dym v
Gordon sums up the weaknesses of this rule as follows:
Contacts,’ ‘interest,’ ‘center of gravity,’ etc... are
catchwords representing at best not methods or bases of
decision but considerations to be employed in setting up
the new rules of law required by changing times. Counting
up ‘contacts’ or locating the ‘center of gravity’ or weighing
the respective ‘interests’ of two states can never be a
satisfactory way of deciding actual lawsuits.92
In sum, the center of gravity rule depends on some sort of logic on the part
of the court and parties to determine the applicable law. But it is a truism that the
life of the law is not dependent on logic but on experience.93
3.1.5. The Law of the Place Which Validates the Contract (Lex Validitatis)
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This rule is usually applied when a court is faced with the question of the validity of
a contract. The rule seeks to select from two competing rules – the law that
invalidates and that which validates the contract. It ignores the law that invalidates
the contract and selects that which validates it.94 It is based on the theoretical
presumption that the parties have intended that their contract be governed by the
law under which it is legally effective.95 It presumes that individuals do not act in
folly or dishonesty but “rather that they intended in good faith that their acts shall
be valid and what they purport it to be.”96 It has also been pointed out that the
application of this rule “better serve[s] business convenience... by making their
[parties’] acts an enforceable promise.”97 This is because it is only practical and
sensible that parties should be held to their bargains98 and that, in any event,
parties’ “true intent is not so much that a particular law governs, but that their
contract be binding.”99 Therefore, proponents of the lex validitatis rule argue that
regardless of the chosen law, the only practical thing to do is to uphold the validity
of a contract.100
Just like other rules, the justifications for this rule also suffer from some
weaknesses. First, as to the argument that it is the intention of parties that their
contracts be valid, it is difficult to decipher the intention of parties in the absence of
a choice of law clause or in cases where the choice is one that is not inferable.
Thus, this rule relies on presumptions.101 Also, parties may be genuinely mistaken
as to the effect of their intended applicable law, such that the law invalidates the
94
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contract.102 In this instance, the parties’ choice of law invalidates their contract and,
because of this, the purpose of the rule is defeated. However, it may be argued that
the court will search for another law to validate the contract. Clearly, an application
of another law to “save the day” is not a manifestation of parties’ intention in this
instance. In effect, the application of the lex validitatis rule in some instances may,
like preceding rules, lead to absurdity or uncertainty.103
3.1.6. The Law of the Place of Litigation (Lex Fori)
This choice of law rule dictates that, regardless of the contract’s contact with
another state’s law or the intention of the parties, the law of the place where the
matter is litigated should be applied (forum law).104 The party who argues for the
application of a foreign law must show reasons for its application. The lex fori rule
is based on the theory that “if the forum and a foreign state each have a domestic
rule, the underlying policies of which are applicable to the interstate case in issue, it
is improper for a court to give effect to the policies of another State in preference to
those of its own State.”105 Therefore, the forum’s policy interest trumps the
application of any foreign law.106 By this rule, the notion of justice to a case is
based on the superiority of a state policy rather than the human conduct which is at
the center of the dispute
Thus, the forum state, which may be fortuitous to hear a case, is portrayed
as a depository of just laws.107 While this rule promotes the forum state’s policies, it
encourages forum shopping because a plaintiff that is aware of a favourable estate
policy on an issue may litigate in that forum as opposed to the “appropriate” or
102
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agreed forum. Also, because of different state policies, similar facts will lead to
different results in different states. This necessarily results in a lack of uniform
decisions on the same facts. This rule also creates a tension between states because
it fixes the choice of law issue among states instead of individuals.108 In effect, the
application of this rule results in a lack of uniformity on the one hand, and breeds
conflict between states on the other hand. Conflict between states means that the
decision of a state is based on how its citizens are treated in another state –
reciprocity. For example, if a Nigerian court, based on Nigerian state policy, refuses
to enforce a loan contract between a German creditor and Nigerian debtor, German
courts and legislature would, as a matter of reciprocity, necessarily deny Nigerian
creditors such an opportunity in Germany. This hinders international or
transactional contracts because citizens of these countries would avoid doing
business with each other.
3.1.7. Express Intention of the Parties (Party Autonomy)
The discussion in chapter 2 above explains the meaning and development of party
autonomy. So here, it suffices to say that the application of parties’ will through
choice of law clauses has “sprinted ahead” of other choice of law rules.109 It has
been noted that “within its realm, it [party autonomy] trumps all other conflict
rules.... thus, [party autonomy] prevails over other conflicts rules, which are
denigrated to mere default rules.”110 In effect, other choice of law rules have been
treated as “subsidiary” rules when courts make choice of law decisions.111
Party autonomy has grown in many dimensions over the years. It has been
described as “one of the fundamental principles of private international law;”112 and
a “master” of all rules in conflict of laws.113 It has also been characterized as

108

See generally, Lehman, supra note 8.
Weintraub, supra note 5 at 355.
110
Lehmann, supra note 8 at 389.
111
Rabel, supra note 6 at 440-441.
112
Institute of International Law, “Resolution on the Autonomy of the Parties in International Contracts
Between Private Persons or Entities” (1992) 64 II YB 383.
113
Lehmann, supra note 8 at 389.
109

64

“perhaps the most widely accepted private international rule of our time,114 a
“fundamental human right”115 and an “irresistible principle that belongs to the
common core of the legal systems.”116 The doctrine has also been likened to
“motherhood and the proverbial pie: virtually nobody is against it and most
commentators enthusiastically endorse it.”117 In effect, party autonomy is described
as a “universal approach which has also been a success in practice.”118 The last
characteristic is an overstatement because there is no universal rule for all
situations. 119 Indeed, it is impossible to have just one approach to all circumstances
because there are many variables that prevent this possibility.120 Thus, other choice
of law rules still co-exist with the party autonomy rule, albeit in different
circumstances.
Those rules may be applied symmetrically with the party autonomy rule to
determine the applicable law of a contract. But countries usually begin the choice of
law process by looking for the will of the parties before considering other rules.121
Therefore, the application of other choice of law rules is treated as dependent on an
absence or presence of the parties’ intention. Lord Wright explained that “English
law in deciding these [choice of law] matters has refused to treat as conclusive rigid
or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis and has treated
the matter as depending on the intention of the parties to be ascertained in each case
on a consideration of the terms of the contract...”122
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However, a German scholar described party autonomy as a “stopgap” that is
only applicable to choice of law issues where there is no other satisfactory rule.123
By this, party autonomy is a make-shift rule. This proposition is oblivious to the
fact that party autonomy possesses inherent traits which endear both parties and
courts to recognize choice of law clauses in contracts. This proposition does not
reflect the importance and advantages of party autonomy in choice of law theories,
especially in international or multi-state contracts. This thesis has shown that the
inadequacies of other choice of law rules have been most evident in international or
multi-state contracts.124 Party autonomy fulfils the objectives of choice of law rules
in multi-state contracts.125 Some of the objectives which the party autonomy rule
fulfils are as follows:
3.1.7.1. Certainty and Predictability
A major advantage that party autonomy has over other choice of law rules is that it
enables parties to predict the applicable law to their contracts.126 This means that
the governing law of a contract is not left to circumstances outside the reach of the
parties; it is controlled by the parties through a choice of law clause.127 This
function is important because parties are unable to claim opportunistically the
protection of contractual rights which they did not envisage as applicable in their
contract.128 Therefore, party autonomy enables the parties to plan their transaction
according to the proposed chosen law.129
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Also, through party autonomy, contractual parties are sure of their legal
choices, especially on issues relating to the choice of the governing law. 130 Thus,
persons of different nationalities or regions are able to enter into a contract without
the fear that the law of the country of one party will “override” the other.131 This
gives security to contractual parties.132 The need for certainty is important in
international contracts where more than one national law may equally be applicable
to the contract because:
An international contract, like any other contract, requires
certainty. Where several fora are available and several laws
potentially applicable, the parties should be able to avert
such uncertainties through an agreed choice of law and/or
forum. To leave that determination to a court invites
uncertainty since national choice of law rules ...differ and
even if they involve similar non-rule statements, such as
the ‘centre of gravity’ or ‘close connection’ test, they are
open to judicial chauvinistic manipulation.”133
To this end, parties can avoid a fortuitous application of other choice of law
rules which may, sometimes, yield uncertain and unexpected results. Because of
this advantage over other choice of law rules, some writers have argued that party
autonomy promotes the reasonable expectation of parties.134 For example, a writer
stated that “The theory [party autonomy] provides, in general, for the fulfillment of
the ‘actual’ reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract.”135 However, it
should be noted that the satisfaction of parties’ reasonable expectation is limited to
instances where such expectations deserve satisfaction.136 As the next section
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shows, parties’ expectations are curtailed or limited in certain cases to satisfy
national interests and also to protect weaker parties.
3.1.7.2. Commercial Convenience/Flexibility
Party autonomy promotes international or transnational commerce. This is because
parties can choose laws outside their respective domestic legal systems. This
encourages “internationalization” of choice of law rules. As a result, parties are able
to choose a “neutral law” that has no connection with their contract. 137 Indeed, the
growth of various types of contract laws in the 21st century makes the application of
the party autonomy rule inevitable.138 Through party autonomy, parties enjoy the
freedom to choose any “sophisticated” contract law of any country to suit their
commercial need.139 In international contracts, there are usually various motives for
selecting the law of a country, one of which is the “attractiveness” of the law of the
chosen country.140 For example, English law has enjoyed patronage from
contractual parties in international insurance and maritime contracts because of its
development in these areas of law.141 The ability of parties to choose these laws or
venues, regardless of geographical location of the contract or nationality of the
parties, promotes legal commercial convenience. It is arguable that parties will be
able to settle their disputes with ease if a contract is governed by the law of the
country which has “best practices” in that area of law and in which there are settled
judicial precedents and robust legislative frameworks.
Finally, to achieve commercial convenience in an international contract,
there is a need for flexibility in the choice of law rules. Party autonomy ensures that
parties enjoy flexibility in their choice of law rules, such that they can satisfy their
peculiar transactional needs by choosing the best applicable choice of law rule most
suited to their transactions.
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3.1.7.3. Uniformity
Generally, uniformity of decisions in different national courts is one of the aims of
choice of law theory.142 Indeed, one of the reasons for applying choice of law rules
is to ensure uniform decisions.143 For example, advocates of the lex situs rule argue
that the reason for applying the law of the place of a contract is that such a place is
certain. But because of developments in contract law, as well as different national
contract laws, it is difficult to achieve uniformity by this rule.
The application of the autonomy rule fulfills this important objective for
choice of law because it proposes that, regardless of: the national court; domicile of
the parties; the center of gravity; or place of performance, parties’ choice of law is
accepted as the applicable law. In the “ticket case” of Siegelman v Cunard White
Star Limited,144 an agent of the defendant issued tickets which contained a choice of
law clause (English law) to persons of different nationalities on board a ship. It was
held that the rationale for including the choice of law clause in the ticket is that,
regardless of the forum, there will be a uniform applicable law.145 Indeed, this
example shows that the recognition of party autonomy is a way to achieve uniform
decisions.
Uniformity in the application of a choice of law rule also encourages easy
enforcement of judgments because, if countries recognize the power of individuals
to choose the applicable law in their contracts, arguments on the applicable law are
eliminated during enforcement of the judgment.146 Related to the foregoing is the
fact that party autonomy discourages forum-shopping because parties would have
agreed on the applicable law and, sometimes, court.147 Thus, a party may object to
the jurisdiction of a court based on agreement of a choice of law or forum clause.
3.1.7.4. Less Burden on National Courts and parties
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Other choice of law rules, apart from party autonomy, share a common
characteristic – they, sometimes, involve the consideration of different factors to
arrive at an applicable law. For example, the application of the center of gravity
rule involves a “preliminary test” of every occurrence connected to the contract.
This may not be an enviable task for judges who listen to counsel arguments from
divergent views. First, the judge collates the facts (characterization); decides which
facts are relevant to the determination of the applicable law and those that are not;
examines the applicable laws to justify each state policy; and most onerously,
determines the law of the country that is closely connected to the contract.148 This
process is just a preliminary decision which is exclusive of the trial. In an extreme
situation, a dissatisfied party, after the preliminary decision on the choice of law,
may apply for a stay of proceedings to appeal the decision. In countries with slow
judicial process, it may take years before this point is resolved, by which time
evidence may be lost and witnesses or the parties may have died.
Party autonomy removes the burden of making decisions on the applicable
law from the court to parties.149 This is because allowing parties’ will to decide the
applicable law removes the preliminary judicial inquiries on the applicable law.
This simplistic nature of party autonomy is preferred to other “complex” choice of
law rules.150 Indeed Walker says that “conflict of law rules should be easy and
simple and easy to apply: they should facilitate the judicial task.” 151 Once a choice
of law clause is included in a contract, courts, often-times, do not see the need to
inquire about the application of other rules. This was demonstrated in Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star Limited when Judge Harlan said:
We see no harm in letting the parties' intention control ...
Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the legislative
function, it seems more realistic to regard them as relieving
the courts of the problem of resolving a question of conflict
148
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of laws. Their course might be expected to reduce
litigation, and is to be commended as much as good
draftsmanship which relieves courts of problems of
resolving ambiguities.152
The parties’ burden of choosing the applicable law does not include
analyzing the intricacies of the application of other choice of law rules. The only
requirement is that, based on their preferences, parties should agree on the
applicable law. Thus, if the parties agree on a law, it will be unnecessary to engage
the services of solicitors from different countries to analyze the intricacies of the
otherwise applicable rules or laws (although it is sometimes good). This saves the
parties’ time and energy on the choice of law clause in a contract and allows them
to concentrate on other contract clauses. In some cases, the choice of law clause
may even be a product of negotiation and compromise.153 For example, a party may
concede to a particular law in exchange for another favourable clause in the
contract.154 This introduces the flexibility that parties need in a contract to strike a
“balanced” negotiated contract.
3.1.7.5. Sense of Justice between the Parties
The search for justice between parties is one of the objectives of the application of
choice of law rules.155 Indeed, the desire to do justice in cases involving legally
relevant foreign elements is one of the most important objectives of any legal
system.156 In cases where parties are of equal bargaining power and the choice
results from the free will of parties, the application of the party autonomy rule gives
parties a sense of justice.157 This is because “the law chosen by the parties may on
occasions be more sensitive to fair dealings and moral concepts than even that of
the domicil of the parties [or any other choice of law rule].”158 Parties, therefore,
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become partners in the administration of justice to their disputes. Also, since there
may be more than one applicable law in an international contract, it is difficult to
justify application of one law over the other because “it is highly unlikely in the
mid-twentieth century that any one state is the sole depositary of just laws.”159 It is
difficult to answer the question that: in the case of two applicable laws that seek to
do justice, which one should prevail?160 Party autonomy, therefore, solves this
problem by allowing the parties to choose the applicable law. This ultimately
creates parties’ sense of belonging and responsibility in the judicial process.
3.1.8. Criticism of the Party Autonomy rule
Apart from the early opposition to party autonomy discussed in chapter 2, scholars
also criticize it as a conflict of laws rule. The criticism is like Beale’s “party
legislation” argument. It is argued that “it [party autonomy] allows the intention of
private parties to determine the scope of the legislative jurisdiction of states that have
not delegated such power to them.”161 A writer concluded that “it will be hopeless
for one to predict the validity of a contract according to the intention theory.”162
This argument is flawed because most states recognize party autonomy.163
The argument also ignores the fact that a choice of law clause is just a piece of paper
with no legal force until the courts “breathe life into it.”164 In effect, parties’ choice
of law is still subject to the forum courts’ scrutiny.165 In some cases, the choice of
law does not even change the risk allocation in a contract which is based on contract
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law principles. Indeed, regardless of the applicable law, party autonomy does not
affect the legislative jurisdiction or interests of states.166
Another justification for the party autonomy rule, contrary to what critics say,
is that it is not an unruly horse. This is because it operates within a delineated legal
limit. This point is discussed next.
3.2. Party Autonomy: An Unruly Horse?
Notwithstanding the advantages of party autonomy, should countries allow parties to
choose the applicable law without any restraint? The answer is in the negative.
Indeed, it has been noted that “everyone agrees that however desirable party
autonomy may be, it cannot be absolute. While individuals and enterprises ought to
be free to select any law they please, they should not be able to abuse that freedom to
the detriment of one of the contracting parties or society at large.”167 There are
reasons why party autonomy has been limited in some circumstances, and how this
has been done. The limitations which vary from country to country, are mainly
twofold – unequal bargaining power and public policy.
3.2.1. Unequal Bargaining Power
As noted in Chapter 2, party autonomy is an exercise of contractual freedom in
regard to choice of law. However, there are instances where a party is unable to
exercise the freedom to choose the applicable law, because the other party
possesses overwhelming bargaining power.168 This may be because of inequality
(asymmetries) of information between the parties.169 An example of this scenario
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exists in adhesion contracts, the types in fine print in standard form containing prearranged and offered by a “stronger” party to the other party on a take it or leave it
basis.170 Adhesion contracts include loan agreements, consumer contracts,
franchise, employment contracts and transportation contracts.171 These contracts
either completely remove the freewill of the adhering party or fundamentally
restrict it. There is, therefore, the need to balance freedom of contract and fairness
between parties in these types of contracts.172
Generally, party autonomy is a product of two opposing principles. First is
the need to assign the judge the role of an umpire with no discretion to interfere
with the choice of law clause in a contract. Second is the need for fairness which
encourage judges’ “active” participation in determining whether parties are not, by
any means, coerced or influenced in a choice of law decision, such that the choice
is not autonomous in the true sense of it.173 In support of the latter principle,
Ehrenzweig describes true autonomy as freedom to contract and not freedom to
adhere.174 Thus, courts strive to balance these principles to ensure justice in
individual cases.
3.2.2. Public Policy
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Since party autonomy is a function of the choice of law rules of each state,175 states,
in order to protect their policies, limit the will of the parties to choose the applicable
law.176 These policies seek to protect the interest of the public, third party interests,
or even the interests of the parties themselves.177 Indeed, it has been noted that
“appropriate constraints on party autonomy are necessary to protect the autonomy
of others.”178 This why states seek to balance the competing interests at stake in the
exercise of party autonomy, with their legitimate protective interests.179 The
protective measures of public policies are, often times, expressed as mandatory
rules that limit the right of parties to choose laws that are against the “fundamental
values” of the forum state or, otherwise, the applicable law.180
A mandatory rule, therefore, “is an imperative provision of law which must
be applied to an international relationship irrespective of the law that governs that
relationship.”181 The principles of territoriality and sovereignty are exemplified in
the application of mandatory rules because the forum or the country whose law
would otherwise be applicable, dictates the scope and manner of application of
party autonomy.182 For example, the insurance, usury, franchise, and consumer
laws of most countries contain provisions that protect the national interests, such
that parties cannot evade the application of these laws to their contracts.183 It should
be noted that mandatory rules do not just restrict the scope of party autonomy;
sometimes they prohibit party autonomy altogether. For example, public policy
expressed in the form of mandatory rules may dictate the legality or otherwise of a
175
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contract. To this end, parties cannot make some contracts because mandatory law
deems them illegal. For example, gaming and lottery contracts are prohibited by the
law of most countries.
Generally, the limitations of the party autonomy rule discussed in this
section produce unpredictable results for its application because the determination
of the scope of the rule is left to the discretion of each state.184 States’ balancing of
public rights against private ones has never been done according to uniform criteria.
More so because “public policy” has not lent itself to an easy definition, nor has it
been easy to apply.185 As the next chapter shows, the scope or limitation of party
autonomy is usually determined by political, national and economic interests, legal
history, public policy, academic opinion and, even sometimes, religious beliefs. To
avoid or reduce this uncertainty, parties must be aware of the specific limitations to
party autonomy in the laws of the countries that they choose.186
3.3. Conclusion
The choice of law rules examined in this chapter show that all but one of the rules
cannot satisfy choice of law objectives—certainty, flexibility, simplicity and
uniformity. Party autonomy is the only conflict of law rule that satisfies these
fundamental objectives. By highlighting the advantages of party autonomy, this
thesis seeks to justify its application, especially in international commercial
contracts. This discussion in this chapter has portrayed party autonomy as a leading
choice of law rule, but points out that it carries limitations, two major reasons for
limiting it being unequal bargaining power between contracting parties and public
policy. These limitations, however, threaten the certainty and uniformity
justifications of the doctrine because they are influenced by varying factors in each
states.
The next chapter deals with these limitations in detail. It examines party
autonomy in some jurisdictions to exemplify its differing scope in different
184
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countries. The emphasis is on how and why the countries discussed have applied
these limitations to party autonomy. The conclusion is that the scope or limitation
of party autonomy is usually determined by political, national and economic
interests, legal history, public policy, academic opinion and even, sometimes,
religion.
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CHAPTER 4: SCOPE OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF LAW IN
CONTRACTS—THE CHALLENGE OF UNIFORMITY
4.0. Introduction
It is a truism that an absolute or unqualified party autonomy rule or doctrine is more
“mythical than realistic.”1 Since the party autonomy rule is dependent on its
recognition by sovereign states, this chapter analyzes the scope/limitation of the
rule and its application in some jurisdictions. This is done through a comparative
examination of national private international law rules and cases which apply them.
The comparative examination shows that there is no convergence in the application
of the doctrine in the world today.
Generally, countries apply differing limitation tests of party autonomy in
different circumstances and for different purposes. The purposes range from the
economic to the religious.2 Some countries do not even have a systemized private
international law rule that sets out these limitations; the limitations are left to the
interpretation of judges and individual national legislation.3 As a result, decisions
on choice of law are based on precedents and judicial discretion. 4 This further
deepens the divergence of the scope of party autonomy across jurisdictions.
Though this thesis reflects a textual analysis of some statutes and case law,
it does not reflect what courts presently do or what they will do. Therefore, the
discussion here constitutes “prophecies” of what courts may do based on what they
have done (precedents) and what national statutes contribute to this predictive
picture.5 Also, this thesis does not cover all the limitations and their applications in
national private international rules; it selects the ones relevant to its theme. This
selective approach is pragmatic, given the limited space this thesis allows.
Nonetheless, analysis of the selected national statutes will contribute to the overall
goal of this chapter – to show that the application of the party autonomy rule,
1
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through its varying national limitations, is far from uniform. Some of the limitations
and their applications are now examined.
4.1. The Substantial or Close Connection Test
This limitation requires that a choice of law should possess a territorial connection
to the contract.6 It relies on the theory that a choice of law must be related to a
particular place in the contract and not merely a fictitious relation to the contract.7
Thus, this test “rests in reality upon a compromise between the concept of party
autonomy and the principle of territoriality.”8 This means that parties are not bound
to choose the closest connection or vital law of any place connected to their
contracts; they are only required to choose the law of a place that is related to the
contract, albeit “substantially.”9 Indeed, the real meaning of party autonomy is lost
if parties are compelled to choose the law of the place that is closest or vital to their
contracts.10 This test seeks to prevent contractual parties from evading the laws of
the place that is closely connected to their contracts by choosing a “neutral” or
totally unrelated law.11 In other words, as long as they choose the law that has a
relation or is connected to their contract, the parties may evade what might
otherwise be an applicable law.12
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For a choice of law to satisfy the substantial or close connection test, it may
be sufficient to show that the chosen law is that of a jurisdiction “where a
significant enough portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur
or occurs.”13 This test may also be satisfied if the choice of law is that of the place
of domicile of one of the parties, the place of negotiation, the state of incorporation
of the parties, parties’ principal place of business, the situs of the property of goods,
or the place through which the goods were shipped.14 It is doubtful that a forum
clause is enough to create a substantial or reasonable connection. However, courts
may be inclined to treat the forum clause as a connection to the forum because
judges will be happy to apply the forum law which they are familiar with. Indeed, it
is a natural inclination of every judge to apply the law of his country. 15 Some
countries that apply this test are examined briefly.
4.1.1. The United States of America
The United States is one the countries that applies this limitation.16 Section 187(1)
of the Conflict of Laws Restatement (Second) generally provides that parties can
choose the applicable law “if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision directed at the issues.” Subsection 2 of the
same section provides that where such an issue is not one that could be “resolved
by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, the chosen law
must bear a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there must
be a reasonable basis for the parties’ choice.” The Uniform Commercial Code,
13
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98-99. For example, some states in the United States recognize the right of parties to choose a law that is
unconnected to their contracts. See NY General Obligations Law §§ 5-1401, 5-1402; see also UCC § 4A507 (wholesale wire transfer may select a law regardless of connection).
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2008, also has a similar limitation. This Code is a set of non-binding provisions
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI). The Code aims to achieve a
uniform application of choice of law rules and to facilitate easy commercial
transactions through its adoption in the 50 states of the United States.17 States have
therefore adopted it, albeit with variations in detail without any threat of
obligation.18 Section 1-105 (1) of the Code provides that “when a transaction bears
a reasonable relationship to [the forum] state and also to another state or nation, the
parties may agree that the law of either [the forum] state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties.” In effect, the Code requires that a
choice of law must have a “reasonable relation” to the contract.19
Despite some academic comments on these provisions,20 judicial decisions
that apply this test are few.21 This may not be unconnected to the fact that the test
permits courts’ discretion in determining a choice of law that has a “substantial
connection,” or a choice of law that is “reasonable.” Indeed, there is no definition
17

Jack Caldwell, Robert Jordan & George Pugh, “Choice of Law under the Uniform Commercial Code”
(1950) 10:3 La L Rev 278 at 278; Charles Bunn, “Freedom of Contract under the Uniform Commercial
Code” (1960) 2:1 Boston College L Rev 59 at 59.
18
See Symeon C Symeonides, American Private International Law (Alphen aan den Rijin, Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2008) at 215.
19
Uniform Commercial Code 1- 301 (1) (2008). It should be noted that the Revised Uniform Code 2003
had no connection test but it received less support from both the states and academics. See Graves, supra
note 16 at 59. As a result, the “connection test” was restored in 2008.
20
Most commentators agree that this provision seeks to prevent parties from evading the applicable local
law. See e.g. Eugene F Scoles et al, Conflict of Laws, 4th ed (Minnesota: West Group Publishers, 2004) at
947-948, 975; but see Steven N Baker “Foreign Law Between Domestic Commercial Parties: A Party
Autonomy Approach with Particular Emphasis on North Carolina Law” (2008) 30:3 Campbell L Rev 437
at 442. (he argues that the words are vague and too restrictive to ensure certainty and predictability in
contracts).
21
See e.g. Wright v Martek Power Inc, 314 F Supp 2d 1065 (D Colo 2004) (the court refused to enforce the
choice of law clause, both because the chosen state had no substantial relationship with the contract and
because the application of the chosen law would violate a fundamental policy of the state whose law would
otherwise govern); Sentinel Indus Contracting Corp v Kimmins Indus Service Corp, 743 So 2d 954 (Miss
1999) (the court disagreed with a Texas choice of law clause in a contract for dismantlement of a
Mississippi ammonia plant and its shipment to and reassembly in Pakistan); Robinson v Robinson, 778 2d
1105 (La 2001) (the court found that one spouse’s brief residence in the chosen state was not sufficient
connection for upholding the choice of law clause in a marital property contract); Curtis 1000 Inc v Suess,
24F 3d 941 (7th Cir 1994) (the court disregarded Delaware’s choice of law clause in an Illinois employment
contract because Delaware’s only connection was that it was the place of the employer’s incorporation).
Fuller Company v Compagnie De Bauxites De Guinee, 421 F Supp 938 (WD Pa 1976) (parties chose New
York but the court noted that there is no connection of New York to the making or performance of the
contract other than the retention by CBG of New York counsel. The court applied Pennsylvania law
because it bore a reasonable relationship to the transaction).
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of these ambiguous words in the statutes. This means that courts determine the
definition of these words and the application of this test on a case by case basis.
Practically, it is difficult for a choice of law to fail this test because if the parties fail
to satisfy the “connection” requirement, they may be able to show that the there is a
reasonable justification for the choice of an unconnected law.22 For example, in
Radioactive, JV v Manson,23 a case that involved a music recording contract, the
court noted that the choice of law (New York) was connected with the contract, and
that even if it were to be unconnected, New York law would have been reasonable
because New York courts “have significant experience with music industry
contracts.”24 Indeed, parties may not be short of reasons for choosing a particular
law.25 Such reasons include the developed or neutral nature of the chosen law,26 or
the parties’ familiarity with the chosen law.27
A commentator argued that the “close connection” and “reasonable choice”
limitations are identical because satisfaction of one necessarily leads to the
satisfaction of the other.28 This may not be so in cases where a law is chosen for its
neutrality and commercial convenience. A neutral law may satisfy the reasonable
test but not the close connection test.29 This is because a neutral choice of law is
usually unconnected to the contract. Nevertheless, these limitations are not
mutually exclusive. The “reasonable” relationship requirement only presents a
“lower hurdle” than the “significant connection” test.30
4.1.2. Spain

22

P M North, “Choice in Choice of Law” (1992) 3 KCLJ 29 at 36 (“commercial men and women are likely
to have good reasons, which should be accepted, for choosing an unconnected choice of law”).
23
153 F Supp 2d 462 (SDNY 2001).
24
Ibid at 471.
25
Frederick Alexander Mann, “The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws” (1987) 36:3 ICLQ 437 at 447.
26
Bremen v Zapata, 407 US 1 (1972). (choice of a neutral forum, resulting in a neutral choice of law was
held to be an adequate basis for upholding the choice of law clause).
27
Hay, Borchers & Symeonedes, supra note 14 at 1090.
28
SM Richardson, International Contracts and The Choice of Law (DCL Thesis, University of Canterbury
2005) [unpublished] at 287.
29
Baker, supra note 20 at 443.
30
Graham A Penn & Thomas W Cashel, “Choice of Law clauses under English and New York law” (1986)
I & II J Bus L 333 at 497, 500; Richardson, supra note 28 at 287.
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Spanish private international law rule also requires proximity of the chosen law
with the contract. Article 10(5) of the Spanish Civil Code states that: “The law to
which the parties have expressly submitted shall apply to contractual obligations,
provided that it has some connection with the transaction in question.”31 Unlike the
United States’ provision, the Spanish Code does not require parties to show the
reasonableness of their choice of law. Since the “reasonable choice” condition
permits a wider judicial discretion to uphold a choice of law, it may be argued that
Spanish courts do not possess as wide a discretion as the United States’ courts.
4.1.3. Panama
Another national legislation that regulates the proximity of the chosen law is the
Panamanian Private International Code, which came into force on 1 August 2015.
Article 75 of the Code expressly provides that “the applicable law must bear a link
with the economy of the transaction or derive from a law known by the parties.”32
The first criterion seeks to protect the economic interest of countries connected with
the contract (presumably Panama), while the second criterion seeks to ensure that
parties know the choice of law. This provision generally seeks to prevent evasive
contracts, as well as protect “weak” domestic parties against economic exploitation
in international contracts.33
Two authors ask: “what would happen if only one of the parties knows [the]
law: would such law be considered to satisfy the proximity requirement?”34 It is
suggested that the word, “parties,” as used by the Code, means mutual, not
unilateral knowledge. The more perplexing issue is the scope of the parties’
knowledge. Should parties know all the legal effects of their choice? Is a party
under any obligation to disclose adverse legal effects to the other party? It is
submitted that the knowledge required is one that will enable the parties to predict
31

Spanish Civil Code 1974, art 10(5).
Official
version
is
in
Spanish,
online:
<www.infojus.gob.ar/docsf/codigo_Civil_y_Commercial_de_la_Nacion.pdf>.
33
Chapter 2 of this thesis identified that one of the reasons for late development of the doctrine in the
Americas is the notion that party autonomy will encourage parties to choose a foreign law instead of the
domestic law. This provision seeks to allay such fear.
34
Maria Mercedes Albornoz & Nuria Gonzalez-Martin, “Towards the Uniform application of party
autonomy for choice of law in International Commercial Contracts” (2016) 12:3 J Priv Intl L 437 at 445446.
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the outcome of their choice; only Courts can determine the legal effect of their
choice.35 On the second question, parties must disclose the adverse legal effect of a
choice. This is because non-disclosure may be interpreted to be a misrepresentation
made in bad faith.
4.1.4. Nigeria
Although Nigeria does not have a national statute like Panama, Spain, or the United
States, the Nigerian Supreme Court decision in sonnar (Nigeria) Ltd v Panlenreedi
MS Nordwind36 suggests that Nigerian Courts may limit party autonomy in cases
where the choice of law has no relation to the contract—in this case, the parties
chose German law. The court found as a fact that the contract was between a
Liberian shipowner and a Nigerian shipper. The following are the geographical
connections to the contract: (1) Bangkok was the place of the supply (rice), (2)
Nigeria was the place of the delivery of the rice (the place of performance), (3) The
bill of lading was issued in Liberia. The only connection with Germany was that the
shipowner’s agent, who served as a transporter in this case, carried on its business
in Germany. The court saw no relevance of German law to the contract. It held that
for a choice of law to be effective, it must be reasonable. In this instance, the choice
of German law was unconnected with the contract. At the same time, it was
unreasonable, since it had little or no connection to the parties’ contract.
Other African countries that require proximity of the chosen law with the
contract include Algeria,37 Cape Verde,38 Angola,39 Mozambique,40 and GuineaBissau.41
4.1.5. The United Arab Emirates
35

Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 33.
[1987] NWLR (Pt 66] at 520 [Sonnar].
37
Algerian Civil Code (2007), art 18 expressly requires a “real connection” between the law chosen and the
parties or the contract, online: <www.joradp.dz/TRV/FCivil.pdf>.
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Cape Verde Civil Code (1997), art 41(2) only allows a choice of law “whose applicability corresponds to
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online:
<www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=202959>.
39
Angola Civil Code, Law Decree 496 of 25 November,1977, art 41.2.
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Mozambique Civil Code, enacted by Portuguese Ordinance No 22,869 of September 1967, art 41.2.
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also applies the proximity rule. Section 19 of the
United Arab Emirate Civil Transactions Code (CTC) provides that:
Contractual commitments in form and context shall be
governed by the law of the State where the common
residence of the contracting parties is located. Should they
have different residences, the law of the State where the
contract is made shall apply, unless the parties agree
otherwise, or the conditions show that another law is to be
applied.42
This Code acknowledges the will of the parties to choose an applicable law
but the choice of an unconnected law is a source of debate. Some commentators
argue that an unconnected choice of law should be recognized because section 23
of the CTC permits an Emirati court to apply general principles of private
international law where there is no express provision in the Code. They conclude
that reliance on private international law principles justifies the recognition of an
unconnected choice of law.43 Other commentators argue that an unconnected choice
of law should not be recognized “because the applicable law is restricted by the aim
of the contract.”44
The latter view has judicial support. In a reported case,45 the Emirati court
of appeal rejected the choice of English law in a contract because the payment of
four promissory notes was made in Abu Dhabi. The contract had no connection
with English law. The court, relying on article 20-23 of the Civil Procedure Law
(CPL),46 held that notwithstanding the choice of English law, Abu Dhabi courts had
an “international jurisdiction” to entertain the claim. It relied on section 21 of the
42

Federal Law of No (5) of 1985 On the Civil Transactions Law of the United Arab Emirates, Amended by
Federal Law No (1) of 1987.
43
See e.g. Aoudallah Shaiba Alhmad (  )تنازع القوانين واحكام التنازع القضائي في القانون االماراتيConflict of Laws and
the Conflict of Internal Jurisdiction in the Emirati Law (Dubai Police Academy, 2001) at 297 (in Arabic).
44
Hamad Ibrahim Ahmed Ali Alustath, Choice of Law in Respect of contracts in the United Arab Emirates
and the European Union; and Related Aspects of Private International Law in Relation to the Dubai
International Financial Centre (DCL Thesis, University of Essex School of Law, 2015) [unpublished] at
53.
45
Reported in Ahmad Al Awamleh, “Abu Dhabi Court: Choice of Law May not be a Choice” (6 March
2011) AL Tamimi & Co (blog), online: <www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-7/march6/abu-dhabi-court-choice-of-law-may-not-be-a-choice.html>; see also Christopher Mills & Susie AbdelNabi, UAE: Choice of Governing Law and Jurisdiction” (6 March 2014) Clyde & Co (blog), online: <
www.clydeco.com/insight/article/uae-choice-of-governing-law-and-jurisdiction>.
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CPL which states that the UAE courts shall have jurisdiction to hear proceedings
against an alien who maintains no residence or domicile in the UAE in the
following cases:
a. If he has elected domicile in the
UAE;
b. If the proceedings concern property
in the UAE, inheritance accruing to
a citizen or an estate opened
therein;
c. If the proceedings involve an
obligation that was made,
performed or was supposed to be
performed in the UAE, a contract to
be attested in the UAE, an event
that occurred in the UAE or
bankruptcy declared by a UAE
court.
The Court specifically relied on the last condition to ignore the English
choice of law because article 24 of the CPL states that if the parties’ choice is
contrary to the provision of article 21, it must be struck down.
4.1.6. The Close Connection Test is not a Universal Test
Not all private international law rules require connection with a chosen law. Most
countries in Europe, as well as Canada,47 and China48 do not require a substantial
connection.49 The most often cited authority for this proposition is the Privy
Council decision in Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co.50 The dictum of
Lord Wright that “connection with English law is not, as a matter of principle,

47

Catherine Walsh, “The Uses and Abuses of Party Autonomy in International Contracts” (2010) 60:1
UNBLJ 12 at 13-14.
48
See Yongping Xiao & Weidi Long, “Contractual Party Autonomy in Chinese Private International Law”
(2009) 11 Year Book of Private International Law 193 at 197 (“[a]lthough the chosen law most often has
some connection with the transaction, there is general consensus that Chinese law allows the choice of a
law which has no connection with the contract”).
49
Genevieve Saumier, “The Hague Principles and the Choice of Non-State ‘Rules of Law’ to Govern an
International Commercial Contract” (2014) 40:1 Brook J Intl L 1 at 2.
50
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essential,”51 has been followed by countries mentioned above. To this end, some
national statutes are silent on whether the choice of law requires a connection with
the contract.52 It is presumed that such silence mean that connection with the
contract is unnecessary.
4.2. The Choice of Law must be Bona fide, legal and not contrary to public
policy
This limitation is evidenced in the dictum of Lord Wright, speaking on behalf of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Vita Food. This case arose from
damage to a shipment of fish carried on a Canadian ship (The Hurry On) from
Newfoundland to New York, under bills of lading issued in Newfoundland in
1935.53 The cargo was damaged off the coast of Nova Scotia, Canada, and the suit
was brought in Nova Scotia where the carriers were domiciled. Even though the bill
of lading had no connection with English law, both parties expressly stated in the
bill of lading that English law is the governing law. This was because an old
contract clause was used in error, instead of a new contract clause (paramount
clause) that would have reflected provisions of The Hague Rules54 and section 3 of
the Newfoundland Carriage of Goods by Sea Act55 that were in force in 1935.56
Although the trial and Appeal Courts invalidated the contract because it was
contrary to the provisions of the statute (Newfoundland Act), the Privy Council,
based on the governing clause (English law), upheld the validity of the contract.
51

Ibid at 292.
See e.g. Civil and Commercial Code of the Argentine Republic, 2015, art 2651, Chinese Private
International Law Act 2010, art 3, 41; Cuba Civil Code (Law No 59) 1998, art 17; Japanese Act on the
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One of the issues was whether the parties could choose English law instead
of the Newfoundland Act that was closely connected to their contract. Lord Wright
answered the question in the positive. He stated that “connection with English law
is not, as a matter of principle, essential.”57 Therefore, an express intention of the
parties is conclusive under the common law.58 His classic dictum is as follows:
It is objected that this is too broadly stated and that some
qualifications are necessary...But where the English rule
that intention is the test applies, and where there is an
express statement by the parties of their intention to select
the law of the contract, it is difficult to see what
qualification are possible, provided the intention expressed
is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for
avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy.59
The Vita Food decision generally raises some choice of law issues,60 but
this thesis focuses on the scope of party autonomy as espoused by Lord Wright.
This is treated under four headings: Bona fide, legality, mandatory laws, and public
policy.
4.2.1. Bona fide Test
The meaning of “bona fide” as used by Lord Wright is a subject of academic
comments.61 One commentator even thinks that it has no meaning.62 My contrary
57

Vita Food, supra note 50 at 292.
R v International Trustee, [1937] AC 500 at 529; but see the Court decision in Re Helbert Wagg & Co
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opinion is that words are not used in vain; they usually have a meaning. Tetley
thinks that a bona fide choice means that the choice of law must be clear, express,
made in good faith and innocently.63 He argues that the choice of law clause in Vita
Food was based on an “old” standard form which was relied on in error or
“innocently.” This interpretation may be inaccurate because the word “good-faith”
itself is ambiguous and relatively subjective. Cheshire & North “presumes” that the
words “bona fide” mean that “parties cannot pretend to contract under one law in
order to validate an agreement that clearly has its closest connection with another
law.”64 They think that the fact that the choice of law was made in bad faith is
evidenced by a lack of connection between the contract and the law chosen.65 But if
the bona fide test is an anti- evasion test, the Vita Food case would have failed this
test because the choice of law in this case had no connection with the law chosen.
Indeed, the essence of party autonomy is to “evade” the otherwise applicable law. 66
Mann thinks that the word means a choice of law that is reasonable and not
arbitrary, capricious, eccentric or fanciful.67 This is because there are cases where
parties have made an unrelated choice of law decision and the choice was upheld
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because they were reasonable.68 Dicey and Morris, whose definition is similar to
that of Cheshire and & North, disagree. They argue that the word “bona fide”
means more than a “capricious” and “eccentric” choice of law.69
These scholars’ definitions may be academic because there is no reported
English decision where a choice of law was struck down because it failed the bona
fide test.70 Also, though most common law countries recognise this test, they deny
its existence because it is rarely applied.71 Regardless of the academic nature of this
definition, my view is that “bona fide,” as used by Lord Wright, means that the
choice of law must be a genuine one. Parties must have intended or declared to be
bound by their choice. It must not be feigned agreement or a mere facade. This
interpretation has its root in the intention theory because a choice of law clause
must be supported by an intention to be bound by it.
4.2.2. Legality, Public Policy, and Mandatory Law
These limitations are treated under the same heading in this thesis because laws
prohibiting illegal contracts and mandatory laws possess the element of public
policy. In effect, similarities in the application of these limitations do not make any
differences between them clear cut.72 Indeed, “every rule of law should be based
upon, and reflect policy considerations.”73 However, there is a difference between
statutes prohibiting illegal contracts and public policy. While court decisions that a
contract is illegal are usually based on positive laws (statutes), decisions of courts
on public policy are based on values so fundamental to the society as to necessitate
the courts’ intervention, even though there has been no breach of a legal obligation
68
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in a contract.74 There is also a difference between mandatory laws and public
policy. While public policy operates negatively because it disallows the application
of an otherwise applicable law, mandatory rules operate positively because they are
super-imposed on the applicable law of the contract.75 Simply, for purposes of this
thesis, it is taken that a limitation imposed by public policy is also deemed to be
imposed by mandatory law.
Most jurisdictions limit party autonomy in contracts that are tainted with
illegality. However, countries, or even states within a country, classify illegal
contracts differently.76 For example, though the United States’ federal statute
prohibits the sale of marijuana, its sale is legal in 23 of its states.77 While
Singaporean courts will not enforce a gaming contract because it is illegal under
Singaporean law,78 Canadian courts will enforce it.79 Therefore, it is necessary to
determine the law of the country that defines an illegal contract in an international
contract. This is because there is no consensus on the law of the country by which
legality is to be determined. Generally, illegality may be determined by the law of
the place of performance, the proper law, or the law of the place of contracting.80
The predominant view is that the proper law of the contract and the law of the place
of performance usually determine the legality of a contract in most common law
74
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countries.81 In effect, if a contract is illegal by the law of the place of performance
and the proper law, a choice of law of another jurisdiction will usually not be
recognized or enforced.
Just like determining illegality, the definition and scope of the applicable
public policy in a multi-state contract is not settled.82 One view is that the public
policy of the forum and its scope is the applicable public policy. 83 Another view is
that both the public policy of the forum and the public policy of a country which
would have been applicable had the parties not made a choice of law would be the
applicable law (mandatory law of the third countries). Countries that fall under this
latter category include the Netherlands,84 the United States of America,85 and
Switzerland.86
Determining the scope of party autonomy under these limitations is,
therefore, characterised by lack of uniformity and uncertainty in various
jurisdictions.
4.3. Choice of Mode of Expression
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There are different modes of expressing the parties’ intention. It may be through an
express or a tacit (implied) choice.87 Parties make an express choice through the
choice of law clause in a contract, while parties make a tacit choice if the terms or
surrounding circumstances of the contract point to a particular system of law.88
Contract terms that indicate a tacit choice include an exclusive jurisdiction clause,89
an express choice made in a related transaction or in a previous course of dealing, 90
and a standard form known to be governed by a particular system of law.91
The application of an express choice does not pose much threat to the
uniform scope of party autonomy because most jurisdictions permit parties to make
such choice, but the application of a tacit choice produces such a threat. This is
because some countries do not permit or restrict the application of a tacit choice of
law because of the fear that such choice may lead to an arbitrary result or a choice
unintended by the parties. This arises from the fact that tacit choices are usually
inferred based on judges’ assumptions from the terms or surrounding circumstances
of a contract.92 To prevent judges from making arbitrary tacit choices, countries
either totally prohibit tacit choices or, when they permit it, adopt different
approaches to ensure that the inferred choice of law reflects the will of the parties.
Some countries infer a choice of law based only on the terms of the contract, while
some rely on the surrounding circumstance of the case. Others even rely on both the
terms of the contract and surrounding circumstance of the case. Indeed, there is no
universal approach as to the indicators of a tacit choice of law.93
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Lack of uniformity of the scope of party autonomy is further deepened by
some countries’ stance on the scope of party autonomy generally – they do not set
out the modes of exercising the parties’ choice of law. This creates uncertainty in
the choice of law process because parties are unsure about how to make a choice of
law.94 Thus, parties and courts are enmeshed in the argument as to the proper mode
of exercising party autonomy and the validity of the mode adopted by a party.
In the discussion that follows, the divergence in the mode of exercising
party autonomy is further exemplified through legislative provisions and judicial
practices in some countries.
4.3.1. Countries that do not Recognize a Tacit Choice
Peru is one of the countries that require parties to make an express choice only. 95
For a choice of law to be valid under Peruvian law, it must be express, not tacit.
The Peruvian Civil Code provides that “contractual obligations are governed by the
law expressly chosen by the parties....”96 Chinese law also stipulates that a choice
of law should be made expressly. Article 3 of the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations (Chinese PIL
Act) provides that “the parties may explicitly choose the law applicable to their
foreign-related civil relation in accordance with the provision of this law.”97 A
commentator noted that this limitation is justified on the basis that “the boundary
line that separates reasonable interpretation from arbitrary fabrication is not
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clear.”98 He concludes that “given the judicial environment in China is far from
perfect,” limiting the autonomy of the parties to an express choice of law protects
parties from arbitrary results that may arise from an inferred choice of law.99
4.3.2. Provision for a tacit choice – divergent indicators
In countries that permit a tacit choice of law, the criteria for determining it are
divergent.100 These criteria run along two lines – determination of the choice of law
through contract terms or through the surrounding circumstances of the contract.
For example, the national private international law statutes of Armenia,101
Quebec,102 and Uruguay103 determine a tacit choice through the terms of the
contract only. On the other hand, the national statutes of Slovakia104 and
Liechtenstein105 determine a choice of law based on the surrounding circumstances
of the contract only. National statutes that combine both criteria, that is, the terms
of the contract and the circumstances of the contract, include Turkey, Qatar, and
Albania.106 In fact, Article 116 of Switzerland’s private international law statute
provides that “[t]he choice of law must be express or result with certainty from the
provisions of the contract or from the circumstances...”107
As earlier noted, countries that permit inference from the terms of a
contract fear that if decisions are based on the circumstances of the case, it may
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cause judges to reach arbitrary decisions.108 They assume that “justice between the
parties will be promoted by the application of a rule of law which leaves only
limited scope for judicial discretion.”109 As a result, they limit the discretion of
judges in the determination of tacit choices.
4.4. Internationality of the Contract
Most countries accept that party autonomy should be limited to international
contracts and not domestic contracts.110 This is because “party autonomy” is a
doctrine of conflict of laws that applies to a contract that has a foreign element.111
Wolff accepts that “it is common ground that in the case of contracts with a foreign
element foreign domicil, foreign nationality, foreign place of contracting, foreign
place of performance—the parties themselves have, within limits, a right to
determine what law is to be applied to their contract.”112
Limiting party autonomy to international contracts do not only encourage
transnational trade because parties from various jurisdictions are free to choose the
applicable law, it also prevents domestic parties in a domestic contract from
evading the mandatory legislation of a country.113 Restricting party autonomy to
international contracts, therefore, allays parties’ fear of the compulsory application
of the law of the place of contract or performance to their contact. It also ensures
that parties are certain of the legal effect of their choice. In effect, while most
countries recognize the advantages of party autonomy, they prevent parties in
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domestic contracts from abusing the principle.114 This abuse stems from the parties
being able to evade the domestic laws which would ordinarily regulate their
contracts. Thus, this limitation ensures that “socially undesirable anomalies are not
created by having another state’s law applied to persons or activities that are part of
its own social or economic system.”115 However, despite the limitation of party
autonomy to international contracts, parties in a domestic contract can incorporate
foreign law into their contract.116 Indeed, incorporation of a foreign law is a matter
of construction by the court and not a question of conflict of laws.117
There is no universal acceptance of the definition of an international
contract, or the criteria for its determination.118 This prevents the uniform
application of the scope of party autonomy in most jurisdictions because parties
interpret “internationality” differently. Countries may define domestic contracts
broadly, such that categories of contracts regarded as international are limited, that
is, they may classify a contract as a domestic one if the proper law of the contract,
upon objective consideration, is that of the forum, regardless that the contract has a
foreign element. Countries may also strictly define a contract as domestic where the
state has an “interest” in the contract.119 These interpretations depend on how a
country defines the connecting or qualifying factors for internationality. Therefore,
the meaning of an international contract usually depends on the connecting factors
set by each country. These factors include: the fact that the parties have their places
of business in different states, the different domiciles or habitual residences of the
parties, the fact that the place of performance is abroad, and the fact that payments
relating to the contract are in foreign currency or in a foreign place.120 The
application of this limitation in some countries to determine the internationality of a
contract in some countries is exemplified below.
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4.4.1 Broad interpretation of an International Contract
An example of a country that broadly interprets “internationality” is Uruguay. The
Uruguayan Draft Code defines an international contract as one in which the parties
have their habitual residence or establishments in different states or which has
“objective links” with more than one state.121 This appears broad because
“objective links” may be subject to interpretations to suit different purposes.
Similarly, Paraguay, in Article 2 of its private international legislation, it is
provided that the internationality of a contract should be interpreted in “the broadest
way possible.”122 It is submitted that broad interpretations like these ones permit
courts to consider economic factors in determining the international character of a
contract. However, this may not protect developing countries’ economies from
“external exploitation” because courts, in their discretion, may interpret an
otherwise domestic contract to be an international one.
4.4.2. Narrow Interpretation of an International Contract
The Chilean private international law rule is an example of a statute that limits the
scope of an international contract.123 Although the Chilean Civil Code does not
define an international contract,124 a joint reading of Article 16 of this Code125 and
Article 113 of the Chilean Commercial Code126 reveals that a contract is not
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considered international where the place of execution is abroad and the place of
performance is Chile. In other words, a contract entered into in one country to be
performed in Chile is not an international contract as far as the Chilean law is
concerned.127 Also, notwithstanding the presence of a foreign element in a contract,
section 21 of the United Arab Emirates’ Civil Procedure Law restricts the
international character of such contracts.128 The Vietnamese Code states that “a
contract entered into and performed entirely in Vietnam must comply with the law
of the socialist Republic of Vietnam.”129 This strict or limited interpretation was
criticized in the decision of the highest South American court, the Venezuela
Supreme Tribunal of Justice, in Embotelladora Caracas C.A et al v Pepsi Cola
Panamericana S.A130 as insufficient in the realm of international commerce. The
court held that all factors should be taken into consideration to arrive at a broad
definition of an international contract. However, the provision of the Code reflects
the history of Latin American countries’ hostility to party autonomy. As pointed out
in chapter 2, Latin American and African countries restrict or prohibit the choice of
a foreign law because they believe that it gives foreign laws, and by extension
foreign countries, an economic advantage over their domestic laws. This explains
why Article 2(3) of the Panamanian Private International Law Code 2014131
requires courts to make international commerce a consideration in choice of law
decisions.132
4.4.3 Can Parties’ Choice of Law Create an International Contract?
The issue is whether the choice of a foreign law in a contract is enough to turn an
otherwise domestic contract into an international contract. Some national private
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international law rules suggest that parties can transform an otherwise domestic
contract into a cross-border contract if they choose the law of another state.133 In
effect, parties can choose a foreign law in their domestic contracts. The only
limitation is that the choice of law is subject to the mandatory domestic rules of the
country. For example, Article 3111 of the Quebec Civil Code provides that “[a]
juridical act, whether or not it contains any foreign element, is governed by the law
expressly designated in the act...where a juridical act contains no foreign element, it
remains nevertheless subject to the mandatory provisions of the State which would
apply in the absence of a designation.” Article 113 of the Chilean Commercial
Code also allows parties to choose a foreign law in a domestic contract.134 Other
countries with similar provisions include Albania,135 Bulgaria,136 Estonia,137
Russia,138 and Serbia.139
However, some countries expressly prohibit the internationalization of a
contract through a choice of law clause or the will of the parties. For example, the
Ukrainian Private International Law prohibits the choice of a foreign law if the
contract does not have a “foreign element.”140 The Uruguayan Draft Code is more
explicit, it expressly provides that “a contract cannot be internationalized through
the sheer will of the parties.”141
The differing criteria for determining the internationality of a contract,
therefore, accounts for the scope of party autonomy. Countries autonomously
determine the criteria that best suit their judicial, economic, social, and political
interests.
133

Albornoz & Martin, supra note 34 at 441.
Chilean Commercial Code, supra note 126.
135
Law No 10428 of 2 July 2011 on Private International Law.
136
Bulgarian Private International Law Code (Law No. 42 of 2005 as amended by Law No 59 of 2007).
137
Private International Law Act (2002).
138
Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Part III, enacted by Federal Law No 146 of 26 November 2001,
art 1210.5.
139
Serbian Ministry of Justice Draft Code on Private International Law (2012).
140
Law No 2709 –IV as amended, (2005), arts 5(6) & 43.
141
Proyeto dey Ley General de Derecho International Privado (2009), art 48. Paraguay’s private
international law is silent on this provision. This could be interpreted to mean that parties can create such
internationality in a contract. See José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, “The new Paraguayan Law on
international contracts: back to the past?” (2016) vol 2 Eppur Si Muove: The age of Uniform Law-Essays
in Honour of Michael Joachim Bonell to Celebrate his 70th Birthday; see also Regulation (EC) No.
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to
contractual obligations (Rome 1 Regulation), art 3.
134

100

4.5. Exclusion of Party Autonomy in certain types of Contracts—Varying
Considerations
Generally, through local statutes, states exclude certain contracts from the scope of
party autonomy. By this, parties whose bargaining power is weak are protected
from other parties who possess strong bargaining power that enables them to
choose a “one-sided” unfavourable law to the business interest of the domestic
party. A commentator tagged these statutes as “localizing statutes” that co-exist
with other statutes. These localizing statutes contain express provisions that make a
domestic statute applicable in multi-state situations.142 In effect, localizing statutes
exclude “both the judicial and the contractual choice of another state’s law.”143
Because localised statutes are specific legislations, they override choice of law or
conflict of laws statutes, which usually contain generalized provisions.144 Although
a localising statute may qualify as a mandatory rule, its application is different. A
localizing provision expressly declares its application to a multi-state situation with
or without expressing a public policy; but for a rule to qualify as a mandatory rule,
it must contain an element of public policy.145
In enacting localized statutes, most countries seek to strike a balance
between enthusiasm for party autonomy and comity on one side, and protection of
their citizens, economy and sovereignty on the other side.146 Common examples of
such contracts are employment contracts, insurance contracts,147 consumer
contracts,148 construction contracts, carriage contracts, charter contracts, franchise
142
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or distributorship contracts,149 and contracts involving real property or immovable
properties.
However, considerations for enacting localised laws that prohibit or restrict
party autonomy differ from state to state. Localised laws are influenced by
historical, economic, social, political, colonial, and religious factors. As discussed
in chapter 2, hostility to party autonomy in Latin America and some parts of Africa
is largely influenced by historical, colonial, and economic factors. Latin American
and African countries’ colonial experience and fragile economies largely dictate
that the content of their localised laws must protect their citizens from economic
exploitation and foreign political domination. Developing countries do not restrict
localised laws to the conventional contracts mentioned above, a situation that
largely accounts for the varying scope of party autonomy in the world. While
localised laws are affected by a common factor in developed countries –
Continental Europe and Anglo- America (asymmetry of information between
private individuals); it is affected by different factors in developing countries –
Africa and Latin America (national economy and colonial history). Some of the
localised laws, especially those in Africa, are examined to illustrate this point.
4.5.1. Localizing contracts in Africa
Local African laws show that developing countries’ statutes prohibit party not be
applied. Although there is no uniformity on what type of contract should exclude
party autonomy in Africa, some examples exist. A Nigerian judge stated that in
maritime and aviation matters, “Nigerian courts ... ma[k]e use of local laws,
occasionally English laws and we take into account international [maritime]
conventions.”150 Indeed, section 20 of the Nigerian Admiralty and Jurisdiction
Act151 precludes parties from making a choice of jurisdiction. In effect, the statute
removes the discretion of a judge to enforce forum selection clauses.152 One of the
149

See e.g. Paraguayan Law 5393 ‘on the law applicable to international contracts, (2015), art 1;
Symeonides, supra note 142 at 296, 326.
150
Olakunle O Olatawura, “The Context and Development of Transnational Law Practice and Policy in
Nigeria” (2004) 9:3 Unif L Rev 511 at 517.
151
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act Cap A5 LFN 2004.
152
See JFS Investment Ltd v Brawal Line Ltd & Ors [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt 1225) 495.

102

objectives of the statute is to protect Nigerian shipping companies from instances
where foreign parties or large multinational companies may insist on foreign
jurisdictions where Nigerian law may not be applied. Although this statute has been
criticized for not allowing parties to autonomously choose their jurisdiction (party
autonomy), it remains the law in Nigeria.153
Also, in technology transfer agreements, some African countries prohibit
the parties’ choice. For example, Clause 13 of the Revised Guidelines on
Acquisition of Foreign Technology, issued in 2003 by the National Office for
Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP), mandatorily prescribes Nigerian
law for technology transfer agreements between a foreign investor and a
Nigerian.154 In effect, the statute prohibits both the choice of a foreign law and nonstate laws. The objective of the Guideline is to ensure that Nigerians secure the best
terms in the contract. This objective is in line with section 4 of the NOTAP Act155
which gives NOTAP the mandate to secure the interest of Nigerians in foreign
technology contracts. This Regulation has been criticized on the basis that most
Nigerian statutes are not suited to protect the interest of Nigerians and that
provisions of foreign laws are better in this regard.156 Regardless of criticism, the
objective of the statute is not in doubt – to protect Nigerians from unequal
bargaining power that arises during contract negotiations between them and
foreigners or large manufacturing companies.
The Egyptian law on technology transfer agreements contains more
stringent provisions against party autonomy. The Egyptian Competition Law
provides that Egyptian technology transfer provisions shall apply to any agreement
for the transfer of technology to be utilized in Egypt, irrespective of whether such
153
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Arab LQ 3 at 10.
155
National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion Act Cap 62 LFN 2004.
156
George Nnona, “The Choice of Law in International Contracts for the Transfer of Technology: A
Critique of the Nigerian Approach” (2000) 44:1 J Afr L 78 at 84.
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transfer takes place outside or inside Egyptian borders or the nationalities or
countries of the parties.157 The law also applies to internal transfer and a crossborder transfer of technology, as well as arbitration proceedings involving disputes
as to such transfer.158 It applies to both independent contracts for the transfer of
technology, as well as contracts involving transfer of technology components. An
agreement which stipulates a foreign law is to be struck down.159 The statute, just
like the one in Nigeria, aims to protect the interest of Egyptians from foreign
exploitation through unequal bargaining power in contracts with foreigners and
large manufacturing companies.160
4.6. Other areas of Limitation and Divergence
It is impossible to exhaustively discuss the varying limitations on the scope of party
autonomy within the confines of this thesis, but it suffices to mention that other
limitations exist. This includes the limitation of parties’ choices to state laws as
opposed to a non-state law.161 Indeed, “Courts often do not respect choice of law
agreements in which parties have chosen a set of principles without choosing a
national law.”162 Although most countries make this restriction, there are national
statutes like those of Paraguay163 and Venezuela164 that allow parties to choose a
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Law No. 3 of 2005 on the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices, art 72
[ECL].
158
Ibid, Art 87(1).
159
Ibid, Art 87 (2).
160
Wahab, supra note 1 at 464; See generally, Hamzah & Stovall, supra note 154.
161
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co, [1984] AC 50 (UK.) at 67 (Lord Diplock)
(“contracts must be “made with reference to some system of private law which defines the obligations
assumed by the parties”).
162
Thalia Kruger, Feasibility Study on the Choice of Law in International Contracts–Overview and
Analysis of Existing Documents-(Preliminary document No 22, The Hague Permanent Bureau Netherlands
2008) at 14, online: <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e7a5badc-b56e-4f94-a859-a07ee858dd71.pdf>. But some
commentators advocate for the application of non-state laws in National Courts. See e.g. Saumier, supra
note 49; Gunther Teubner, “Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems” (Review)
(1997) 45:1 Am J Comp L 149.
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Paraguayan law, supra note 146, art 5 provides that “[i]n this law, a reference to law includes rules of
law of a non-State origin that are generally accepted as a neutral and balanced set of rules.” see Rodríguez,
supra note 137 at 19-21.
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Venezuelan Private International Law Act, 1998, arts 30 & 31. See also Banque Artesia Nederland, NV
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Universal
CA,
[2014]
(Exp.
2014-000257),
online:
<www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1867&step=Abstract>.
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non-state law.165 Other limitations touch on the validity of the contract,166 the
capacity of parties, and consent of the parties, that is, whether parties have
consented or whether such consent was free from error or duress.
4.7. Conclusion
The foregoing comparative analysis of countries’ varying application of the
limitation of party autonomy shows that the importance of party autonomy which
relates to certainty and uniformity, may be “under threat.” In essence, it has been
established that: (1) party autonomy is, essentially, a manifestation of national will,
rather than a matter of supranational recognition; (2) absolute or unlimited party
autonomy is almost impossible to find in any legal system; (3) there are varying
degrees to which party autonomy exists in different countries. The scope of such
autonomy is determined by political, national and economic interests, legal
history,167 public policy, academic opinion and as in the United Arab Emirates,
religious convictions;168 (4) in most jurisdictions, the relative exceptions and
165

Not all recent statutes. The New Civil and Commercial Code of the Argentine Republic, 2015, art
2651(d) only permits parties to incorporate non-state laws in their contract terms. See Alejandro M Garro &
Alberto L Zuppi, “The New Civil and Commercial Code of Argentina (2015) and the Vienna Convention
on
Contracts
for
the
Sale
of
Goods” (2015)
at
8,
online:
<www.sbm.com.ar/assets/pdf/prensa/nuevo_codigo/final_the_new_CCiv_com_Argentina_and_the_cisg4.p
df>.
166
This relates to whether parties can by their choice of law invalidate their contract. See comments on the
Restatement (second), § 187. Commentators have also been divided on this issue with opponents’ argument
that party autonomy on validity issues allows parties to bootstrap themselves. See generally GC Cheshire,
International Contracts: Being the Fifteenth Lecture on the David Murray Foundation in the University of
Glasgow (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Company, 1948); A Thompson, “A Different Approach to Choice of
Law in Contract” (1980) 43:6 Mod L Rev 650 at 657; David G Pierce, “Post-Formation Choice of Law in
Contracts” (1987) 50:2 Mod L Rev 176 at 190. This thesis argued in previous chapters that such choice is
subject to the decision of the forum state. As a result, no bootstrapping scenario arises. See further
Kindrad, supra note 62 at 102-103 (“[t]he answer seems to be that the parties are not by choosing the ·law
to govern validity making their undertaken obligations legally enforceable. It is the law of the forum which
does that”); see also E Maw, “Applicable Law and Conflict Avoidance in International Contracts” (1970)
25 NY City Bar Assoc Rec 365 at 374-75; R J Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (Minneola,
New York: Foundation Press, 1971) at 273.
167
This accounts for the difference in the application of close connection test in the United States and the
United Kingdom. See Prebble, supra note 16 at 502 (“it will be noticed that when individual limitations
upon autonomy are discussed, English courts generally appear to allow more latitude to contracting parties
than do American ones. There are historical reasons for this difference. England never passed through the
dogmatic vested rights era that beset the United States; consequently, autonomy in England is by no means
a fresh idea to be handled gingerly”).
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Federal Law of No (5) of 1985 On the Civil Transactions Law of the United Arab Emirates, Amended
by Federal Law No (1) of 1987, art 27 (“[t]he provisions of the law indicated by the foregoing provisions
may not be applied in case they are contrary to the Islamic Sharia, public policy or morals in the United
Arab Emirates State”).
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expansion of the doctrine and its constraints challenge the prospect of realizing a
uniform scope for party autonomy.
The next chapter examines regional and international legislative efforts to
unify the scope of party autonomy. It looks at it from two international legislative
classifications/approaches – hard law and soft law. It points out the advantages and
weaknesses of both classifications, and ultimately answers the question of whether
the new international soft law instrument on choice of law – the Principles on
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contract169 – as it is, can yield an
“international uniform scope of party autonomy.” In other words, can the Principles
harmonize the divergent national scope of party autonomy?

169

Approved on 15 March 2015 by The Hague Conference on Private International Law, online:
<www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135> [Principles].
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CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL CODIFICATIONS OF THE
SCOPE OF PARTY AUTONOMY ON CHOICE OF LAW – A NEW
DAWN?
5.1. Introduction
This chapter, which is divided into four sections, focuses on a new soft law
instrument – Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts.1
It first examines the efforts of international organizations and regional legislative
bodies to unify the scope of party autonomy through different codification
techniques.2 It particularly examines the scope of the Principles and the Hague
Conference’s justifications for using a soft law approach for this process. It
concludes that a soft private international law rule, especially on the scope of party
autonomy, is a step in the RIGHT direction to unify the divergent scope/limitations
of party autonomy. Section 2 argues that although the Principles constitute a step
in the right direction, the Hague Conference did not consider factors for its
acceptance in developing countries where party autonomy is still viewed with
skepticism because of the possibility of its abuse by dominant parties. It is
imperative for the Hague Conference to consider these factors because the
acceptance of the Principles in these countries depends on its collective intrinsic
values, that is, “on the substantive content of its rules, rather than on external or
political factors.”3
Section 3 examines the relationship of the Principles, as soft law, with some
hard law instruments on choice of law – the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1 Regulation)4 and the InterAmerican Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts (Mexico

1

Approved on 15 March 2015 by The Hague Conference on Private International Law, online: <
www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135> [Principles].
2
This thesis is limited to the provisions of the Principles. Discussions on other private international
instruments are limited in this thesis, references are only made to their provisions where it will enhance the
analysis in this chapter.
3
Maria Mercedes Albornoz & Nuria Gonzalez-Martin, “Towards the Uniform application of party
autonomy for choice of law in International Commercial Contracts” (2016) 12:3 J Priv Intl L 437 at 458.
4
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 17 June 2008 on the
Law
Applicable
to
Contractual
Obligations,
online:
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008R0593>.
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Convention).5 It particularly looks at the provisions on a choice of non-state law
and on the mandatory choice of law in these instruments. It argues that the choice
of non-state law may also be less persuasive in continental Europe because the
Rome 1 Regulation, which prohibits the choice of a non-state law, is a binding
instrument. The Principles’ conditions for the application of non-state laws even
make it more problematic, not only for countries in Europe but for developing
countries. Finally, section 4 examines the nature of the Principles and its
relationship with other soft laws – the UNIDROIT-Principles of International
Contracts6 and non-state law – the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods.7 Explaining the scope of the Principles, it argues that
the Principles cannot, normatively, empower the choice of another soft law or nonstate law because they are all either in the same legal normative order, or the others
outrank the Principles. Even if the Principles empowers the choice of some soft
laws, it cannot do so in areas that those soft laws have not made provision for. The
analysis concludes that, if the Principles are not “creatively” interpreted, its
application with other soft laws or non-state law may produce problematic,
uncertain and unintended results.
This analysis points out that the overall intrinsic value of the Principles,
especially for developing countries, create a new set of debates and problems for
the goal of arriving at a uniform scope of party autonomy, a goal which scholars,
governments and international organizations must, consequently, find new ways to
attain.
5.2. Unifying the Scope of Party Autonomy – Regional and International
Classification Efforts
Due to the divergence in the scope of party autonomy in national legal systems,
regional and international efforts have been made to unify the scope of the doctrine.
5

Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts; 17 March (1994) 33 ILM
732, 733.
6
Online:<www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010e.pdf>.
[PICC].
7
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 11 April 1980, 1489 UNTS
3, (entered into force 1 January 1988) [CISG].
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These efforts are in the form of private international law instruments that set out
general general provisions on choice of law. The instruments aim to achieve
certainty in decisions of national courts and uniformity in private international law
rules.8 The objective has been to encourage transnational trade, as the growth of
transnational trade and commerce is the goal of choice of law international or
regional instruments. The instruments are classified here via two codification
techniques – hard law and soft law.
Hard laws are binding instruments that command compliance from member
states that are signatories to them.9 Examples of hard choice of law instruments
include the Rome 1 Regulation 2008,10 the Mexico Convention, and Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States 1933 (Montevideo Convention) 1979.11 These
instruments, as explained in chapter 2, are regional and are intended to apply within
their identified geographical areas. Thus, the Rome 1 Regulation is in force in
continental Europe, and the Mexico and Montevideo Conventions are in force in
Latin America. These choice of law instruments have been the subjects of academic
comments,12 and in some cases, are bedeviled by low ratification.13 These

8

Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 31 October 1951, 220 UNTS 121, art. 1
(entered into force 15 July 1955). It provides that “[t]he purpose of the Hague Conference is to work for the
progressive unification of the rules of private international law ….”
9
See Hartmut Hillgenberg, “A Fresh Look at Soft law” (1999) 10:3 Eur J Intl L 499 at 500. It should be
noted that some commentators do not see the difference between the two techniques. See e.g. Andrew T
Guzman & Timothy L Meyer, “International Soft law” (2010) 2:1 J Leg Analysis 171 at 172-174.
10
For an application and scope of this instrument, see Francisco J Garcimartín Alférez, “The Rome I
Regulation: Much Ado About Nothing?” (2008) 2 Eur Leg F 61.
11
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26
December 1934). For a list of the regional hard law instruments, see generally, the Feasibility Study on the
Choice of Law in International Contracts - Overview and Analysis of Existing Instruments - Preliminary
Document No 22 B of March 2007 for the attention of the Council of April 2007 on General Affairs and
Policy
of
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Conference,
online:
<https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e7a5badc-b56e-4f94-a859a07ee858dd71.pdf>.
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See generally, Volker Behr, “Rome I Regulation A—Mostly—Unified Private International Law of
Contractual Relationships Within—Most—Of The European Union” (2011) 29 JL & Com 233; Helmut
Heiss, “Insurance Contracts in Rome 1: Another Recent Failure of the European Legislator” (2008) 10 YB
Priv Intl L 261; Michael Wilderspin, “The Rome 1 Regulation: Communitarisation and Modernisation of
the Rome Convention” (2008) 9:2 Journal of the Academy of European Law (ERA Forum) 259; José
Antonio Moreno Rodriguez & María Mercedes Albornoz, “Reflections on the Mexico Convention in the
Context of the Preparation of the Future Hague Instrument on International Contracts” (2011) 7:3 J Priv
Intl L 491 at 526 (“Rome I has failed to progress any further, remaining faithful to its strongly ingrained
statism”).
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The Mexico Convention only has two signatories – Mexico and Venezuela.
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comments generally reflect the insufficiency in choice of law issues and,
insensitivity to national conflict of laws issues.
There are other hard laws that seek to achieve uniform substantive contract
terms. An example is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sales of Goods (CISG). This instrument is acknowledged as the
“most successful attempt to unify a broad area of commercial law at the
international level.”14 The CISG seeks is to regulate terms in international sale of
goods contracts;15 it does not cover private international law issues, especially the
validity of a contract of sale.16 CISG emerged from the efforts of experts working
under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). This treaty, which came into force on 11 April 1980 at Vienna, has
been ratified by 84 states from different regions and legal backgrounds. 17 In effect,
the CISG is international hard law that is applicable to contracts for the sale of
goods among contracting states.
In contrast, a soft instrument is non-binding. It relies on the effectiveness of
its contents to persuade countries to adopt it, whether they are members of the
drafting organization or not.18 Their application is not bound by geographical space

14

Harry Flechtner, “Introductory Note: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales
of Goods, Vienna, 11 April 1980” (2009) Audiovisual Library of International Law 1 at 1, online:
<http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ccisg/ccisg.html>.
15
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parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are Contracting States; or (b)
when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.” See
also Harry Flechtner, supra mote 14 at 1 (“the treaty aims to reduce obstacles to international trade,
particularly those associated with choice of law issues, by creating even-handed and modern substantive
rules governing the rights and obligations of parties to international sales contracts”).
16
Ibid, art 4(2).
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See the table of the countries, online: <www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html>; see also
Joseph M Perillo, “Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a
Review” (1994) 63:2 Fordham L Rev 281at 282 (“[i]t is striking that this Convention was acceptable to
nations from different families of legal systems, such as the United States and France, and such diverse
economic backgrounds as China and Germany”).
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A commentator noted that “soft law only expresses a preference for certain behaviour.” See Cynthia
Crawford Lichtenstein, “Hard law v. Soft law: Unnecessary Dichotomy?” (2001) 35:4 Intl Lawyer 1433 at
1434. Indeed, this may be true of customary law, as well as hard laws. However, the meaning and
relationship between these sources of international law is debatable, but it has been argued that these
sources work symmetrically to create a coherent legal order. See generally, Allison Christians, “Hard Law,
Soft Law, and International Taxation” (2007) 25:2 Wisconsin Intl LJ 355; Final Report of the Committee
on the Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law (200)
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or the countries that are its signatories. Indeed, the provisions of a soft law
instrument are open to all countries to adopt. One example here is the Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (PICC).19 The PICC is a set of black letter
rules that deal with a “broad range” of issues related to international commercial
contracts.20 It is a product of the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT) – an independent intergovernmental organization.21 This
instrument, which is a private codification output, aims to promote principles to
regulate international commercial contracts. In effect, it is a form of a restatement
of “the commercial contract law of the world” which is not intended to be adopted
as a treaty but as a model to countries.22 Parties can expressly choose the PICC,
either because there is a deadlock of choice of law, or because of its neutrality,23 or
if the contract stipulates that the contract is to be governed by “general principles of
law.”24 Also, the PICC could be used to interpret or supplement other international
uniform law instruments or domestic laws.25 It should be noted that “non-state law”
as used in this thesis means “laws” similar to the PICC, that is, rules of
international organization that suggests substantive commercial contract terms
between private entities only. Therefore, “non-state law” in this thesis does not fit
into the broader category of non-state laws.
Although there have been soft law instruments, like the PICC, that make
provisions for the regulation of international commercial contracts, there had been
no soft private international law on this subject until 19 March 2015 when the

International Law Association London Conference; Michael Byers, “Power, Obligation, and Customary
International Law” (2001) 11:1 Duke J Comp L.
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Maud Piers & Johan Erauw, “Application of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial
Contracts in Arbitration” (2012) 8:3 J Priv Intl L 441 at 411.
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Perillo, supra note 17 at 283.
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24
Ibid.
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Hague Conference on Private International Law approved the Principles on Choice
of Law in International Commercial Contracts.26
The next section examines the Principles in detail and in the light of reasons
for the divergence of the scope of party autonomy between developed and
developing countries, particularly, economic and colonial history. It also examines
some provisions of the Principles and generally argues that the debate on
developing a uniform scope for party autonomy is far from over.
5.2.1. Synoptic History, Scope, and Justification of the New Soft law (Principles)
Although regional hard laws on choice of law produced some convergence,27 there
has been no global convergence on the scope of party autonomy; hence the need for
a “global instrument” that unifies the scope of this doctrine.28 The Hague
Conference took up the task to produce a global instrument through its Permanent
Bureau. The Permanent Bureau reviewed various regional instruments on choice of
law and noted particularly that there is a regional “proliferation of instruments” on
party autonomy.29 This is coupled with the fact that there are still varying
limitations on the doctrine, especially in Latin America. After consultations with
“interested parties in the field,” the Bureau concluded that promoting party
autonomy at the international level meets “a real need for the actors in the field of
26

Principles, supra note 1. Although there are different modes of enacting this soft law, which include
model law, code of conduct, and good practice guides, the Hague Conference preferred the choice of
Principles like the PICC.
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See generally, Giesela Rühl, “Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts:
Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency” (2007) CLPE Research Paper 4/2007 1; Mathias
Reimann, “Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century”
(1998) 39:3 Va J Intl L 572; Friedrich K Juenger, “The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable
to International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons” (1994) 42:2 Am J Comp L 381.
28
For a historical development of the Principles, see Marta Pertegas & Brooke Adele Marshall, Pertegá,
“Party Autonomy and Its Limits: Convergence Through the New Hague Principles on Choice of Law in
International Commercial Contracts” (2014) 39:3 Brook J Intl L 975 at 980-981; Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts:
Hague Principles?” (2010) 15:3 & 4 Unif L Rev 883 at 883-889; see also Hague Conference, Council on
General Affairs and Policy, Feasibility Study on the Choice of Law in International Contracts. Report on
Work Carried Out and Preliminary Conclusions. Note Prepared by the Permanent Bureau, Prel Doc No
22A, March 2007 at 8, online: < https://assets.hcch.net/docs/edd1c4ea-0dcb-42fc-8c17-561a9046a5f4.pdf>.
29
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report on Work Carried Out and Perspectives for the
Development of the Future Instrument, Preliminary Document No 7 of March 2009 for the attention of the
Council of March/April 2009 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference [Preliminary Draft of No 7
2009] at 5-6, online: <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/64fe9fef-e0f1-4927-b8ca-924d6ee01e0c.pdf>.
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international commerce.”30 The Bureau, therefore, constituted a Working Group
made up of 29 scholars to draft the text of the instrument.31 The Working Group,
which first sat on 21 January 2010, completed the draft and the commentary on the
Principles on 28 January 2014.32 The final text, which consists of 12 articles with
some “innovative” provisions in articles 3, 5, 6, and 8, was approved by the Hague
Conference on 19 March 2015.33
Thus, the Principles is a supranational instrument that seeks to provide a
uniform application of party autonomy and its scope, albeit in a global manner, just
like the existing hard laws on choice of law.34 Its scope is limited to express choice
of law in international commercial contracts that are subject to arbitration and
litigation proceedings.35 It shares similar characteristics with the PICC because it
serves as a model guide for private international hard law instruments, national
legislation, and arbitrators.36 It can also be used to interpret, supplement or develop
private international law rules, just like the PICC.37 In effect, the Principles shares a
codification approach similar to the PICC – they are both sets of black letter laws
supplemented by illustrations and comments to help users with interpretation.38 Its
envisaged users are lawmakers, courts and arbitrators, parties and their legal

30

Ibid at 5. Interested parties include the UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL and international commerce
practitioners.
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advisors.39 Although the Principles do not have legal force to ensure compliance
from its users because they are soft law, they persuade compliance through the
intrinsic values that they possess.40
Notwithstanding arguments against the choice of soft law as a codification
technique or approach,41 the Hague Conference is justified in adopting this
approach for the Principles.42 First, the effectiveness of hard laws is hindered by
challenges, one of which is ratification.43 Apart from the fact that it is usually
difficult for countries to reach an agreement,44 there is no assurance that a hard law
instrument will be adopted or ratified by states because, often times, ratification
depends on political factors or policy concerns.45 Even if a hard law instrument is
ratified, states may implement it differently from one another.46 The
implementation of a hard law instrument also creates cost for states because

39

Principles, supra note 1 at paragraph 1.20 (Introduction).
See e.g. Symeonides, supra note 34 at 899.
41
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“formal commitments” to hard laws restrict states’ behavior in areas of national
sensitivity.47
In effect, the choice of the soft law approach is beneficial for the potential
influence/impact/effectiveness of the Principles because: (1) it is faster, easier and
less costly to negotiate than a hard law instrument;48 (2) it is flexible to adapt to
different emerging trends in dealing with conflict of laws issues; (3) it allows
experts who are familiar with the complexity of the realities in conflict of laws
disputes to decide on the technical aspect of the law;49 and (4) it serves as an
interpretative guide for existing hard law instruments. Indeed, it is noted that the
Principles aim to achieve three goals simultaneously – to serve as a source of
inspiration to legislators, as a tool for interpretation by courts and arbitrators, and as
a binding set of rules in contracts between public parties.50
Because of the codification technique of the Principles and its intended
effect on regional private international law instruments and national statutes, it
furthers the effort to unify the disparate scope of party autonomy as discussed in
chapter 4. The ultimate aim is to unify both interpretations of existing regional
instruments and national statutes on limitations of party autonomy. The Principles
could also be applied in countries where there is no regional private international
law instrument on choice of law. In effect, countries can adopt this instrument
without any obligation to comply with it. By this, certainty in the application of the
doctrine and its scope is “universally achieved” without compulsion. The next
section examines how justifiable these claims are for developing countries.
5.3. The Hague Principles and the Developing Countries
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To achieve universalism or the acceptance of a common scope for party autonomy,
provisions of the Principles must allay the fears or the skepticism of the countries
that do not recognize any fundamental limits to the application of the doctrine.51
The fears or skepticism peculiar to some developing countries in Latin America and
Africa arise from the economic and political dominance exerted by some developed
countries.52 Unlike developed countries, developing countries generally experience
stunted and uneven economic growth.53 Therefore, the provisions of the Principles
must be seen to facilitate compromise of national interests between parties from
developed and developing countries.54
It must be pointed out that the Principles, as a composite instrument, has not
facilitated a compromise. It only addresses the technical aspects of the doctrine; It
does not speak to the competing national interests and concerns, especially in
relation to unequal bargaining power between parties in developed and developing
countries. The underlying competing national interests merit consideration because
jurisdictional and legislative tasks reflect the status of sovereignty of each country.
This thesis has pointed out that the arguments against party autonomy or its
limitation in Latin America and Africa are based on the regions’ economies that are
weak and fragile, compared to the economies of the developed countries, and the
colonial experience inflicted by the developed countries.55 Indeed, parties or large
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multinational companies from developed countries wield strong economic power in
contracts involving parties from the developing states.56
It is a truism that party autonomy, if unrestricted, permits oppression of the
weak by the strong.57 Even advocates of party autonomy acknowledge that “in the
event of unfair advantage arising from contractual disparities, State intervention is
advisable.”58A situation of “unfair advantage” arises where parties from developed
countries use standard forms containing a choice of law favourable to them to the
detriment of parties from developing countries.59 In effect, due to the “insufficient
technological and managerial capacities of developing countries, and in part to the
monopolization of world trade by industrialized countries,”60 parties from the
developing countries who are confronted with a take it or leave it situation may be
in a disadvantageous position to bargain a favourable choice of law. This occasions
abuse of party autonomy by contracting parties from developed countries,
especially multinational corporations. For example, a multinational corporation that
is aware of the advantage that a law confers on it, and to the detriment of the
business of the party from a developing country, may insist on such choice of law.
The latter reluctantly agrees because of the economic geographical sphere in which
it operates.
In sum, “[b]argaining power disparities are a real phenomenon that affect
the ability of the ‘weak’ party to obtain its preferred terms in a contractual

comercialinternacional?, Asunción, CEDEP / Thomson Reuters / La Ley Paraguaya 245 at 335; Friedrich
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interaction with a ‘strong’ party” in developing countries.61 Due to this imbalance
arising from economic disparity between parties from developed and developing
countries, there is a need for transnational justice or “state intervention.”62 This is
why some developing countries restrict the choice of an applicable law and forum
to protect their domestic parties if there is a likelihood of an unfair outcome
dictated by unequal bargaining power.63 Factors that courts take into consideration
to determine unequal bargaining power include the status of the contracting parties,
the business sophistication of a party, illiteracy, poverty, economic background,
gender, and monopolization of a particular market.64
Although the Principles recognised disparity or unequal bargaining power
in employment and consumer contracts,65 it generally assumes that parties are equal
in other types of international contracts. This does not represent the current state of
the context of international contracts.66 This thesis argues that an abuse of party
autonomy is not only inherent in employment or consumer contracts. Generally, it
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exists between parties in any international contract.67 Regardless of the context,
there is a general tension between the principle of party autonomy and the desire to
protect the weaker party.68
To protect weaker parties, article 11 (1) & (2) of the Principles subjects
parties’ choice of law to the mandatory laws of the forum and third states.69
However, this does not completely protect parties in developing countries. This is
because, while article 11(1) directs the compulsory application of a forum law,
article 11(2) leaves the application of a third state law to the discretion and
interpretation of the forum court.70 By this, the application of a mandatory law of a
third state can be avoided by a choice of a forum court that is less likely to adopt
the mandatory law of third states. In effect, a party can remove the legal efficacy of
the third state law by manipulating the choice of a forum. 71In any event, Article 11
does not enjoin the forum court to apply a local law. As explained in chapter 4, a
local law is different from a mandatory law. While a local law does not possess a
public interest element, a mandatory law possesses such an element.72 A forum
court may, therefore, ignore the application of the local law of a third state because
it does not fall under the two categories contemplated by article 11 of the Principles
– public policy and mandatory laws.
Also, article 2(4) of the Principles provides that “[n]o connection is required
between the law chosen and the parties or their transaction.” This provision permits
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parties to make an unrelated choice of law without any provision to check an abuse
that may arise from it, especially in international contracts between developed and
developing countries. This provision may not reflect developing countries’ national
interest. In fact, an African commentator noted that principles like pacta sunt
servanda which is the foundation of article 2(4), “deny Third World States, whose
only measure of sovereignty is the control of their natural resources, the right to
make fair rules about the adjudication of disputes arising in connection with the
exploitation of such resources.”73 This is not unconnected to the argument of Latin
American commentators that it enables parties to choose the law of a foreign
country whose economy is bigger than that of the domestic country.74 It is,
therefore, unsurprising that representatives from Brazil and Uruguay, in response to
questions as to whether they will adopt this article, answered in the negative.
The argument that the choice of an unrelated law enables parties to choose a
neutral law is hard to defend because a neutral law is never neutral. Such law is
usually related more to one party than the other, hence the proposal for the choice
of the neutral in the first place. The party in whose favour a neutral law is made
may, therefore, find it more advantageous than the other party. 75 If the purpose of
private international law rules is to do justice in different transnational
relationships, it is impossible to argue that the Principles ensure justice for weaker
parties in this circumstance. Without a proposal that balances the choice of an
unrelated law and incidents of abuse, it is difficult to determine the response of
these countries to the Principles. Although three African scholars were members of
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the working group, it is difficult to argue that these persons represent the interest of
African society.76
It may be argued that if a party is strong enough to enter into an
international contract, it does not need much state protection. However, this
argument is less persuasive because the strength of a party may be a relative reality.
A party that is generally strong may be considered weak when dealing with another
party that possesses stronger economic power in the context of negotiating an
international contract. It is commonplace that “African countries rightfully feel
threatened by the overwhelming power of certain multinational corporations whose
financial resources far surpass their own and whose tentacles extend into many
different countries.”77 It is, therefore, not an overstatement that parties do not
possess equal bargaining power in the making of international contracts.
In view of the foregoing, it is noteworthy that though Paraguay adopted
article 2(4) of the Principles in its private international law legislation, it excluded
franchising, agency, representation and distributorship contracts from it.78 Except
the franchising agreement, these issues are governed by Paraguay’s Law
194/1993.79 This law protects local investors from foreign manufacturers or foreign
firms by dictating the terms of their contract, just like the Egyptian Competition
Law80 and the Nigerian Technology Regulation discussed in chapter 4.81 It also
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subjects any dispute arising from these contracts to the jurisdiction of Paraguay.82
International contracts that fall under this law are interpreted strictly against the
foreign manufacturer because the contract is interpreted from a “domestic
perspective.”83 A commentator sees the law as discriminatory, because “it restricts
freedom of contract, [whose] single purpose is to punish foreigners.”84 The 2014
proposed amended draft of the Law 194/1993 still shares similar characteristics
with the old law. In fact, it has been noted that “the draft legislation aims to provide
more elements of protection for Paraguayan representatives, agents or
distributors.”85
Assuming that every country adopts the Principles but also excludes some
local or private contracts form their domestic application, the logical enquiry must
be what then is the achievement of the Principles. Specifically, the issues to resolve
are whether it has achieved uniformity or certainty in transnational commerce and
choice of law; and whether as soft law, it is not redundant, as Klabbers claimed.86 If
the Principles recognize the reality of unequal bargaining power between
contracting parties, perhaps its provisions would have, apart from the mandatory
clause, included a clause that makes a uniform provision for weaker parties. Today,
the economy-protecting localised statutes in Latin America and Africa not only
threaten uncertainty in the scope of the doctrine. They also show that states that
81
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recognize party autonomy are still conscious of the economic threat that an abuse of
party autonomy poses.
In sum, the Principles may remain less persuasive because of some of its
negative economic consequences for developing countries. It is difficult to argue
that, in relation to unequal bargaining power, the Principles put due weight on the
underlying economic concerns of developing states and the general effect that this
has on the economic bargaining power of parties, as well as the impact of the abuse
of party autonomy on the economy of developing countries that this induces.
Indeed, a Latin American commentator noted that “party autonomy cannot be
judged purely from a technical standpoint because it puts values at stake. That is
why we cannot give a blank cheque to party autonomy.”87 Some other
commentators see a law of this nature as “hardly anything short of an ego trip by a
few writers of the developed world eager to impose, for the advantage of their
countries and regions, rules that they are conversant with on the poor less heard
nations without caring about the sensibilities of the latter’s local setting and
peculiar dynamics.”88
It is plausible to argue that the Working Group drafted the Principles
without caring about the sensibilities of the developing countries’ local systems and
peculiar dynamics, most likely because the developing countries, especially those
from Africa, did not participate in the Hague Conference’s survey that sampled the
application and scope of party autonomy in various countries. 89 Majority of the 33
members states that responded to the questionnaires are European countries.90 A
reason for this omission may be that the Hague Conference does not consider the
87
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agreement of countries as a condition for the acceptance of the Principles; it only
hopes that the Principles “constitutes a preliminary stage which, in a more distant
future, might facilitate the adoption of a veritable international convention on this
topic within the Hague Conference.”91 But agreement on the Principles is not the
same as consultation before the enactment of the Principles. It is difficult to
imagine how developing countries who were not consulted or whose interests were
not taken into account at the “preliminary stage,” would become signatories to the
future Convention in its final form.
5.3.1. Possible Effect and Acceptance of Article 3 in Developing Countries
Article 3 of the Principles provides that “the law chosen by the parties may be rules
of law that are generally accepted on an international, supranational or regional
level as a neutral and balanced set of rules, unless the law of the forum provides
otherwise.” It also allows parties to choose a hard law, regardless that they are not
contracting states.92 Thus, in an indirect way, article 3 of the Principles turns a hard
law into soft law for contracting parties in regions without Conventions that
regulate choice of law issues. For example, it was pointed out in chapter 2 that there
is no regional instrument that regulates choice of law in Africa. If the provisions of
the Principles, especially article 3, are adopted in national private international
rules in African countries, it enables parties in African states to choose international
instruments from other regions as the governing law in their contracts.93 This
fosters transnational trade because private international law instruments can be
applied beyond their initial geographical area. Continents like Africa, with few
experts on conflict of laws, can also benefit from the industry and resources
channelled into these Conventions. Also, parties in Latin America that are not
signatories to the Mexico Convention can indirectly benefit from the Principles’
provisions through the adoption of article 3.94
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However, it is unclear how developing countries, especially in Africa,
would accept the choice of a non-state law in their domestic courts even if no treaty
prohibits it.95 Some developing countries mistrust and are unconvinced by non-state
law because they seem like “classical principles of international law.”96 Indeed, it
has been noted that “lex mercatoria [non-state law] is a creation of a coterie of
western scholars…who [load them] with norms entirely favourable to international
business.”97 As well, non-state laws were made at a time when developing countries
were not members of international organizations.98 As a result, most developing
countries do not consider that such laws represent their interest.99 It is even believed
that the interests expressed in the non-state laws are “inimical” to the interests of
developing countries.100
The Principles is a non-state law that proposes another non-state law. In this
sense, it is doubly unappealing to African states for adoption. This is
notwithstanding that three African scholars were members of the working group
that drafted the Principles. In sum, the Principles’ provisions can hardly be said to
cater to the preferences of most African states. This overall distrust on the part of
developing countries against non-state laws means that the Principles’ elevation of
party autonomy to the level of non-state law may be seen as designed to entrench
Mexico Convention, arise from negotiations that only focus on the peculiar circumstances of the contracting
states.
95
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the existing imbalance of bargaining power between developed and developing
countries.
It is not uncommon that a stronger party, with the unsuspecting approval of
the weaker party, may exclude his liability under some non-state laws through
contract clauses.101 For example, article 6 of the CISG enables parties to derogate
from provisions of the Convention,102 including those meant to protect weak
contracting parties.103 This may not be problematic if the CISG is interpreted
together with the private international rules of a contracting state, as localized laws
of these states protect the parties. But where the choice is made through the
Principles, localized laws cease to apply because they are not covered by Article 11
of the Principles.104 Since the CISG is the chosen law, stronger parties can evade
localized laws to their benefit. This situation may be prevented if parties are subject
to local laws that contain non-derogable fair contract terms.
However, in defence of a non-state law, it has been argued that even if a
non-state law creates disadvantages for parties in developing countries, only parties
are affected, not the larger society.105 This larger society is not identified, nor who
its members may be. However, this argument creates a distinction between
members of a society or a state. The function of a country is to protect every
member of its constituent communities, large or small. Even if discrimination is
permitted as between these communities and their members, it is not true, as
otherwise argued, that the choice of a non-state law does not affect developing
countries. As stated above, the law chosen creates either an adverse or a positive
network effect on the economy of a developing country. For example, if a party,
through a superior bargaining power, chooses a non-state law that adversely affects
101
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the business of a party in a developing country such that the latter becomes
insolvent. This necessarily reduces the per capita income of the developing country.
Furthermore, article 3 may be less persuasive because of the Principles’
conditions for its application.106 As earlier quoted, article 3 states that “[t]he law
chosen by the parties may be rules of law that are generally accepted on an
international, supranational or regional level as a neutral and balanced set of rules,
unless the law of the forum provides otherwise.” In effect, even if a forum court
permits the application of a non-state law, parties can only choose it if it possesses
some characteristics.107 These include that the non-state law must be a generally
accepted neutral and balanced set of rules. The questions that arise from these
conditions include: who determines if the rule is neutral or balanced? Is it the
parties or the court? If it is the parties, it creates an unnecessary burden on them
because they could also choose a state law. In effect, if parties have to justify their
choice of non-state law, they may not likely choose a non-state law.
Article 3 explains the term “neutral”, but it remains vague and controversial,
especially when the “neutral law” is made by an agency or organization of which
the forum state is not a member. By whose standard is the acceptance to be
measured – the parties or national courts? How do we quantify the level of
acceptance or who determines when the rule is balanced enough? To subject a nonstate law to these tests is a heavy burden that even states find difficult to bear. 108
The issue is more problematic because some countries classify some non-state laws
as “seller friendly” or “buyer friendly.”109 For example, while some delegates at the
Vienna Conference on the CISG classify it as “seller friendly,” other countries
classify it as “balanced.”110 Thus, if a forum country accepts a non-state law as
neutral, it may not be accepted as such by the enforcing country, that is, where the
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judgment creditor seeks to enforce his judgment. The judgment may be set aside for
being contrary to the enforcing country’s public policy.
Can developing countries, especially in Africa, be swayed or persuaded by
the Principles and its adoption by other countries, even if there is no treaty
obligation that is against it? It is difficult to answer this question in the positive.
This is because of the challenges engaged by the application or interpretation of
non-state laws. These exercises are difficult or challenging because: (1) the law’s
content cannot be established with sufficient certainty, and (2) there is no
authoritative source for interpreting it.111 This may lead to differences in
interpretation – a situation that ultimately breeds uncertainty in the decisions of
national courts.
To overcome interpretational challenges, a commentator suggested national
courts should invite scholars to proffer interpretations on “internationally accepted”
non-state laws.112 But this may not also produce certainty because, apart from the
debate on the sufficiency of such opinion, opinions of scholars on private
international law issues are divergent.113 Also, the argument that non-state laws
should be applied like foreign law is fraught with some challenges because, while a
foreign law is an external law that belongs to another sovereign state, a non-state
law does not belong to any sovereign state.114 Non-state laws can, therefore, not be
treated as “external law” because, if the former is recognised by national private
international law, it becomes part of the domestic law that is applied in such a state
without need for “proof” like foreign law. Even if a non-state law is treated like a
foreign law, it will lead to uncertainties because some states use different principles
to determine the content and interpretation of a foreign law.115
111
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Even if arguments on the application of non-state laws are persuasive, the
problematic interpretations of the application, such as the “general acceptability”
and “neutrality” concepts of the Principles may produce arbitrary results in
developing countries.116 More so for their lack of the calibre of seasoned judiciary
that can bring judicial expertise to handle this sort of situation.117 Thus, to avoid
decision-making uncertainties, some developing countries may not adopt article 3
altogether.118 Consequently, courts may favour the application of the forum law
whose complex interpretations of non-state law may lead to arbitrary application of
the same.119
Overall, the conditions attached to article 3 breed another set of disputes
over the suitability of non-state law. The choice of non-state law may be challenged
on the basis that it does not meet the criteria set out by the Principles.120 This is
because parties, and even courts, may interpret the Principles’ criteria differently.
In countries with slow judicial processes, resort to non-state law may be a way to
delay trial in cases where there is no defence to the plaintiff’s claim. As an analyst
concluded, the conditions in Article 3 of the Principles are “riddled with
uncertainty, obfuscation and self-serving terminology.”121
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5.4. The Hague Principles and Hard laws
Apart from the effects of the Principles on weak parties and its application in
developing countries, they may also be faced with legal normative challenges from
hard laws on choice of law issues. This section argues that treaty compliance may
also influence some countries’ decision to ignore some provisions of the Principles.
Although its Working Group sought to avoid any immediate risk of conflict of
standards with other hard law instruments,122 there is still a divergence between the
provision of some hard laws and the Principles. This discussion focuses on the
Principles and two private international law documents – the Mexico Convention
and the Rome 1 Regulation. It discusses two provisions under these instruments –
mandatory law and non-state law.
5.4.1. Mandatory Laws
The scope of the application of mandatory laws under the Rome 1 Regulation,
Mexico Convention and the Principles appears divergent. The Principles permits a
wider application of mandatory laws than the Rome 1 Regulation and Mexico
Convention. Article 11(2) of the Principles permits the forum court to determine
when mandatory provisions of third states override the parties’ choice of law. Also,
it does not require proximity of third states’ mandatory law with the contract.
However, article 11(2) of the Mexico Convention, although worded differently,
requires that the mandatory law of a third state must bear “close ties” to the
contract. Article 9(3) of the Rome 1 Regulation specifically refers to the mandatory
law of the place of performance.123
Although there are differences between the provisions of these international
instruments,124 some of these could be harmonized by resort to the purpose of the
Principles to achieve collaborative interpretation with other instruments. For
example, the Principles may be regarded as a general statute that suggests a wide
122
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discretion to apply mandatory laws of third states while the Mexico Convention and
the Rome 1 Regulation may be regarded as specific statutes that curtail the
discretion of the judge. This interpretation could mean putting a soft law and hard
laws on the same legal or normative order. However, this may not necessarily be so
if the soft law (Principles) is seen in the light of the older treatise on the subject
(Mexico Convention and the Rome 1 Regulation).125 If seen in this light, it can be
argued that the three instruments permit the discretion of the forum court to apply
the law of a third state.
5.4.2. Non-state law
The Principles proposes the possibility of choice of a non-state law – an issue that
has been the subject of academic comments and criticisms.126 As earlier quoted,
article 3 provides that “[t]he law chosen by the parties may be rules of law that are
generally accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral
and balanced set of rules, unless the law of the forum provides otherwise.”
Notwithstanding criticism, Paraguay’s national private international law legislation
have incorporated this provision.127 However, none of the countries in Europe have
adopted it. This may not be unconnected to the fact that Rome 1 Regulation does
not allow a choice of non-state law; it only allows it if parties incorporate it in their
contracts.128 This thesis answers the question whether countries signatory to the
125

Commenting on avoidance of “collision” of Hard law and soft law, Jan Klabbers, stated that “[t]he most
popular and obvious strategy, then, is to simply deny the existence of any conflict, and interpret the older
treaty in the light of the newer soft law instrument. Indeed, this has probably become the most often
invoked explanation concerning the legal effects of soft law instruments: they may serve as interpretative
guides.” See Klabbers, supra note 41 at 177.
126
For example, some commentators argue that non-state laws are not legitimized by a democratic
legislative process. See Schwartze, supra note 105 at 95. On other comments, see generally, Markus
Petsche, “The Application of Transnational Law (Lex Mercatoria) by Domestic Courts” (2014)10:3 J Priv
Intl L 489; Michael Joachim Bonell, “Soft law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the UNIDROIT
Principles” (2005) 51:2 Loy L Rev229.
127
Paraguay. A Paraguayan Law 5393 “on the law applicable to international contracts” (2015), art 5.
Indeed, it has been noted that the legislation, regarding choice of law, basically reproduces the Principles
with minor modifications. See José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, “The new Paraguayan Law on
international contracts: back to the past?” (2016) vol 2 Eppur Si Muove: The age of Uniform Law-Essays
in Honour of Michael Joachim Bonell to Celebrate his 70 th Birthday 1 at 8, online:
<www.mondaq.com/pdf/clients/519934.pdf>.
128
See Recital 13 of the Rome 1 Regulation’s Preamble, parties can only make a to a non-state law “by
reference into the[ir] contract a non-State body of law or an international convention.”

131

Rome 1 Regulation can adopt the Principles or use it as a guide for the
interpretation of a choice of a non-state law, as contemplated by the preamble of the
Principles. Put more generally, can signatories to a Convention that does not allow
the choice of a non-state law adopt the Principles’ non-state law provision, even if
persuaded by the provision in the Principles? The answer is in the negative because
the Principles is a soft law that has no normative legal force to ensure compliance
like the Rome 1 Regulation.129 The Principles can only serve as a supplement when
there is no conflict between it and the Regulation.130 Indeed, in 2008, the European
Commission proposed non-state law provisions to the European Council and
parliament for inclusion in the Rome 1 Regulation but it was rejected in the final
draft.131 It is unsurprising that representatives from the European Union opposed
the choice of non-state law in the Principles “with vehemence.”132
5.5. The Scope of Article 3 of the Principles and its Relationship with other Soft
laws or Non-State Law – The PICC and the CISG
Assuming that countries under a treaty obligation are persuaded to adopt article 3 of
the Principles, the application of the Principles still raises some interpretational
issues that arise from its relationship with some soft laws and non-state laws –
PICC and CISG. This discussion argues that article 3, which makes provision for
non-state laws, sometimes poses a challenge to systematic application and
interpretation of the Principles with other soft laws and non-state laws—PICC and
CISG. Also, the Principles, when interpreted in the light of its article 3, poses
difficulty for determining the nature and scope of its provisions. This thesis
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proposes interpretations that avoid some of the difficulties that arise from the
Principles’ application.
5.5.1. The Problematic nature and Scope of the Principles
The introduction to the Principles states that parties and their legal advisors are part
of the envisaged users of the Principles.133 Does this mean that parties can choose
the Principles as a soft law? If article 3 permits the choice of a soft law, is this
provision not self-selecting of the Principles, which itself is soft law? A
commentator thinks that parties can opt into the Principles, like the CISG or PICC,
because the Principles is also soft law or non-state law.134 His reason is that the
Principles did not expressly foreclose parties from opting into it.135 This
interpretation arises from a principle that everything that is not forbidden is
permitted.136 But this may not necessarily be so because the Principles could be
interpreted by another statutory interpretation to the effect that the express mention
of a thing in a statute excludes the other (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
Since the Principles did not expressly allow parties to opt into it, parties should be
excluded from adopting it. Although the introduction to the Principles states that
legal advisers and parties are its envisaged users, the preamble, which sets out the
Principles’ application, did not extend its application or scope to adoption by
parties. Thus, the aim of the Principles is, through legal advice, to “guide” parties
in their contracts clauses (incorporation); it does not aim to be a party-selecting
governing law.
It may be argued that article 3 of the Principles contemplates that the
Principles should be a self-selecting rule for parties. Comment 3.10 of the
Principles requires that for a law to qualify as a non-state, such law must be used to
133
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solve “common contract problems in the international context.” It can, therefore, be
argued that since the Principles intends to solve common choice of law problems
that arise from international contracts, it qualifies as a non-state law that parties
may choose. This argument may not go too far because, generally, soft laws can be
classified into two– procedural and substantive transnational law.137 A procedural
soft law aims to process the differences between the national laws – rules of private
international law. It is a sort of transnational conflict of laws system, but a
substantive soft law seeks to harmonize the targeted body or area of law – rules of
law.138 Therefore, a soft law can be classified as “rules of law” or “rules of private
international law.” The PICC and the CISG are examples of rules of law, while the
Principles is an example of a rule of private international rule. In effect, since
article 3 only mentions “rules of law,” it impliedly excludes rules of private
international law – thereby preventing the Principles from self-selecting itself. In
fact, an earlier version of article 3 of the Principles explicitly stated that “parties
may also designate non-state private international law rules.”139 Since this provision
was removed in the final draft of the Principles, it forecloses the Principles from
becoming self-selecting.140
5.5.2. Does Article 6 (1) (a) of the Principles Contemplate that the Choice of a
Non-state law be applied to Putative Issues?
Article 6 (1) (a) of the Principles provides that “whether the parties have agreed to
a choice of law is determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to.”141 This
provision subjects the agreement on choice of law to the putative proper law. This
means that where one party challenges the existence of a choice of law agreement,
either through duress, misrepresentation or any other vitiating contract element,
reference must be made to the law to which the parties purportedly agreed. 142 It
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answers the “bootstrap” arguments discussed in chapter 2 on whether the validity of
a choice of law should be legally determined independently of parties’ choice.
The pertinent issue is whether reference to “law” in article 6 means
reference to a state law or a non-state law. This issue is important because parties,
through article 3, can solely choose a non-state law as the governing law of their
contract. In this instance, it may be argued that the non-state law is the putative law
of the contract. This argument may arise because the Principles does not clarify
when it refers to state laws as opposed to non-state laws. However, this thesis
argues that reference to a putative law in article 6 means a state law because the
commentary to article 6 did not refer to a non-state law.143 Even when the
Principles referred to the CISG, it treated it as a state law, and not as a soft law
instrument to be applied outside its intended geographical scope.144
This foregoing position is a plausible interpretation of article 6 (1) (a) of the
Principles because the determination of a putative law through a choice of non-state
law produces some problematic results.145 The application of non-state laws to
putative issues means that they will be applied outside their intended scope.146 The
PICC and CISG intend to answer substantive contract law questions; they do not
intend to primarily cover private international law issues.147 Although the PICC
makes provisions for validity and formation of an agreement, these provisions can
be excluded by parties.148 Thus, parties can exclude provisions of the PICC relating
to mistakes, impossibility of initial performance, and misrepresentation. 149 If parties
exclude these provisions, the PICC cannot accept a reference on putative issues
from the Principles.
The same scenario applies where the CISG is the chosen putative law. The
CISG expressly limits its application to matters relating to the “formation of the
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contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising
from such a contract.”150 It excludes questions relating to the validity of a
contract.151 The CISG, therefore, does not contemplate the resolution of conflict of
law issues especially on the choice of law.152 It has been noted that “any issue of
validity [of contract] ... falls outside the scope of the Convention and is governed
by the rules of the domestic jurisdiction whose law is otherwise applicable.”153 The
rationale is that validity issues usually reflect public policy issues that are peculiar
to each domestic legal system.154 Indeed, the CISG cannot accept the Principles’
reference to independently determine the validity of a choice of law because the
former is usually applied as part of the conflict of law rules of each forum state.155
The application of the CISG and PICC in putative decisions, therefore,
creates a sort of “renvoi” between the Principles and the non-state laws. For
example, while the Principles refer questions of validity of choice of law to the
CISG, the latter refers it back to the Principles as a private international law rule
because the CISG does not contain provisions that cater for this situation. This
reference may go on indefinitely if the two non-state laws are not “creatively”
interpreted.156
150
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The application of article 6(2) of the Principles may be a solution to these
“renvoi” cases.157 It provides that “the law of the State in which a party has its
establishment determines whether that party has consented to the choice of law if,
under the circumstances, it would not be reasonable to make that determination
under the law specified in paragraph 1.”158 This means that if it will be
“unreasonable” to determine the choice of law under the law referred to, the court
can resort to the law of the place of establishment of the party who seeks to impugn
consent. This article enjoins users of the Principles to consider both the
circumstance of the case, and the reasonableness of the law. There are two ways to
interpret this provision to solve “renvoi” cases.
First, it could be argued that Article 6(2) is inapplicable to situations where
the chosen non-state law does not contemplate its application in the first instance.
For Article 6(2) to apply, the non-state law must contain provisions that are
unreasonable or will lead to an absurd result.159 Since choice of law rules governing
choice of law agreements are absent or may be excluded in these non-state laws –
PICC and CISG – there is nothing that produces an unreasonable result. The second
interpretation takes into consideration both the circumstance of the reference and
the effect of the application of a non-state law. The Principles’ reference to nonstate law, which leads to a renvoi situation is, in itself, an unreasonable result that
needs gap-filling by state laws.160 This is because “reasonability” is a subjective
term that arises from different scenarios. This thesis prefers the latter argument
because it furthers the purpose of the Principles – to serve as a supplement for
national statutes and international instruments.
157
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(gap-filling) [Italics for emphasis]. See the Report of the Second Meeting of the Working Group on Choice
of Law in International Contracts (15-17 November 2010), online: <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/6580f1b886d2-4c74-bc79-b933ea0376cf.pdf>.
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However, to avoid difficulty in the interpretation and application of article 6
(1) (a) of the Principles, the Hague Conference should clearly define “law” in
subsequent amendments/reviews of the Principles. If the Hague Conference wishes
that non-state law should be applied to putative circumstances, this should be
explicitly stated.161 Also, article 6(2) could be amended to include situations where
it is impossible to determine the issues on validity of choice of law through a choice
of a non-state law. By this amendment, the renvoi situation is avoided because the
applicable law, in cases where non-state law is not applicable, will be the law of the
place of establishment of the party that seeks to challenge the choice of a law.
5.5.3. The Normative Relationship of the Principles with other Non-State Laws
The application of article 3 of the Principles raises normative issues with other soft
laws.162 The pertinent issue in this regard is whether the Principles, being soft law,
can empower the choice of another soft law.163 For example, the PICC
contemplates that parties might empower its application if they choose a forum’s
private international law rule. However, parties cannot choose through the
Principles because the Principles does not have any legal force like national private
international rules. Since the Principles and the PICC are both soft laws, the former
cannot empower, direct, or control the application of the latter. In effect, the
Principles and the PICC are in the same legal normative hierarchy. The Principles
can only empower the PICC if the states adopt the former. It is the national private
international rule that empowers the Principles to adopt another soft law.
The relationship between the Principles and the CISG is different from the
PICC because the CISG is a binding convention in contracting states.164 The CISG
is applicable when the rules of private international law lead to the application of
161

It should be noted that this will generate another level of argument on “private legislation” as stated by
Henry Beale. See generally, Joseph Henry Beale, “What Law Governs the Validity of Contract I” (1909)
23:1 Harv L Rev 1.
162
See generally, Marshall, supra note 104.
163
This argument assumes that parties can adopt the Principles.
164
The CISG is currently in force in 84 countries, including the United States, Canada, Russia, China,
Japan, most American states (except Brazil and Bolivia), Australia, Singapore, European Union Member
States (except The United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal and Malta), and Switzerland. See Graziano, supra
note 152 at 94 –5.
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the law of a contracting state.165 Clearly, this criterion does not contemplate soft
private international rules like the Principles; it only contemplates private
international law rules of countries.166 It is, therefore, impossible for the Principles
to control, empower, or direct the application of the CISG without the force of a
national private international law rule. Thus, the Principles must first be adopted by
countries, whether they are member states of the Hague Conference or not, before it
could control the application of the CISG. This is because the Principles – a soft
law – is lower in the legal normative hierarchy than the CISG – a hard law. Even if
the CISG is chosen as a soft law in non-contracting states – where it becomes soft
law – the Principles is still in the same legal normative hierarchy with CISG.
Therefore, it cannot control the application of the CISG.
In sum, it is difficult to argue that some envisaged users of the Principles –
parties and their legal advisers – can directly choose the Principles to control other
soft laws, either because they are in the same legal normative hierarchy or because
they outrank the Principles.
5.6. Conclusion
This discussion answers the question posed in this chapter in the negative, namely
that the Principles cannot effect uniformity in the scope of party autonomy.
Although scholars have expressed optimism for global acceptance of the
Principles,167 and, thus, a uniform scope of party autonomy, application of the
Principles raises a new set of problems or challenges which range from
acceptability to interpretational. This thesis showed the possible reluctance of both
the developed and developing countries to accept or adopt some provisions of the
Principles. The developing countries consider some of its provisions as lacking in
sensitivity to their fragile economies and colonial history. The developed countries
consider some of the Principles’ provisions (for example, article 3) as an invitation
to flout a treaty obligation. The Principles also face interpretational challenges.
165

This is not the only condition for its application. See the CISG, art 1.
Franco Ferrari, “PIL and CISG: Friends or Foes?” (2013) 31 JL & Com 43 at 58-59.
167
Symeonides supra note 34 at 899; Pertegás & Marshal supra note 28 at 1002. The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) endorsed the Principles in its Forty-Eight Session
at Vienna on 29 June – 16 July 2015.
166
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Though its provisions are explained through commentaries, it still encounters
interpretational challenges that face most soft laws. These challenges arise from the
ambiguity surrounding its scope as soft law, and its relationship with other soft and
non-state laws. These issues, if not addressed, may make the Principles redundant
as Klabbers has claimed.
The next chapter assesses the development of party autonomy so far, and
recommends possible solutions to the new challenges that arise from the
introduction of the Principles. The aim is to propose a better way to unify the scope
or limitation of party autonomy in most jurisdictions and to solve some of the
interpretational challenges identified in the discussion in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
6.1. Uniform Scope for Achieving Party Autonomy: Assessment
The universal recognition and development of party autonomy has been arduous
and long, but the determination of its scope has been more arduous. The scope of
party autonomy, as discussed in this thesis, still presents a global challenge for
regional legislative bodies, international organizations and actors, and private
international law scholars. As this thesis shows, various regional instruments have
championed the cause to unify the scope with little success. However, there appears
to be a new dawn with the Hague Conference’s approval of the global soft model
law – Principles on Choice of Law in International Commerce – that serves as a
code of best practices on party autonomy and its scope in international commercial
contracts. But, as this thesis shows, this instrument is not without its challenges,
especially because it is the first of its kind in international choice of law
instruments.
This thesis presented examples of sovereignty and interpretational
challenges to the application of the Principles. These challenges, which arise from
the divergent historical and economic backgrounds of countries, and the nature and
scope of the Principles itself, militate against the uniformity and certainty goals of
party autonomy in transnational trade or commerce. For instance, although
Paraguay has adopted the provisions of the Principles, this lone “success” must not
detract attention from the challenges that the Principles face. The question to be
answered is how the Hague Conference can solve or, at least, minimize the
challenges so as to achieve the Principles’ objective – global acceptance and
application of party autonomy and its scope.
The sovereignty of states is one of the reasons why the scope of party
autonomy still lacks global uniformity. As this thesis shows, states limit party
autonomy for various reasons. One reason, common to developing countries –
Latin America and Africa – is the protection of national economies/interests from
foreign exploitation. Countries in Latin America and Africa believe that allowing
contracting parties to choose the governing law, in some instances, gives foreign
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parties an opportunity to choose laws inimical to the interest of their economies.
As a result, these countries show little interest in international instruments that
permit wide application of party autonomy such as the Principles.1 Consequently,
these developing countries are barely conversant with the content and application
of instruments like the Principles.2 To remedy this situation, especially as it relates
to the Principles, the Hague Conference must create avenues to address this apathy
toward the Principles and to fill the information gap in order to interest developing
countries in its potential benefits.
The Hague Conference can create awareness for the Principles by literally
taking the Principles to the “doorsteps” of developing countries, especially
countries where party autonomy is not accepted or where it is fundamentally
restricted. This can be done by explaining the application of the Principles through
workshops and seminars that highlight the benefits of adopting it, and to allay the
fears associated with some of Principles’ provisions, and to suggest ways to better
apply its provisions. Already, the Principles have generated discussion from the
academy, but further discussion, especially from developing country scholars,, may
generate knowledge and improve awareness of the Principles.3 This may improve

1

Argentina is an example. See Department of International Law, Secretariat for Legal Affairs Organization
of American States, “The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts and
the Furtherance of its Principles in the Americas” (Paper prepared by the Department of International Law,
Secretariat for Legal Affairs Organization of American States, 15 March 2016) OEA/SG/DDI/doc. 3/16
[unpublished] at 21.
2
See José Antonio Moreno Rodriguez & María Mercedes Albornoz, “Reflections on the Mexico
Convention in the Context of the Preparation of the Future Hague Instrument on International Contracts”
(2011) 7:3 J Priv Intl L 491 at 493. E Hernández-Bretón is convinced that this is the case. See E
Hernández-Bretón, “La Convención de México (CIDIP V, 1994) como modelo para la actualización de los
sistemas nacionales de contratación internacional en América Latina” (2008) 9 DeCITA, derecho del
comercio internacional, temas y actualidades 170.
3
See e.g. Symeon C Symeonides, “The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts:
Some Preliminary Comments” (2013) 61:3 Am J Comp L 29 (he hopes for positive outcomes); see also
Andrew Dickinson, “A Principled Approach to Choice of Law in Contracts” (2013) Butterworths J Intl Ban
& Fin L 159; Thomas Kadner Graziano, “Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law Clause in Battle
of Forms Situations: The Hague Solution” (2013) 14 YB Priv Intl L 71; Brooke Adele Marshall,
“Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract” (2012) 13:1 Melb J Intl L 1; Moreno Rodriguez & M
Albornoz, “Reflections on the Mexico Convention in the Context of the Preparation of the Future Hague
Instrument on International Contract” (2011) 7:3 J Priv Intl L 491; Brooke Adele Marshall, ‘The Hague
Choice of Law Principles, CISG and PICC: A Hard Look at a Choice of Soft Law” Max Planck Private
Law Research Paper no 16/27 (2018) Am J Comp L 1(forthcoming); Júrgen Basedow, “The Hague
Principles on Choice of Law: Their Addressees and Impact” (2017) 22:2 Unif L Rev 304; Peter
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information for, among others, the Principles more generally, notwithstanding its
wide-ranging party autonomy provisions. Of course, as the experience with the
Mexico Convention shows,4 knowledge of the application of the Principles would
not necessarily translate into its global acceptance.
To make the Principles a universal, acceptable code of best practices on the
doctrine of party autonomy and its scope, the Hague Conference must, when
reviewing the Principles, consider some underlying factors of concern to the
developing countries. As discussed, the Principles did not, generally, take into
consideration the reality of unequal bargaining power in international contracts,
especially as it affects developing countries. Provisions in the Principles, especially
article 11 which subjects every choice of law agreement to public policy and the
operation of the mandatory laws of the forum and third states, are limited in their
application and, as a result, “they do not necessarily coincide with the need to
protect the weaker party.”5 If the Principles’ provisions are not reviewed to
generally protect against the adverse impacts of unequal bargaining power in
international contracts, it may be of no interest in developing countries that are
eager to protect their economies. Left in its current form, the Principles’ provisions,
especially in relation to unrestricted party autonomy, may expose developing
countries’ economies to threats from developed state parties or large multinational
corporations from developed countries.
The Hague Conference should take a cue from two regional instruments in
the inter-American sphere that make provisions for weak parties. If it does, it may
help developing countries to cease thinking of the Principles’ provisions as a
“disguised attempt to consecrate policies amenable to Western interests as rules of
universal validity.”6 Article 4 of the Buenos Aires Protocol on International
Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters provides that parties may choose a jurisdiction
Mankowski, “Article 3 of the Hague Principles: The Final Breakthrough for the Choice of Non-State
Law?” (2017) Unif L Rev 369.
4
Despite academic discussions on the scope and benefits of the Mexico Convention, only two countries are
signatories to it—Mexico and Venezuela.
5
See Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 141.
6
Hyder Razvi, “Mandatory Rules of Law in International Business Arbitration” (1998) 3:2 Lahore Journal
of Economics 35 at 58.
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“provided that [the] agreement has not been obtained abusively.”7 Also, article 1(d)
of the Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for
the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments provides that the forum choice is
valid “provided that such jurisdiction was not established in an abusive manner and
had a reasonable connection with the subject matter of the action.”8 These clauses
take into consideration the actual negotiating capacity of parties and the possible
abuse that arises from unrestricted party autonomy.9 These provisions are
recommended to the Hague Conference.
Article 11 of the Principles could also be amended by including a provision
that generally protects a weaker party as follows:

Notwithstanding the mandatory laws and public policy of
the forum state and a third state, the forum court shall
apply the law of the habitual residence of the weaker party
or parties with less bargaining power in cases where parties
have not really agreed on the choice of law or there is a
likelihood of abuse due to unequal bargaining power. Such
application may be raised by the weaker party or by the
court suo motu.
Apart from the issue on unequal bargaining power, the Principles’ proposal
for applying non-state laws (article 3) in international litigation proceedings merits
a review. This provision should be removed from the Principles because it does not
have any effect on the goals that the Principles seek to achieve as to the scope of
party autonomy – certainty, predictability and uniformity. It is difficult to imagine
how the proposal or the introduction of non-state laws in international commercial
litigation proceedings will ensure certainty or uniformity of party autonomy, as
most countries, except Paraguay and Venezuela, do not allow the choice of nonstate law. It is doubtful that article 3 of the Principles will be accepted in the
7

Buenos Aires Protocol on International Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters: MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC.
Nº 01/94. See also Cecilia Fresnedo de-Aguirre, “Party Autonomy- A Blank Cheque?” (2012) 17:4 Unif L
Rev 665 at 663 [Emphasis mine].
8
CIDIP-III, La Paz, 1984; see also Solari Barrandeguy, Pactos Procesales de La Paz, (1986) Montevideo,
Fundacion de Cultura Universitaria 50 quoted in de-Aguirre, supra note 7 at 663 [Emphasis mine].
9
Solari Barrandeguy, Pactos Procesales de La Paz, (1986) Montevideo, Fundaci6n de Cultura
Universitaria 50, quoted in de-Aguirre, ibid.
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European community, especially because a regional treaty – Rome 1 Regulation –
prohibits parties to choose a non-state law.

It also presents a big step for

developing countries that had, hitherto, not recognized party autonomy. Now, they
will not only recognize party autonomy but also recognize a non-state law. Of
course, the Principles, may be used by for interpretation of national statues, but is
this the best that the Principles can achieve?
So, how can the introduction of non-state law represent “international best
practice” in international commercial contracts as claimed by the Principles? It is
not clear to whom the introduction of non-state law represents best practices:
countries, or the Hague Conference’s Working Group. It is not the countries
because, since the Principles is a soft law, they did not negotiate on this provision.
The conditions of neutrality, general acceptance and the balanced nature of a nonstate law create another set of disputes on its own because these words are
ambiguous, resulting in uncertainty of decisions. Such a situation had hitherto been
absent from the application of non-state law, albeit, in arbitral proceedings. In
effect, instead of the Principles finding solutions to the existing divergence on the
scope of party autonomy, the application of non-state law creates a new set of
problems. Indeed, the introduction of this provision creates an unnecessary
distraction from other issues of party autonomy which require uniform application
in most jurisdictions.10 The Hague Conference may wish to draft a comprehensive
hard law instrument that will give states the opportunity to negotiate a non-state law
proposal, instead of experts’ proposal in a soft law.
The Hague Conference should also review interpretational challenges which
arise from the nature of the Principles and its relationship with other soft and nonstate law. For example, the Conference should negatively answer the question of
whether the Principles is a self-selecting rule for parties. Also, the relationship of
the Principles with other soft laws merits further review, especially where it is
impossible to solve conflict of law issues through reference to a putative soft law
10

Ralf Michaels agrees with this opinion. See Ralf Michaels, “Non-State Law in the Hague Principles on
Choice of Law in International Contracts” in K Purnhagen, Kai, Rott, Peter eds, Varieties of European Law
and Regulation: Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz (Gewerbestrasse, Switzerland: Springer International
Publishing, 2014) at 23 (“article 3 responds to a need that is not really there”).
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(article 6(1) (a)). In this case, article 6(2) could be amended to include situations
where it is impossible to determine the issues on validity of choice of law through a
choice of a non-state law. By this amendment, the renvoi situation is avoided
because the applicable law, in cases where non-state law is not applicable, will be
the law of the place of establishment of the party that seeks to challenge the choice
of a law.
In sum, the Principles could mean the beginning of a new dawn if the
Hague Conference on private international law accommodates some of the issues of
concern in the developing countries and also further expatiates on some of the
Principles’ provisions. However, this is not to boldly claim that total uniformity is
achievable once these issues are resolved. This is because of the peculiar
sovereignty challenges that constantly arises in private international law. As stated
in chapter 1, the role of scholars concerned with private international law is to
constantly seek common criteria through which cases that has foreign elements are
decided. Even if total uniformity may be unrealistic in private international law, we
must “substantially” seek uniform rules that do justice between private individuals
in transnational contract. For example, although the disparity of bargaining power
is a reality among states, the Hague Conference can make rules that minimize the
effect of such disparity, even if it may not be able to totally bridge it. The Hague
Conference may have acknowledged this in its provisions on mandatory rules and
public policy. However, these provisions are not enough to bridge such disparity
gap in unequal bargaining power of parties across jurisdictions. A general clause as
suggested in this subsection would mean that the effect of the disparity is
realistically considered.
6.2. General Conclusion
Transnational trade is a natural phenomenon in the world, just like sleeping, eating,
laughing, and crying are natural to human life.11 Party autonomy, which is a function

11

See Joseph M Perillo, “Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text
and a Review” (1994) 63:2 Fordham L Rev 281 at 281.
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of every legal system, is the freedom of contracting parties to choose a governing
law for their transnational trade contracts. Therefore, as a choice of law rule, party
autonomy would encourage transnational trade or commerce in the 21st century,
because if parties can choose the governing law of their contracts, business persons
who engage in trans-border trade are certain of their contractual choices and would
be encouraged to carry on business. Thus, it is, of interest for transnational trade that
there should be a global application and scope of party autonomy. In effect, if parties
in international contracts know when they are permitted to choose a governing law,
and to what extent such a choice is permissible, they will be eager to do business
with each other.
This thesis examined the history of party autonomy in four different regions:
Continental Europe, Anglo-America, Latin America, and Africa. The histories and
developments in party autonomy in these regions are uneven, influenced by varying
factors – scholarship in continental Europe; case law in Anglo-American society;
colonialism in Latin America and Africa with their resultant fragile economies. The
development of party autonomy in these regions was also characterized by
arguments for and against the doctrine. Some scholars argued that party autonomy is
the enthronement of the parties’ will within the ambit of the law, but other scholars
regard the doctrine as a license for contracting parties to perform a “legislative
act.”12 The latter, therefore, argue that party autonomy must be subject to the
sovereign power of a state through its legislation.
Notwithstanding the arguments against the doctrine, the rise of international
trade in the 20th century required most countries to recognize party autonomy.
Notwithstanding the recognition, some Latin American and African countries have
still not recognized party autonomy or fundamentally its scope, partly for reasons of
the late development of the doctrine in the regions, but mainly for the adverse
economic effects of their colonial experiences.
It is the case that the history of party autonomy cannot be isolated from other
choice of law rules. Consequently, arguments against party autonomy necessarily
12

Beale championed this cause. See generally Joseph Henry Beale, “What Law Governs the Validity of
Contract I” (1909) 23:1 Harv L Rev 1.
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feature arguments in favour of other choice of law rules. This thesis examined other
such rules, including the law of the place of contracting (lex loci contractus), law of
the place of performance (lex loci solutionis), law of the place that validates the
contract (lex validitatis), and the law of the place of domicile (lex domicilii). As
noted, these are all characterized by uncertainty and absurdity in their application.13
However, the application of the party autonomy rule (express intention) ensures
certainty and uniformity in choice of law decisions. The thesis argued that party
autonomy, because of its certainty and uniformity function in international
commerce, is the “least problematic” choice of law rule. Although courts still apply
other choice of law rules, they only resort to them in cases where parties have not
made an express choice of law.
However, as advantageous as the doctrine of party autonomy is to
international trade, to leave it unrestricted is to open it to abuse by parties with
superior bargaining power over those with less bargaining power. National laws,
therefore, restrict the scope of the doctrine to prevent or minimize this potential. In
other words, the sovereignty of states permits them to control the scope of party
autonomy for different reasons ranging from the economic to the political.
The comparative analysis of countries’ varying applications of the limitation
of party autonomy showed that the importance of party autonomy, certainty and
uniformity may be under threat because (1) party autonomy is essentially a
manifestation of national intent, rather than a matter of supranational recognition; (2)
absolute or unlimited party autonomy is almost impossible in any legal system; (3)
there are varying degrees or scope of party autonomy in different countries,
depending on which factors held sway, from the economic, through history, to the
religious; (4) the relative exceptions and expansion of the doctrine and constraints in
most jurisdictions challenge the realization of the uniform scope of party autonomy.
For the foregoing reasons, regional instruments, including the Rome 1
Regulation, the Mexico Convention, and the Montevideo Convention, have sought to
13

It should be noted that some scholars see these choice of law rules as express intentions of the parties
because the connecting factors for determining the rules are based on the actions or intentions of the
parties. For example, it is the parties’ action to execute a contract in a place that activates the lex loci
contractus rule.
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unify the scope of party autonomy. Notwithstanding that these conventions are hard
laws, the scope of party autonomy remains divergent around the world. One of the
reasons may be that these instruments, being regional instruments, concentrate on the
regional peculiarities of each enacting body. They have also been criticized as
lacking to cater for all conflict of laws situations and are sometimes, insensible to the
peculiar needs of countries. This accounts for low ratifications of some of the
instruments.14
To push uniformity forward, notwithstanding, the Hague Conference on
private international law developed an instrument that possesses characteristics
different from the existing regional hard law instruments on the subject, Principles
on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts. This soft law instrument
commands no obligation from states; it only serves as a model law for states to
adopt. It aims to solve the existing global challenge on party autonomy and its scope
that this thesis examined in chapter 4. For the first time in the history of a choice of
law instrument, this soft law seeks to make uniform provisions on the scope of party
autonomy, not just for courts but for arbitral proceedings. Some commentators have
expressed hope that if its provisions are globally adopted, it will eradicate or, at least,
reduce the challenges as to uniform scope of party autonomy.
But this thesis highlighted some challenges that may still confront the
Principles. These challenges arise from the uneven development of party autonomy
in the four regions examined in this thesis. The Hague Conference did not consider,
or neglected the interests of developing states in some of the provisions of the
Principles, especially articles 3 and 2(4) of which relate to the introduction of nonstate laws, and an unrestricted party autonomy, respectively. Although the Principles
exclude consumer and employment contracts from its scope, developing countries
may still feel threatened by provisions that give wide latitude to parties to choose
any governing law in their international contracts, simply for reason of economic
power disparities that favour the developed countries, and/or their multinational
companies.

14

As noted in Footnote 4.
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Article 11 of the Principles which provides that parties shall not derogate
from the application of mandatory statutes or the public policy of the forum or third
state, is not enough to prevent the abuse of party autonomy. This is because it makes
the mandatory law of a third state discretionary and a matter of interpretation for the
forum court. Moreover, article 11 does not cover the provisions of localised laws that
most developing countries enact to protect their residents and national economies. A
forum court can, therefore, refuse the application of a third state’s mandatory law,
either because it does not consider it to be mandatory, or because it does not
recognize its localized law. To this extent, the Principles may not command global
adoption, especially in some developing countries.
The Principles’ proposal of non-state law in its article 3 in national courts
may also be a step too far in a soft law. Although Paraguay has recognized the
application of non-state laws in its national courts, non-state laws have been rejected
by most jurisdictions. One reason for its rejection, especially in Africa, is that most
African countries were not part of organizations that drafted some soft laws, and so,
their interests were not represented in them. A likely reason for its rejection in
continental Europe is that a hard law – the Rome 1 Regulation prohibits the
application of soft laws in national courts to resolve in disputes arising from
international contracts. The best possible way to introduce a non-state law in
international commercial litigation is through a hard law, where states have the
opportunity to negotiate the application and scope of such a law.
The Principles’ conditions for the application of a non-state law, which relate
to acceptance and the neutral and balanced nature of the non-state law, also create
difficult interpretational hurdles for parties and national courts to cross for reasons of
their ambiguity, creating another set of interpretational disputes. Parties and national
courts may interpret the conditions differently, such that certainty and uniformity in
the application of non-state laws are lost both in international commercial litigation
and arbitration proceedings. This, in turn, creates uncertainty in the enforcement of
judgments decided on a non-state law because the application of a non-state law may
be against the enforcing country’s public policy.
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Apart from the neglect of national values in some developing countries
and the controversial introduction of non-state laws in international commercial
litigation proceedings, the nature of the Principles and its application, just like other
soft laws, creates further interpretational issues. The Principles shares a similar
legislative approach with other soft laws, especially UNCITRAL’s Principles of
International Commercial Contracts. However, its application is different from
them. Other soft laws regulate the substantive contract terms in specific contract
situations – rules of law. In contrast, the Principles regulates only the choice of law
as it relates to party autonomy – rules of private international law. Therefore, since
party autonomy is a function of national private international rules, parties cannot
adopt or choose the Principles as the governing law in their contracts, like other soft
laws. They can, however, incorporate its provisions into their contracts. In effect,
although the Principles shares the characteristics of other soft laws, it is different in
application.
Finally, on the international legislative hierarchy, the Principles possess no
legal normative force, just like other soft laws. Thus, it cannot empower the choice
of another soft or hard law because it does not possess the legal normative power to
do so. Its provisions must, therefore, remain persuasive to its envisaged users.
Consequently, reference to other soft or hard laws in the Principles is subject to
national private international law rules. This is more so because reference to other
soft laws, sometimes, produces unintended results because the latter does not
contemplate such reference or even refers the issues back to private international law
rules.
In sum, the Hague Conference’s introduction of the Principles as a soft
choice of law instrument constitutes a step in the right direction to unify the scope of
party autonomy. However, the Principles face acceptance and interpretational
challenges in its application to international commercial contracts. It is, therefore,
too early to think that a new dawn on the uniform scope of party autonomy has
arrived.
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